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Introduction 
Theodore: Cause you seem like a person, but you’re just a voice in a computer. 
Samantha: I can understand how the limited perspective of an un-artificial mind 
would perceive it that way. You’ll get used to it.1 
Can robots have rights? This question has inspired significant debate among phi-
losophers, computer scientists, policymakers, and the popular press. However, 
much of the discussion surrounding this issue has been conducted in the limited 
quarters of disciplinary silos and without a fuller appreciation of important macro-
level developments. I argue that the so-called “machine question” (Gunkel, 2012, 
p. x), specifically the inquiry into whether and to what extent intelligent machines 
might warrant moral (or perhaps legal) consideration, deserves extended analysis 
in light of these developments. 
Two global trends seem to be on a collision course. On the one hand, robots 
are becoming increasingly human-like in their appearance and behavior. Sophia, 
a female-looking humanoid robot created by Hong Kong–based Hanson Robotics 
(Hi, I Am Sophia…, 2019), serves as a prime example. In 2017, Sophia captured 
the world’s imagination (and drew substantial ire as well) when the robot was 
granted “a citizenship” by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Hatmaker, 2017). While 
this move was criticized as a “careful piece of marketing” (British Council, n.d.), 
“eroding human rights” (Hart, 2018), and “obviously bullshit” (J. Bryson quoted 
in Vincent, 2017), it elevated the idea that robots might be eligible for certain 
types of legal status based on how they look and act. Despite the controversy 
surrounding Sophia and calls to temper the quest for human-like appearance, the 
degree to which robots are designed to emulate humans is only likely to increase 
in the future, be it for reasons related to improved functioning in social environ-
ments or the hubris of roboticists. 
On the other hand, legal systems around the world are increasingly recogniz-
ing the rights of nonhuman entities. The adoption of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution 






chapter to the rights of nature (RoN) (Ecuador Const., tit. II, ch. 7). Courts and 
legislatures different corners of the globe have similarly identified rights held by 
nonhumans—the Whanganui River in New Zealand, the Ganges and its tributaries 
in India, the Atrato River in Colombia, and Mother Nature herself (Pachamama) 
in Ecuador (Cano-Pecharroman, 2018). In the United States, nearly 100 municipal 
ordinances invoking the RoN have been passed or pending since 2006 (Kauffman 
& Martin, 2018, p. 43). Many more efforts to legalize the RoN are afoot at the 
subnational, national, and international levels (Global Alliance for the Rights of 
Nature, 2019). All of this is happening in tandem with legal efforts seeking to pro-
tect animals under the argument that they, too, possess rights. While animal rights 
litigation has not had much success in the United States (Vayr, 2017, p. 849), it 
has obtained a few victories in Argentina, Colombia, and India (Peters, 2018, p. 
356). These worldwide movements cast doubt on the idea that humans are the 
only class of legal subjects worthy of rights. 
These trends speak to two existential crises facing humanity. First, the rise 
of robots in society calls into question the place of humans in the workforce and 
what it means to be human. By 2016, there were approximately 1.7 million robots 
working in industrial capacities and over 27 million robots deployed in profes-
sional and personal service roles, translating to around one robot per 250 people 
on the planet (van Oers & Wesselman, 2016, p. 5). The presence of robots is only 
likely to increase in the future, especially in service industries where physical 
work is structured and repetitive (Lambert & Cone, 2019, p. 6). Half of all jobs in 
the global economy are susceptible to automation, many of which may involve the 
use of robots designed to augment or replace human effort (Manyika et al., 2017, 
p. 5). In Japan, a labor shortage is driving businesses to utilize robots in occupa-
tions once the sole domain of humans, especially where jobs entail physically 
demanding tasks (Suzuki, 2019). The country’s aging population is also acceler-
ating the demand for robot assistance in elderly care (Foster, 2018). Some have 
questioned whether robots will come to replace humans in numerous fields such 
as, inter alia, agriculture (Jordan, 2018), journalism (Tures, 2019), manufacturing 
(Manyika et al., 2017), and medicine (Kocher & Emanuel, 2019). Others have 
argued that robots have and will continue to complement, not supplant, humans 
(Diamond, Jr., 2018). 
The forward march to automate tasks currently assigned to humans for reasons 
related to economic efficiency, personal safety, corporate liability, and societal 
need is proceeding apace, while the ramifications of this shift are only beginning 
to be explored. One recent article suggests that the results of the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election may have been influenced to a non-trivial extent by the presence 
of industrial robots in certain labor markets (Frey et al., 2018). On a more philo-
sophical level, advancements in technology, especially in the areas of artificial 
intelligence (AI) and robotics, have elicited discussions about the fundamental 
characteristics that define humans and the extent to which it might be possible 
to replicate them in synthetic form. What is it that makes humans special? Our 
intelligence? Memory? Consciousness? Capacity for empathy? Culture? If these 






algorithms, and if technology proceeds to the point where nonhuman entities 
are indistinguishable from their human counterparts, will this lead to the kind of 
destabilizing paradigm shift that occurred when Galileo confirmed the heliocen-
tric theory of the universe? 
Second, climate change threatens the existence of entire communities and 
invites reflection about the relationship between humans and nature. Despite the 
hope inspired by the widespread adoption of the Paris Climate Accord, recent 
estimates of the impact of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the 
international agreement show that the world is on track to experience warming 
in excess of 3°C by 2100 (Climate Analytics, Ecofys and NewClimate Institute, 
2018), a number well above the global goal of containing the rise in temperature 
to only 1.5°C. At the current rate of increasing temperatures, the planet is likely to 
reach the 1.5°C threshold between 2030 and 2052, with attendant impacts includ-
ing sea-level rise, biodiversity loss, ocean acidification, and climate-related risks 
to agricultural or coastal livelihoods, food security, human health, and the water 
supply (IPCC, 2018). As such, climate change presents a clear and present danger 
not only to physical assets like lands and homes, but also to social institutions 
such as histories and cultures (Davies et al., 2017). 
Acknowledgment of a changing climate and the degree to which it has been 
exacerbated by human activities has given rise to the idea that the Earth has 
transitioned from the Holocene to a new geological epoch—the Anthropocene 
(Crutzen, 2002; Zalasiewicz et al., 2007). Although some have taken issue with 
this proposal on the grounds that it masks the underlying causes responsible for 
the environmental changes observed (Haraway, 2015; Demos, 2017), others have 
found the concept useful for exploring the limitations of current systems and 
probing the boundaries of nature itself (Dodsworth, 2018). On the former point, 
Kotzé and Kim (2019) argue that the Anthropocene 
allows for an opening up of hitherto prohibitive epistemic “closures” in the 
law, of legal discourse more generally, and of the world order that the law 
operatively seeks to maintain, to a range of other understandings of, and cog-
nitive frameworks for, global environmental change. 
(p. 3) 
In this sense, the pronouncement of a new geological era offers an opportunity for 
critical examination of the law and how it might be reconceived to address the com-
plex problems caused by industrialization. On the latter point, the Anthropocene 
renders human encounters with the natural world uncertain (Purdy, 2015, p. 230). 
It suggests the “hybridization of nature, as it becomes less and less autonomous 
with respect to human actions and social processes. To sustain a clear separation 
between these two realms is now more difficult than ever” (Arias-Maldonado, 
2019, p. 51). More specifically, the Anthropocene presents a serious challenge to 
Cartesian dualism by rejecting ontological divisions in favor of a single, Latourian 
“flat” ontology defined by ongoing material processes, not static states of being 





















part of nature and act upon it (Dodsworth, 2018, p. 36). As a result, the boundary 
between humans and nonhumans has effectively collapsed. 
The two trends—the development of machines made to look and act increas-
ingly like humans, and the movement to recognize the legal rights of nonhuman
“natural” entities—along with the two existential crises—the increasing presence
of robots in work and social arenas, and the consequences of climate change
and acknowledgment of humanity’s role in altering the “natural” environment— 
lead us to revisit the question that is the focus of this book: under what condi-
tions might robots be eligible for rights? Of course, a more appropriately tailored
formulation might be—under what conditions might some robots be eligible for
moral or legal rights? These italicized qualifications will prove important to the
discussion in Chapter Two regarding the relationship between personhood and
rights, and the interdisciplinary framework I put forth in Chapter Five that seeks
to respond to the central question motivating this study. But before arriving at
these key destinations, we need to first develop a common understanding about
the kind(s) of technology relevant to the philosophical and legal analysis under-
taken here. 
Defining key terms 
The word robot first entered the popular lexicon in Karel Čapek’s 1921 play 
R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots) (Čapek, 2004). Čapek based the term on 
the Czech word robota, which means “obligatory work” (Hornyak, 2006, p. 33). 
Interestingly, Rossum’s robots were not machines at all, but rather synthetic 
humans (Moran, 2007). Today, however, robots have become almost univer-
sally associated with nonhuman machines. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), for example, defines a “robot” as an “actuated mechanism 
programmable in two or more axes … with a degree of autonomy …, moving 
within its environment, to perform intended tasks” that is further classified as 
either industrial or service “according to its intended application” (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2012). 
But this technical definition arguably fails to fully encapsulate the range of 
entities recognized as robots.2 The “degree of autonomy” is perhaps ironic given 
the original definition’s emphasis on servitude, and the performance of “intended 
tasks” seems to place a direct limit on the ability of a machine to act according to 
its own volition. Further, the ISO definition lacks any consideration of a robot’s 
particular physical appearance or form. Winfield (2012) offers a more multifac-
eted definition that identifies robots according to their capabilities and form: 
A robot is: 
1. an artificial device that can sense its environment and purposefully act on 
or in that environment; 
2. an embodied artificial intelligence; or 











The two elements coursing through this definition—capabilities and form—map 
nicely onto the debate over the machine question. Here we have three different 
capabilities—sensing, acting, and working autonomously—and three different 
forms—a device, an embodied AI, and a machine. As such, Winfield’s concep-
tualization covers everything from a companion robot for the elderly to a mobile 
phone running an AI-based assistant to an industrial arm at a manufacturing facil-
ity. Later in his book, he fleshes out what he refers to as a “loose taxonomy” based 
on “generally accepted terms for classifying robots” (Winfield, 2012, p. 37). This 
classification system proposes six categories—mobility (fixed or mobile), how 
operated (tele-operated or autonomous), shape (anthropomorph, zoomorph, or 
mechanoid), human–robot interactivity, learning (fixed or adaptive), and applica-
tion (industrial or service). As we shall see, several of these categories prove use-
ful in distinguishing the types of robots that might warrant moral consideration. 
But before proceeding, two other important terms must be adequately defined. 
First, what is an android, and how does it differ from a robot? The answer depends 
on the person responding to the question. For some in the science fiction com-
munity, android refers to “an artificial human of organic substance” (Stableford 
& Clute, 2019). This conceptualization resonates with Rossum’s notion of robots, 
who were essentially humans grown in vats, but it could also apply to other popu-
lar examples such as Frankenstein’s monster, or beings constructed out of the 
remains of past humans. For others, such as notable roboticist Hiroshi Ishiguro, 
androids are simply “very humanlike robot[s]” (Ishiguro, 2006, p. 320). Perhaps 
one of the more famous androids under this interpretation of the term is the char-
acter Data from the futuristic science–fiction television series Star Trek: The Next 
Generation. Thus, the definition of android seems to primarily revolve around the 
kind of materials constituting an entity, not its outward appearance. For the pur-
poses of this book, android will refer to a synthetically produced human consisting 
of organic material, whereas humanoid will refer to a robot made of mechanical 
parts that is human-like in appearance (i.e., anthropomorphic in shape). 
Second, what is AI? To be clear, as in the cases of robot and android, there 
is no consensus regarding the exact definition of AI. One group of definitions 
focuses on AI as a field of study. For instance, one author writes that AI is “a theo-
retical psychology … that seeks to discover the nature of the versatility and power 
of the human mind by constructing computer models of intellectual performance 
in a widening variety of cognitive domains” (Wagman, 1999, p. xiii). A panel of 
experts similarly conceives of AI as “a branch of computer science that studies the 
properties of intelligence by synthesizing intelligence” (Stone et al., 2016, p. 13). 
In bluntly practical terms, another scholar refers to AI as “the science of get-
ting machines to perform jobs that normally require intelligence and judgment” 
(Lycan, 2008, p. 342). As an area of academic inquiry, AI comprises six disci-
plines—natural language processing, knowledge representation, automated rea-
soning, machine learning, computer vision, and robotics (Russell & Norvig, 2010, 
pp. 2–3). Importantly, robotics is seen as a discipline falling under the umbrella 











A second (but related) group of AI definitions concerns the standards by 
which machines are adjudged to successfully approximate certain processes or 
behaviors. This group is further subdivided into definitions focused on the kind 
of process or behavior under scrutiny (i.e., thinking or acting) and the source 
of the standard being applied (i.e., human or rational) (Russell & Norvig, 2010,
p. 1). Central to all of these definitions is the use of some kind of intelligence to 
accomplish certain tasks and an artefact (i.e., computer) that serves as the physi-
cal vehicle for the expression of intelligence. Notably, intelligence need not be 
determined by the extent to which an entity sufficiently emulates human reason-
ing; it can be compared against a measure of ideal performance. Although, like 
AI, intelligence has many definitions, one version of the concept that speaks to its 
application in computer science is “the ability to make appropriate generalizations 
in a timely fashion based on limited data. The broader the domain of application, 
the quicker conclusions are drawn with minimal information, the more intelligent 
the behavior” (Kaplan, 2016, pp. 5–6). 
Generally speaking, experts distinguish between two types of AI—weak and 
strong. These types vary according to the degree to which artificial forms of 
intelligence prove capable of accomplishing complex tasks and the computer’s 
ontological status based on the authenticity of its performance. In weak AI, the 
computer is “a system [designed] to achieve a certain stipulated goal or set of 
goals, in a manner or using techniques which qualify as intelligent” (Turner, 2019, 
p. 6). In strong AI, “computers given the right programs can be literally said to 
understand and have other cognitive states” (Searle, 1990, p. 67). In the former 
approach, the computer is merely a tool that generates the external appearance 
of intelligence; in the latter, the computer is an actual mind possessing its own 
internal states. 
The weak versus strong AI debate hinges on whether computers simulate or 
duplicate mental states like those experienced by humans. Under a functionalist 
theory, engaging in processes like the manipulation of formal symbols is equiva-
lent to thinking. In this account, mental states can be duplicated by a computer. 
Under a biological naturalist theory, on the other hand, there is something caus-
ally significant about processing information in an organic structure like the brain 
that makes thinking more than a sequence of translational tasks. Using this line of 
reasoning, at best, computers can only simulate mental states (Russell & Norvig, 
2010, p. 954). 
While René Descartes is credited with having been the first to consider whether 
machines could think (Solum, 1992, p. 1234), perhaps the most well-known illus-
trations of the extent to which computers might be able to demonstrate authentic 
intelligence were proposed by Alan Turing and John Searle. In Turing’s (1950) 
imitation game, a human interrogator attempts to decipher the sex of two other 
players (one man and one woman), who are located in a separate room, by ask-
ing them a series of probing questions. Responses are then written and passed 
from one room to the other or communicated by an intermediary so as to avoid 
inadvertently compromising the game. The goal of the other players is to cause 










then enquires about what would happen if a machine took the place of the man. 
He concludes that if a machine was able to successfully deceive the interrogator 
as often as a real human could, this would demonstrate that machines are effec-
tively capable of thinking. This thought experiment thus suggests that behavior 
realistic enough to be indistinguishable from that exhibited by an organic person 
is functionally equivalent to the kind of thinking that we normally associate with 
humans. 
As a rejoinder to Turing’s test, Searle (1980) presented the “Chinese Room” 
argument (McGrath, 2011, p. 134). In this thought experiment, Searle imagines 
himself locked in a room where he receives a large amount of Chinese writing. 
Searle admittedly does not know any Chinese. He then receives a second delivery 
of Chinese writing, only this time it includes instructions in English (his mother 
tongue) for matching the characters in this batch with characters from the first 
batch. Finally, Searle obtains a third document written in Chinese that includes 
English language instructions on how to use the present batch to interpret and 
respond to characters in the previous two. After these exchanges, Searle also 
receives stories and accompanying questions in English, which he answers all too 
easily. Through multiple iterations involving the interpretation of Chinese char-
acters, along with receipt of continuously improved instructions written by people 
outside the room, Searle’s responses are considered indistinguishable from those 
of someone fluent in Chinese and just as good as his answers to the questions in 
English. 
The important difference between the two tasks, according to Searle, is that he 
fully understands the English questions to begin with, while his responses to the 
Chinese questions are merely the product of mechanical symbol interpretation. 
This argument, contra Turing’s, suggests that thinking requires more than execut-
ing tasks with high fidelity to a well-written program. Instead, thinking involves 
“intentionality,” which is “that feature of certain mental states by which they 
are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world” (Searle, 2008,
p. 333). It’s not enough that inputs lead to the appropriate outputs; in order to 
qualify as being capable of thinking, a machine would need to possess mental 
states of its own that can be directed externally. Interestingly, Searle considers 
humans, by virtue of their capacity for intentionality, to be precisely the kind of 
machines one might accurately characterize as intelligent. 
The present study is less concerned with resolving controversies regarding the 
definition of first-order concepts pertinent to AI and more interested in under-
standing how AI figures into the debate over which entities are deemed worthy of 
moral or legal consideration and, possibly, rights. Therefore, this book privileges 
definitions of AI that apply some standard of intelligence (be it human or ideal) 
to the processes or behaviors of technological artefacts. Although this approach 
might appear to sidestep the task of tethering the argument to a single, identifi-
able definition of AI, the reasons for doing so will become clear in the course of 
articulating a framework capable of assessing an entity’s eligibility for rights. 
However, given that robotics is a discipline within the academic enterprise of AI, 





















moral or legal status can be ascribed, presenting a definition of robot seems wise, 
if not essential. Therefore, for the purposes of this book, the term robot will apply 
to those nonhuman mechanical entities that operate under some form of AI and 
vary in capabilities and form according to mobility, how operated, shape, human– 
robot interactivity, learning, and application.3 
A note on methodology 
As a decidedly interdisciplinary endeavor, the quest to assess the eligibility of 
robots for certain rights beckons a methodological approach capable of provid-
ing insights from the page to the sage to the stage. In this spirit, the present text 
utilizes a range of qualitative methods, including philosophical analysis, com-
parative case studies, and structured interviews with robotics experts. During field 
work conducted in Tokyo, Japan, over the span of two weeks in August 2019, I 
completed six interviews with individuals in academia and the private sector. Two 
additional interviewees submitted responses to the questionnaire via email. Given 
the limited duration of my stay in Japan and the low number of study participants, 
I remain circumspect about drawing any definitive conclusions from these efforts. 
However, I do supplement the philosophical and legal analyses contained herein 
with occasional insights obtained through these interviews when appropriate. By 
attempting even a modestly multi-method project such as this one, I hope to illus-
trate the usefulness of applying “triangulation” (Jick, 1979, p. 602) to the study of 
roboethics, and encourage others to follow suit. 
Contributions 
This book makes three contributions to the study of rights in an era of great
technological and environmental change. First, I offer fresh analyses intended
to inform an answer to the machine question by drawing upon lessons from ani-
mal and environmental law. To date, a few scholars have written briefly about
how developments in the RoN movement might influence the debate over robot
rights (i.e., Gunkel, 2012; Torrance, 2013; Bryson et al., 2017; Turner, 2019).
Some have also noted similarities between the machine question and the ques-
tion as to whether or not animals should have rights (i.e., Coeckelbergh, 2011;
Gunkel, 2012; Marx & Tiefensee, 2015; Hogan, 2017). However, none of the
works listed above provides an extended analysis that examines both theory and
practice regarding animal rights and the RoN. In addition, literature on the RoN
has been curiously silent on the status of artefactual entities like robots. This
book seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by bringing them into constructive
dialogue with one another. Second, I present a new, multi-spectral framework
for evaluating the conditions under which nonhuman entities might qualify for
different forms of personhood, a precursor to rights. Bringing together hereto-
fore disparate concepts and empirical evidence from anthropology, law, ethics,
philosophy, and robotics, this tool offers academics, activists, judges, lawyers,











intelligent machines might possess personhood(s). Third, I describe core tenets
of a critical environmental ethic open to moral and legal recognition of nonhu-
man entities. This ethic derives inspiration from contemporary paradigm shifts
observed across several disciplines, including the Anthropocene turn in philoso-
phy (Arias-Maldonado, 2019), the materialist turn in the humanities and social
sciences (Choat, 2017), the ontological turn in environmental law (Vermeylen,
2017), the relational turn in ethics (Coeckelbergh, 2010), and the relational turn in
robotics (Jones, 2013). In so doing, I flesh out the practical implications of shift-
ing to a “kincentric” (Salmón, 2000) and “posthuman” (Arvidsson, 2020, p. 123)
ecological orientation. 
Layout of the book 
The remainder of the book proceeds as follows. In Chapter One, I review the 
literature on the moral status of robots. Scholars writing on this subject mainly 
fall into two camps—one focusing on the properties of an entity and the extent to 
which such properties qualify an entity as morally significant, and another empha-
sizing an entity’s relations with humans or the larger socio-ecological context in 
which it operates. I close by elucidating the oversights and shortcomings of this 
debate, which include an inattention to the relationship between key terms and 
concepts (i.e., moral rights and legal rights), a blindness to (pro-Western) cultural 
biases that shape some of the arguments, and the inherent difficulty of addressing 
robot rights from within a single disciplinary silo (i.e., philosophical or legal). 
In Chapter Two, I clarify the relationship between the muddled array of con-
cepts central to the machine question that serve to justify or invalidate the basis 
for the possession of rights. In particular, I explain how aspects of the properties 
and relations approaches map onto different personhoods, statuses, and incidents. 
I also explore how theories of rights relate to the aforementioned approaches in an 
effort to distinguish alternate pathways to justifying the extension of rights. The 
purpose here is to disentangle the web of cross-listed terms and explicate defensi-
ble connections between them in order to provide a clear conceptual scheme that 
undergirds the framework presented later. 
In Chapter Three, I examine the ways in which philosophical literature and 
case law on animal rights inform the discussion of rights for robots. I chroni-
cle and analyze discussions about animal rights appearing in religious doctrine, 
Enlightenment thinking, philosophical treatises on animal ethics, and innovative 
legal theory. I also review the trials and tribulations of legal efforts to protect 
animal rights in courts across the United States, India, Argentina, and Colombia. 
From the foregoing evidence, I argue that relational approaches to animal rights 
present the strongest basis for affording animals enhanced protection, and that the 
success of animal rights appeals is highly context-dependent at present. I close by 
enumerating the conditions under which the animal rights model might advance 
the development of robot rights, including empirical verification of the presence 
of ontological properties, societal need for nonhuman personhood, and openness 





   






In Chapter Four, I detail how scholarship from environmental ethics, law, and 
philosophy, along with recent cases pertaining to the RoN, might provide a basis 
for extending rights to nonhuman entities. While environmental ethicists propose 
that the environment should be interpreted broadly to include all forms of life, 
analysts writing on critical environmental law, law in the Anthropocene, and New 
Materialism seek to disrupt conventional ideas about nature and agency, suggest-
ing bolder imaginaries. I argue that the collapse of the human/nonhuman binary 
opens up the possibility of expanding the scope of rights. Next, I demonstrate 
how rights have already been extended to natural nonhuman entities under the 
auspices of the RoN, which have been adjudicated successfully in courts within 
Colombia, Ecuador, and India. Finally, from the foregoing evidence, I extract 
elements of a critical, Anthropocene-informed environmental law that support 
further widening of the concept of rights to include artefactual nonhuman entities, 
such as robots. 
In Chapter Five, I stitch together insights from the preceding chapters to argue 
that rights can indeed be extended to robots. First, I return to the concepts defined 
and mapped out in Chapter Two. After considering the individual merits of specific 
properties or mechanisms, I demonstrate how both moral and legal personhoods/ 
statuses/rights emerge from interactions between the two. As such, I contend that 
any solution to the machine question must necessarily take into account a combi-
nation of factors. Second, I probe the extent to which lessons from literature and 
litigation on animal rights translate to the context of robots. I find that the animal 
rights model illuminates important questions pertinent to the extension of rights to 
any nonhumans even if it does not supply the answers. Third, I argue that a criti-
cal, materialist, and broadly ecological interpretation of the environment, along 
with decisions by jurists establishing or upholding the RoN, support extension 
of such rights to nonhuman entities like robots. Fourth, I present a multi-spectral 
framework that can be used to assess whether or not different forms of technology 
(i.e., AI, algorithms, drones, robots, etc.) might be entitled to different types of 
personhood. Fifth, I suggest a praxis-oriented, critically inspired ethic that offers 
protective cover to intelligent machines. Sixth, I demonstrate the applicability 
of the aforementioned framework and ethic to hypothetical scenarios involving 
zoomorphic robot companions and anthropomorphic sex robots. Seventh, I close 
by suggesting areas for further research. 
Notes 
1 Scene from the film Her (Written and Directed by Spike Jonze, 2013, printed with
permission from Annapurna Pictures). 
2 As Gunkel (2018) explains, the term robot does not denote “some rigorously defined,
singular kind of thing that exists in a vacuum. What is called ‘robot’ is something that
is socially negotiated … Its context (or contexts, because they are always plural and
multifaceted) is as important as its technical components and characterizations” (p. 23). 
3 Throughout this book, I use the terms intelligent machines, intelligent artefacts, artifi-
cial agents, AI, and robots interchangeably, notwithstanding certain qualifiers used in 
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1 Rights for robots 
Making sense of the machine question 
Sometimes I Forget You’re a Robot 
(Sam Brown, 2013) 
Most of the literature on the ethical dimensions of robots concerns at least one of 
the five following areas: (1) human actions completed through the use of robots, (2) 
the moral standing of robots, (3) the behavior of robots, (4) the ethical implications 
of introducing robots into social or occupational spaces, and (5) self-reflection by 
scholars regarding the impact of robots on their field of study (Steinert, 2014, p. 
250). In this book, I am primarily interested in contributing to the second area of 
inquiry listed above (along with its analog in the legal domain), although this is not 
to diminish the importance of any of the other ethical issues raised by robots and 
their application in human endeavors. For instance, there is exciting and important 
research being conducted on the ethics of drone warfare (i.e., Enemark, 2013), 
how robots deployed in nursing homes act towards the elderly (i.e., Sharkey & 
Sharkey, 2012), the effects of using robots in the classroom on teachers and chil-
dren (i.e., Serholt et al., 2017), ethical considerations in the design of robots used 
for love or sex (i.e., Sullins, 2012), and the ethical conduct of scholars working 
on human–robot interaction (HRI) (i.e., Riek & Howard, 2014). The point here is 
that the discussion regarding the field of “roboethics” (Veruggio & Operto, 2006,
p. 4) is far more complicated and multi-faceted than is suggested by the narrow 
slice entertained in this work. We have come a long way from Asimov’s (1942) 
three laws of robotics, which exclusively prescribed ethical directives intended to 
govern robot behavior. 
The present text focuses on the moral and legal standing of robots, and seeks to 
develop a response to the following question—can robots have rights? This line 
of inquiry necessarily entails five separate, albeit related, sub-questions: 
(i) Which kinds of robots deserve rights? (ii) Which kinds of rights do these 
(qualifying) robots deserve? (iii) Which criterion, or cluster of criteria, would 
be essential for determining when a robot could qualify for rights? (iv) Does a 
robot need to satisfy the conditions for (moral) agency in order to qualify for 











16 Rights for robots
of robots may qualify for some level of moral consideration, which kind of 
rationale would be considered adequate for defending that view? 
(Tavani, 2018, p. 1; emphasis in original) 
Throughout this work, each of these sub-questions will be answered to some 
extent. As advance warning, more effort will be expended to identify the kinds 
of robots that might deserve rights, establish the criterion for determining rights 
eligibility, assess the importance of agency in the calculation of moral considera-
tion, and explain the rationale invoked to support the preceding arguments than to 
itemize specific rights that might be bestowed upon robots. 
Framing the debate: Properties versus relations 
Broadly speaking, ethicists, philosophers, and legal scholars have extensively 
debated the answer to the machine question, with some finding that robots might 
qualify for rights and others rejecting the possibility on jurisprudential, norma-
tive, or practical grounds. Both sides of the debate frame their positions chiefly 
in terms of either the properties of an intelligent machine or its relationship to 
other entities (Tavani, 2018, p. 2). This division has its roots in the philosophical 
concept known as the is/ought problem, articulated by Hume (1738/1980) in A 
Treatise of Human Nature. The problem, so to speak, occurs when a value-laden 
statement masquerades as a fact-based one; we treat something a certain way by 
virtue of how we think it ought to be treated, not by virtue of what it actually is. 
Therefore, the philosophical task of figuring out the moral status of an entity and 
how to act towards it necessarily involves understanding whether ought is derived 
from is or vice versa.1 More concretely, in the properties-based approach, the 
way we decide how to treat a robot (how we believe we ought to engage with it) 
depends on its characteristics (what it is). In the relational approach, the moment 
we enter into social relations with an entity, obligations towards it are established 
(how we ought to treat it) irrespective of the qualities that suggest its alterity (what 
it is).2 In the space here, I briefly summarize the thrust of these arguments with an 
eye towards more fully examining the relationship between these positions and 
cognate concepts such as personhood and rights, which I discuss in Chapter Two. 
As we shall see, the lively discussion about robot rights has suffered from an inat-
tention to the relationship between key concepts, unacknowledged cultural biases, 
and challenges associated with tackling an interdisciplinary problem. 
One camp consists of analysts who argue that robots do not or should not 
have rights, focusing mainly on the properties of such intelligent artifacts and, 
to a lesser extent, on the relational dimension of HRI. In one of the earlier works 
indicative of this perspective, Miller (2015) contends that what separates humans 
and animals from “automata” is the quality of “existential normative neutral-
ity” (p. 378). Whereas the ontological status of humans and animals is taken 
for granted, the existence of automata is actively constructed by human agents. 
Confusingly, Miller writes about the connection between moral status and the 
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expressed in major international human rights documents. In addition, he claims 
that “humans are under no moral obligation to grant full human rights to entities 
possessing ontological properties critically different from them in terms of human 
rights bases” (Miller, 2015, p. 387). This assertion nearly qualifies as a strawman 
argument. As shown below, those finding robot rights philosophically tenable 
do not advocate for the assignment of all major human rights to technological 
entities. Furthermore, conflating moral rights with legal rights overlooks the var-
ied reasons why nonhumans might be and have been extended the latter kind of 
protection. 
For Solaiman (2017), the question revolves around the extent to which robots 
can fulfill legal duties, which are “responsibilities commanded by law to do or 
to forbear something for the benefit of others, the failure in, or disobedience of, 
which will attract a remedy” (p. 159). Whereas corporations consist of people 
who can perform duties and idols have managers who tend to their legal interests, 
robots have no such human attachments. Therefore, since robots cannot fulfill 
legal duties, they cannot meet the criteria for legal personhood and thus they are 
not entitled to legal rights. 
Bryson et al. (2017) rebuff the idea of granting either moral or legal rights to 
robots. They contend that robots do not possess the qualities intrinsic to moral 
patients (i.e., consciousness), so they cannot hold moral rights or be considered 
moral patients, making them ineligible for legal personhood, and thus not enti-
tled to legal rights (pp. 283–4). Further, leaning on Solaiman, the authors urge 
that absent the ability to be held accountable for one’s actions, an artificial entity 
cannot fulfill legal duties and therefore does not qualify as a legal person. This 
lack of accountability could result in “humans using robots to insulate themselves 
from liability and robots themselves unaccountably violating human legal rights” 
(Bryson et al., 2017, p. 285).3 Neither of these outcomes advance the ultimate 
objective of an established legal order—“to protect the interests of the people” 
(Bryson et al., 2017, p. 274; emphasis in original). In short, the costs of affording 
robots rights outweigh the benefits of doing so. 
For Bryson (2018), robots should not be assigned the status of either moral
agents or moral patients because doing so would place human interests in com-
petition with the interests of artificial entities, which is unethical. Determining 
whether an entity qualifies as a moral patient or a moral agent is critical in estab-
lishing whether or not it possesses moral duties and/or moral rights. Bryson 
agrees with Solaiman that while humans have the power to assign legal duties 
and legal rights to any entity, these forms of recognition are only available to 
“agent[s] capable of knowing those rights and carrying out those duties” (Bryson, 
2018, p. 16). If a robot does not meet the criteria for either moral agency or moral
patiency, it cannot hold moral rights.4 In fact, Bryson (2010) contends controver-
sially, robots should be treated as mere slaves.5 
More recently, Birhane and van Dijk (2020) adopt a “post-Cartesian, phenom-
enological view” and conclude that “robots are [not] the kinds of beings that could 
be granted or denied rights” (p. 2). Whereas all humans share a capacity for “lived 
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technological artefacts that may contribute to the human experience, but they are 
merely elements present in the human social world, not beings unto themselves. 
As such, the authors take a relational approach to robot rights but reach a conclu-
sion totally opposite from the one obtained by Coeckelbergh (2010, 2011, 2014) 
and Gunkel (2012, 2018a).6 Finally, instead of focusing on the rights of robots, 
the scholars suggest, we should concentrate our efforts on safeguarding human 
welfare, which is the ultimate reason for contemplating rights for AI anyway. 
This article is logically flawed and deeply contradictory, rendering its argu-
ments highly suspect. First, the very title of the piece frames the issue in terms 
of both a strawman argument and a false dichotomy. Robot rights are neither 
promoted solely as a means of advancing human welfare, nor are robot rights and 
human welfare mutually exclusive objectives. Second, their alleged employment 
of a post-Cartesian outlook is belied by their assessment that while robots are 
embedded in human social practices, they are still different enough from humans 
to warrant their exclusion from the moral circle. This move ignores the ontologi-
cal flattening that occurs when viewing the moral universe as a social-relational 
whole. If, in fact, “technologies are always already part of ourselves” (Birhane 
& van Dijk, 2020, p. 3; emphasis in original), there is no basis for the kind of 
ontological separation described by Descartes. In short, the authors fail to present 
a convincing case for the dismissal of robot rights. 
Another camp comprises those writers who maintain that robots could con-
ceivably possess rights, exploring the possibilities generated by the properties of 
such entities, their relationship with humans and the larger context in which they 
operate, or a combination of the two. The justifications supplied by these advo-
cates are mostly philosophical, but a few are explicitly legal in nature. For the 
moment, I leave aside arguments that do not directly engage with the question of 
rights (i.e., those dealing primarily with concepts like intentionality, personhood, 
and being alive).7 
On the properties side, Chao (2010) claims that legal rights should be extended 
only to “fully rational” robots that exhibit “consciousness, intentionality, and free 
will” because to deny them such protections in light of their possession of such 
characteristics would be “inconsistent” with the standard by which humans are 
granted rights (p. 98). Hubbard (2011), also seeking to maintain the logic govern-
ing human attributions of elevated moral status, argues that machines capable 
of complex intellectual interaction, self-consciousness, and living in a commu-
nity on the basis of reciprocal self-interests should be given “the basic Lockean 
right of self-ownership” (p. 417). McGrath (2011) suggests that the designation 
of rights depends on determining whether or not a machine is sentient (p. 139). 
Marx and Tiefensee (2015) answer the machine question in terms of how well 
intelligent artefacts approximate human qualities: “[i]n order to be regarded as the 
holder of rights, robots would have to be sentient beings with an idea of a subjec-
tive good and important interests that are worthy of protection” (p. 85). However, 
they also offer the caveat that if there is no meaningful moral difference between 
how humans and robots feel pain, robots might be afforded rights. Danaher 
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on observable behaviors and reactions towards humans. Because mental states are 
unobservable,8 external behaviors constitute the only accessible means of estab-
lishing whether or not an entity possesses the kinds of metaphysical properties 
required to obtain moral status (i.e., consciousness or intelligence). Therefore, 
determinations of moral rights and duties can be achieved by perceiving behavior 
that is performatively equivalent to that attributed to other entities deemed worthy 
of moral consideration by virtue of their properties. 
On the relational side, positions may be further classified as social or ecological 
in orientation (Jones, 2013). The social position emphasizes the interaction that 
a robot has with another entity or the mental representations produced through 
an encounter with an Other. The ecological position, on the other hand, consid-
ers the extent of an entity’s embeddedness within a culture, how its embodiment 
structures perceptions and physical responses, or the degree to which it stands in 
harmony with all things. Levy (2009) approaches the subject from a social per-
spective, arguing that despite not being sentient like animals, intelligent machines 
still might deserve rights because how we treat them will mirror how humans treat 
one another. He concludes by instructing that “treating robots in ethically sus-
pect ways will send the message that it is acceptable to treat humans in the same 
ethically suspect ways” (Levy, 2009, p. 215). Coeckelbergh (2010) advocates in 
favor of a “social ecology” that rejects a priori distinctions between human and 
nonhuman entities, and instead promotes moral consideration based on experi-
ences and the contexts in which they occur (p. 217). Interestingly, Coeckelbergh 
does not foreclose the possibility that properties may play a role in a relational 
approach to moral consideration. Instead, he leaves room for “properties-as-they-
appear-to-us within a social-relational, social-ecological context” (Coeckelbergh, 
2010, p. 219). The same author later invokes both the social and ecological (i.e., 
embodiment) perspectives of a relational approach when he writes, “what matters 
for understanding and evaluating human–robot relations is how the robot appears 
to us” (Coeckelbergh, 2011, p. 198).9 In another work, Coeckelbergh (2014) also 
acknowledges the importance of an entity’s ecological embeddedness: “[o]ur per-
sonal construction of the robot is influenced by the way our culture constructs 
machines, and this construction is not only a word process but also a living pro-
cess” (p. 69). Darling (2016) presents an exclusively social-relational justification 
for extending legal protections to social robots. She argues that the human tenden-
cies to anthropomorphize nonhumans, project our emotions onto them, and shield 
ourselves from the emotional harm we experience when witnessing the abuse of 
other entities suggest that we ought to regulate violent behavior towards social 
robots through laws similar to animal welfare statutes. The litany of sympathetic 
user comments posted in response to a Boston Dynamics (2016) YouTube video 
in which a man strikes a humanoid robot with a hockey stick reflects precisely 
the kind of sensitivity towards nonhumans identified by Darling. She stops short, 
however, of advocating for robot rights, which she regards as fodder for philo-
sophical musings, not policymaking (at least for now). 
Although plenty of philosophers have proposed general theories of moral sta-
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Metz, 2012), few have endeavored specifically to prescribe the boundaries of the 
moral circle with robots in mind. Floridi (1999, 2008) has attempted such an all-
encompassing ecological rendering of the ethical universe. In Floridi’s (1999) 
concept of “Information Ethics” (IE), the line delineating those entities worthy 
of moral consideration from those that do not warrant such treatment pushes out-
wards from its initial encircling of strictly physical beings like animals, persons, 
and plants to ultimately include “every instance of information, no matter whether 
physically implemented or not” (p. 43). Under an IE vision, the individual iden-
tifying factors associated with an entity are conceived as data structures, while 
behaviors or reactions are governed by a grouping of functions, operations, or 
procedures. Anything that is a kind of information or simply is possesses intrinsic 
value. In more concise terms, “life” is replaced with “existence” (Floridi, 2008, p. 
60). Any entity that suffers from entropy, here defined as “any kind of destruction 
or corruption of informational objects … that is, any form of impoverishment of 
being, including nothingness” (Floridi, 2008, p. 60), is deserving of moral con-
cern. By making this kind of shift from biocentrism to ontocentrism, certain kinds 
of robots and even non-embodied AI clearly earn a place within the moral circle 
by virtue of their beingness and entropic condition. However, IE is vulnerable to 
the criticism that it is perhaps over-inclusive, placing excessive duties on entities 
capable of contributing to the destruction of any and all information-based beings. 
Gunkel (2018a), drawing on the work of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and
largely concurring with Coeckelbergh, develops a social-relational approach he
refers to as “thinking otherwise” (p. 159). Here, the moral status of an entity
emerges from an encounter with it, obligating us to respond to its presence before
we fully understand its inner workings or capacities. The determination regarding
the kind of entity we face follows from this initial ethical reaction. In Humean terms,
“ought precedes and takes precedence over is” (Gunkel, 2018a, p. 166; emphasis in
original). Gunkel not only rejects the properties approach, but he also disfavors the
strategy employed by information and environmental ethicists whereby the moral
circle is progressively broadened in an effort to include more and more kinds of
entities within its ambit. He argues that “these different ethical theories endeavor to
identify what is essentially the same in a phenomenal diversity of different individ-
uals. Consequently, they include others by effectively stripping away and reducing
differences” (Gunkel, 2018a, p. 163). This interpretation of “competing centrisms”
(Gunkel, 2018a, p. 163) is not quite accurate, however, insofar as it relates to some
of the more ecologically minded ethical or legal approaches, which explicitly call
for the ontological de-centering of humans (i.e., Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,
2011, 2017; Vermeylen, 2017; Tavani, 2018, pp. 401–402). 
(Dis)integrative approaches 
Some writers have attempted to unify the properties and relational approaches in 
service of expanding the moral circle to include information technology-based 
entities. Søraker (2007) propounds a relational theory that assesses moral status 
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to qualities like free will, reason, and self-consciousness, while two relational 
properties that work in tandem—irreplaceability and constitutivity—are also 
identified. Unpacking this argument, the author holds that “an entity that is an irre-
placeable and constitutive part of an organic unity together with a person thereby 
attains value as an end and moral status” (Søraker, 2007, p. 16). While relational 
properties might be able to confer moral status on an entity, only through the 
demonstration of intrinsic properties can a being enjoy full moral standing. Thus, 
moral status may be a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing proposition.10 The 
resulting integrationist model ordains a hierarchy that arranges the following 
entities in descending order of moral significance: moral persons, merely self-
conscious beings, merely sentient beings, and non-sentient entities. Although this 
effort intends to bring both properties and relations into the same moral calculus, 
it clearly privileges the former at the expense of the latter. Humans are still at the 
apex of the moral order, and the extent to which nonhuman entities might obtain 
moral status is still somewhat dependent on the instrumental value that such enti-
ties hold for moral persons. 
A charitable reading of Coeckelbergh (2012) suggests that he, too, strives for 
an integrationist solution to the properties-versus-relations debate. Expanding on 
the notion of appearances present in his earlier work, Coeckelbergh offers the 
important insight that an entity may be viewed in multiple ways depending on the 
context and how humans relate to it. This phenomenological approach to deter-
mining moral status rejects ontological stability, recognizing that the reality of 
an object is inextricably linked to the subject which encounters it. The logical 
application of this “deep-relational” approach to the domain of AI and robotics 
entails that 
[a]n intelligent humanoid robot may appear as a machine (an object, a thing) 
but also as a living tool; or it may appear as a human, an other (a social other) 
or a subject. It may even appear as a companion, partner, friend, and so on. 
(Coeckelbergh, 2012, pp. 45, 44) 
Although Coeckelbergh does not avoid the charge of anthropocentrism, he suc-
cessfully retreats from a properties-centric approach and leaves room for multiple 
ontologies and direct experiences in the process of assigning moral status. 
Others have rejected both the properties and relational approaches. Tavani 
(2018) takes issue with the properties approach on the grounds that it “fails to 
show us why one property or set of properties should be privileged over another” 
and finds fault in the relational approach, which “leaves us with many unre-
solved questions” (p. 2). The author, agreeing with Gunkel (2018b), contends that 
robots might warrant moral consideration as moral patients, but not moral agents. 
Relying on Jonas’ (1984) update of Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world, 
Tavani (2018) argues that humans have moral obligations to beings with a signifi-
cant presence in the technological-world, such as social robots (p. 12). Curiously, 
while Tavani explicitly locates his position outside the realm of the relational 
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that is wholly compatible with the idea of robots as beings-in-the-technological-
world. As such, he does not manage to successfully evade identification with one 
of the two camps in the machine question debate. 
Rounding out this discussion, Torrance (2013) presents a typology useful for 
categorizing the aforementioned properties or relational approaches according to 
the kind of object positioned at the center of the moral circle. Specifically, he 
identifies four macroethical perspectives—anthropocentrism, biocentrism, eco-
centrism, and infocentrism. Anthropocentrism privileges humans, human-like 
qualities, human interests and needs, or relations with humans. Biocentrism holds 
all organic beings with biologically determined capabilities in higher esteem 
than any created through synthetic means. Ecocentrism prioritizes whole natural 
ecosystems or individual organic beings present in natural ecosystems.11 Finally, 
infocentrism interprets characteristics associated with intelligence or the mind as 
integral to deciding the moral status of an entity.12 
Gunkel (2018a, p. 163) decries these perspectives as essentially exercises in 
progressively larger circle drawing and situates his own argument outside of this 
competition, focusing instead on the spontaneous emergence of relations that 
occurs when encountering an Other of any material composition. However, both 
he and Coeckelbergh seem to implicitly deny the relevance of features that shape 
the interaction between object and subject. For instance, there is a substantial body 
of evidence demonstrating that humans unconsciously apply social expectations 
to and form social relationships with technological artifacts like computers and 
televisions (Reeves & Nass, 1996; Nass & Moon, 2000). The conditions under 
which forms of technology elicit social responses remains an unsettled issue, 
but it is evidently important to understanding the resulting interactive behavior 
observed in humans. More bluntly, it seems likely that the perception that an 
entity possesses lifelike qualities motivates humans to treat Apple’s Siri differ-
ently from the way we treat less animated or dynamic things like a static image 
or a boulder. 
No matter how much analysts want to champion a particular side in this debate, 
or eschew both properties and relations altogether, it stands to reason that any 
approach to assessing the moral status of robots will have to at least consider the 
characteristics of the entity in question along with the context in which it exists. 
In this book, I am not angling to resolve longstanding philosophical disputes or 
prescribe a superior macroethical orientation that specifies the boundaries of the 
moral circle for all entities present in this world. The intent of this project is more 
circumscribed—I wish to propose a method of assessing the eligibility of certain 
kinds of robots for personhood and thus rights. Any claim that the framework 
developed here might apply to other circumstances must be made by the reader 
(be they human or AI). 
Shortcomings of the debate 
As indicated at the outset of this chapter, the discourse regarding the machine 
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insufficient attention to the relationship between key concepts. As evidenced by 
the use of italics above, some of the authors cited discuss legal duties/personhood/ 
status/rights while others focus on moral duties/personhood/status/rights. Still 
others oscillate between legal and moral terms. Yet rarely do they explain how, if 
at all, these concepts are connected to one another. To be sure, “[m]oral rights are 
not the same as legal rights, though protection in law often follows shortly after 
society has recognised a moral case for protecting something” (Turner, 2019, p. 
170). In the next chapter, I attempt to overcome this terminological morass by 
clearly articulating the links between properties or relational mechanisms, person-
hoods, statuses, and rights. 
Second, some of the literature in this area lacks the kind of self-reflexiveness 
that encourages acknowledging one’s own cultural biases. Hard and fast conclu-
sions regarding what is or is not moral, what should or should not be legal, and 
what does or does not count as a person ignore the multiplicity of perspectives and 
ontologies found across space and time. For instance, there exists a discernible 
difference of opinion among Western and Eastern philosophical traditions regard-
ing the social standing of artifacts (Mathews, 1991). As will be argued through-
out this book, the West does not own a monopoly on the truth, and Eastern and 
Indigenous ways of thinking about nonhuman entities deserve a place in the con-
versation about robot rights. 
Third, some of the inconsistencies and oversights present in this burgeoning
area of inquiry are merely the product of the interdisciplinary nature of the subject
matter. Asking the machine question invites many different kinds of experts to
the table—cognitive scientists, engineers, ethicists, futurists, historians, journal-
ists, legal scholars, philosophers, social scientists, and roboticists, among others.
None of these groups on their own can legitimately lay claim to the entirety of
knowledge on the subject of rights for robots. As such, any effort to push this
discussion forward should explicitly indicate the limitations of writing from a
given disciplinary vantage point and draw upon the work of those in cognate
fields to the extent possible. As a political scientist and sometimes legal scholar,
I fully recognize the depth of the pool I have elected to wade into. Any factual
inaccuracies or technological misunderstandings contained within this book are
solely my own. 
To continue this journey, we must first attempt to resolve some of the termi-
nological inconsistencies and conceptual disconnects that frustrate the ability of 
scholars from different fields to engage in meaningful dialogue about the auda-
cious possibility of robot rights. Such is the task that lies ahead in Chapter Two. 
Notes 
1 That is, if debating moral status is indeed the appropriate manner in which to proceed. 
One philosopher argues that the very framing of ethical questions regarding marginal 
cases in terms of moral status is ultimately unproductive, as the discussion could be 
conducted using simpler terms. See Sachs (2011). 
















             
 
24 Rights for robots
3 But see Turner (2019), who argues that “AI personality allows liability to be achieved 
with minimal damage to fundamental concepts of causation and agency, thereby main-
taining the coherence of the system as a whole” (p. 186). 
4 The computer scientist and ethicist’s objection to bestowing rights upon robots is 
unequivocal: “If robots ever need rights we’ll have designed them unjustly” (Bryson, 
2017). Of course, this strongly worded statement ignores the fact that robot design is 
determined by, inter alia, their functional problem-solving capabilities, the intellectual 
aspirations of roboticists, market potential, national research priorities, and realizing 
forms adapted from science fiction. Danaher (2020) suggests that the impulse to design 
robots capable of performing in ways similar to other entities that enjoy at least some 
moral status “will probably prove too overwhelming for any system of norms (legal 
or moral) to constrain” (p. 2046). Another scholar even goes so far as to note that 
“researchers will not be happy building anything less than a fully functional synthetic 
human robot. It is just not in their nature” (Duffy, 2003, p. 188). The point is that robots 
are already and will likely continue to be designed in ways Bryson would consider 
“unjust,” so the point is moot. Instead of trying to beat back against this trend, scholarly 
effort would be better directed at dealing with the ethical and legal consequences of the 
inexorable march forward in robot technology. 
5 Bryson has since walked back her use of the term slaves because of its association with 
the inhumanity of slavery throughout human history. See Bryson (2015). 
6 See the discussion of relational approaches to robot rights later in this section. 
7 I return to these more distant logical connections in Chapter Two. 
8 This situation is known as the “problem of other minds” (Dennett, 1981, p. 173). For 
a review of different theories of mind in the context of social robots, see Gallagher 
(2013). 
9 In this same work, Coeckelbergh explicitly rejects embodiment, although he uses this 
term in a way that is fundamentally different from Jones’ (2013) interpretation. For 
Coeckelbergh (2011), “[e]mbodiment relations refer to the amplification of bodily per-
ception: technology comes to be experienced as being part of us; we do no longer 
notice it” (p. 198). 
10 For a review of the question concerning moral status as a matter of degree, see DeGrazia 
(2008). 
11 Ecocentrists would not agree that their ethical perspective emphasizes individual enti-
ties within the ecosystem. For an extended discussion on ecocentric environmental 
ethics, see Chapter Four. 
12 Given that the present overview focuses exclusively on the writings of scholars who 
have sought to situate robots in the moral universe, thus far we have only observed 
examples of anthropocentric and infocentric perspectives. Biocentric and ecocentric 
perspectives are entertained more fully in the discussions surrounding the rights of 
nature in Chapter Four. 
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2 Getting to rights 
Personhoods, statuses, and incidents 
‘[P]erson’ signifies what law makes it signify. 
(John Dewey, 1926, p. 655) 
Assessing whether or not robots might be eligible for rights requires unpacking 
and connecting concepts pertinent to the determination of rights. In this chapter, 
I attempt to accomplish this task by advancing two arguments. First, the debate 
over the machine question and the discussion of rights for nonhuman entities more 
generally has suffered from terminological inconsistency and the application of 
different standards. In particular, participants in these discourses shift between 
moral and legal frames without fully appreciating how they differ in terms of the 
criteria applied and the conclusions they reach as a result. Second, returning to 
Hume for a moment, the is/ought problem sets up a false dichotomy between the 
properties and relational responses to the machine question. Different types of 
properties connect to different types of personhood, and properties that facilitate 
interaction between entities cannot be divorced from these relations. Importantly, 
properties themselves can be relational in nature, and certain mechanisms by 
which humans identify (with) nonhuman entities reflect a relational kind of per-
sonhood. The question pertinent to this inquiry is not whether is should come 
before ought or vice versa, but rather, what kind of personhood is under scrutiny? 
The chapter proceeds by distinguishing between and exploring the relationships 
among different types of personhood, drawing together personhoods and statuses 
(i.e., agent/patient and subject/object), explaining how statuses translate into inci-
dents, and finally arriving at theories underpinning the extension of rights. The 
goal of this chapter is to map the muddled terrain of personhood(s) in the service 
of clarifying how the concept relates to the different kinds of rights at issue in 
philosophical and legal scholarship on intelligent machines. 
Distinguishing among personhoods: 
Moral, psychological, legal, and relational 
One of the main difficulties experienced in the course of trying to determine 
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it qualifies as a person. This task has proved troublesome for two reasons. First, 
the definition of a person has varied over time and space. Second, scholars repre-
senting different academic fields have tended to talk past one another, neglecting 
the ways in which related debates over personhood might contribute to greater 
transdisciplinary knowledge and meaning-making. Many of the contemporary 
discussions about personhood in law and philosophy begin with definitions put 
forth by Enlightenment thinkers or their intellectual progeny. A common start-
ing place for locating a widely accepted early definition of a person is the work 
of John Locke. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke (1836) 
describes “person” as a “forensic term” that “belongs only to intelligent agents 
capable of a law, and happiness and misery” (p. 234). Later, Gray (1909) distin-
guishes between the common and technical legal meanings of a person, finding 
that the latter refers to “a subject of legal rights and duties” (p. 27). While many 
philosophers and legal scholars move swiftly (and perhaps unwittingly) in their 
writings from the concept of a person to the notion of personhood, anthropologists 
have spilled considerable ink illuminating the complexities of the latter. Although 
many different definitions have been proposed throughout anthropology’s history 
(Appell-Warren, 2014), personhood as it is presently understood in the field might 
be fairly described as a process by which “bodies and persons are culturally con-
ceptualized” (Jackson, 2019, p. 31). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly from a practical standpoint, ancient and/or non-West-
ern ideas about personhood have received little attention. After all, what is the 
value of invoking conceptualizations that fall outside the dominant paradigm 
when seeking to resolve tensions within it? As I argue in this chapter and through-
out the book, this approach has shown itself to be stale and limiting. Considering 
how other cultures have interpreted personhood is not only theoretically produc-
tive, it is normatively crucial to the larger project of recognizing and respect-
ing Indigenous peoples and traditional groups. At least as far back as the 1700s, 
three kinds of personhood have been identified—moral, psychological, and legal 
(Vincent, 1989, p. 701).1 A fourth type of personhood—relational—has long been 
present in Indigenous and traditional societies, but it gained recognition more 
recently in the field of anthropology, and has been observed in robot ethics only 
over the past decade or so. Each of these kinds of personhood are discussed below. 
Moral personhood most often evokes a single human who possesses free will, 
the capacity to act rationally, and self-awareness (Vincent, 1989, p. 701). Gunkel 
(2012) adds that consciousness has long been considered a “necessary precondi-
tion” for moral personhood (p. 90). Himma (2009) defines consciousness as “the 
capacity for inner subjective experience like that of pain” (p. 19). Scott (1990) 
identifies the qualities that constitute a person before sketching the contours of 
moral personhood. Persons are intentional, material, and malleable (i.e., capable 
of holding an unlimited array of beliefs and belief systems). Moral persons are 
those who apply the previous traits in the service of fulfilling two classes of needs: 
(1) those concerned with basic functionalities that enable the development of 
higher order intentional capacities, and (2) those “needs the meeting of which are 
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in original).2 Dennett (1976) distinguishes between moral and metaphysical per-
sonhood, contending that the latter is a necessary condition of the former. Here, 
metaphysical personhood includes consciousness, intelligence, and the ability to 
feel, while moral personhood indicates accountability in the form of rights and 
responsibilities. Yet, in the end, Dennett (1976) finds that moral and metaphysi-
cal personhood “are not separate and distinct concepts but just two different and 
unstable resting points on the same continuum” (p. 193). 
Psychological personhood is also often deployed in the description of individ-
ual human beings, but more specifically it entails those capable of demonstrating 
intentionality,3 sentience, and self-consciousness, which indicates “awareness of 
one’s own mental processes” (Vincent, 1989, p. 696). Unlike its moral variant, 
psychological personhood is an empirical phenomenon capturing both deliber-
ate and non-deliberate behaviors. It also considers the integration of mental and 
physical attributes. Perhaps confusingly, Dennett (1976) suggests that psycho-
logical qualities are necessary for the assignment of moral personhood (p. 177). 
For present purposes, it might therefore be useful as a point of distinction to assert 
that psychological personhood is prior to and works in furtherance of moral per-
sonhood, as the former includes the more sophisticated mental processes required 
to perform the latter. 
The concept of (self-)consciousness deserves extended discussion in light 
of its importance to both moral/metaphysical and psychological personhood. 
Importantly, attempts to define and operationalize consciousness have been 
fraught with difficulty. As Gunkel (2012) notes, we still don’t really know what 
consciousness is, and we don’t have a surefire way of identifying it in others
(p. 90). Similar sentiments were echoed in my interviews with roboticists, each 
of whom spoke about the lack of a common definition or our poor understanding 
of the phenomenon. Watson (1979) proposes two avenues through which one 
might determine whether or not an entity exhibits self-consciousness. First, he 
suggests a test of introspection: “If you understand what Descartes means when 
he says, ‘I think, therefore I am,’ then you have experience of your self which is 
self-consciousness” (p. 125). Second, we can observe the behavior of others and 
assess the extent to which it mirrors our own as humans. If they appear to possess 
the power of communication, they are likely self-conscious. 
The debate over consciousness relates back to the theories of mind discussed 
in the introduction to this book. Under a functionalist theory, cognition is merely 
a process of inputs and outputs that could potentially be replicated in non-living 
forms. By contrast, the theory of biological naturalism posits that neurological 
processes possess a causal power beyond that which inheres in a structure that 
organizes inputs and outputs. Advocates of this perspective argue that conscious-
ness is evidenced through the actual production of mental states, not just fol-
lowing the process that led to them. This requires fully duplicating the causal 
sequences enacted by biological structures, not just simulating them formally 
through artificial means (Searle, 2008). An alternative view submits that instead 
of construing consciousness as the product of internal computational processes or 
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of the agent is causally entangled with a world of physical causes” (Manzotti & 
Jeschke, 2016, p. 172). In this perspective, experience is not wholly an internal 
phenomenon; the external environment shapes causal outcomes. 
Further, consciousness might not be a dichotomous, all-or-nothing quality. 
Turner (2019, pp. 152–153) maintains that there are in fact at least three dimen-
sions of consciousness. First, there is the kind of consciousness present within 
a living organism, which ranges from a state of minimal consciousness (i.e., in 
the midst of REM sleep) to a state of full consciousness (i.e., being wide awake). 
Second, consciousness may develop over the life of a living being of any species, 
which implies that newborn babies possess less capacity for consciousness than 
does a fully mature adult. Finally, varying levels of consciousness may be present 
across species. While these dimensions are not exhaustive, they do suggest that a 
purely binary assessment of consciousness is likely to be under-inclusive. 
The epistemological challenge of identifying consciousness has led to ques-
tions regarding the potential for its presence or absence in artificial forms and 
resulting conclusions about personhood for nonhuman entities. Setting aside the 
circular criterion that a person must be a human, rationality would appear to under-
lie many of the facets of personhood, including consciousness (Pollock, 1989, pp. 
111–112). If the appearance of rationality suggests consciousness, and there is no 
more sophisticated way of establishing that an entity possesses a rational archi-
tecture than simply observing it in action, then in principle there is no reason why 
a machine that acts in ways deemed sufficiently rational could not qualify as a 
person. Lacking the ability to empirically verify the existence of consciousness, 
all we have are external interpretations of internal states and observations about 
the environment in which entities act. If we assume that no one interpretation is 
any more valid than another, we invite a kind of dynamic subjectivity that permits 
variable determinations about personhood. 
Under modern law, legal consideration only extends to those entities rec-
ognized as persons (Donnelly & Whelan, 2018, p. 25). While the Greeks and 
Romans established enduring boundaries separating property from legal persons 
(Calverley, 2008, p. 525), since the 18th century Western legal systems have 
maintained a fairly consistent distinction between natural and artificial persons 
under the concept of legal personhood. Natural persons typically refer to “(1) 
human beings, (2) who have been born, (3) who are currently alive, and (4) who 
are sentient,” and in order to exhibit “active legal personality,” a person must 
also possess “sufficient rationality and age” (Kurki, 2017, pp. 75, 76).4 Artificial 
persons usually refer to corporations. For some, the dual-pronged model of legal 
personhood is sufficiently inclusive. Any entities that are not natural persons 
can simply be considered corporations. Recognizing a third type of legal person 
“would only raise additional issues” and “create legal uncertainty with no corol-
lary benefit” (Welters, 2013, p. 447). 
Echoing Gray, Wise (2010) argues that a person in the legal context needs to 
satisfy only a single criterion: “the capacity to possess at least one legal right” 
(p. 1). However, this interpretation ignores important differences between natu-
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the context of corporations and ships. One scholar stipulates that the following 
attributes must be present in order for an entity to qualify for legal personhood: 
“(1) a person shall be capable of being a subject of law; (2) being a legal subject 
entails the ability to exercise rights and to perform duties; and (3) the enjoyment 
of rights needs to exercise awareness and choice” (Solaiman, 2017, p. 161). While 
rights and duties will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, for the 
time being it suffices to note that the characteristics enumerated above suggest 
that legal personhood implicitly involves autonomy, intelligence, and intention-
ality. One must possess a requisite amount of these three properties in order to 
enjoy rights and perform duties. But Solaiman’s (2017) criteria uncritically lump 
together two distinct, although related, concepts—legal capacity and legal com-
petence. Legal capacity involves the ability of an entity to possess rights and 
discharge duties, while legal competence speaks to the ability to enter into legal 
relations with other entities, which is often dependent upon one’s age and level of 
cognitive functioning (Kurki, 2017, p. 76). 
The literature might be characterized as advancing three interrelated concep-
tions of legal personhood: (1) legal-persons-as-right-holders; (2) capacity-for-
rights; and (3) capacity-for-legal-relations (Kurki, 2017, pp. 77–78). The extent 
to which an entity can hold rights depends on the theory of rights used (i.e., will 
theory or interest theory) and the resulting conclusion obtained from its applica-
tion. I return to rights theories later. The question regarding whether or not an 
entity possesses the capacity for rights is determined on either a conceptual or 
legal basis. A better way to state this inquiry might be, is the lack of capacity due 
to psychological/physical limitations or the entity’s mere absence of formal legal 
recognition? Relatedly, can the dearth of capacity be overcome simply by grant-
ing the entity legal status so that it may exercise its rights and fulfill duties, or are 
there meaningful deficits among the ontological properties of the entity that frus-
trate its full participation in the legal system? As Kurki (2017) notes in concrete 
terms, the rock lacks conceptual capacity, whereas the slave lacks legal capacity 
(p. 83). Finally, an entity’s potential for engaging in legal relations refers to its 
ability to partake in the range of reciprocal legal activities specified by Hohfeld 
(1913), which include rights and other correlative incidents. Hohfeldian incidents 
are described more thoroughly in a subsequent section. Generally speaking, any-
thing that holds rights can participate in legal relations, but the converse is not 
necessarily true. 
Two specific classes of entities—corporations and ships—are often highlighted 
in the literature on legal personhood. These usual suspects enter the frame both in 
situations where authors seek to explain the limited conditions under which non-
human entities enjoy legal status and where others argue that the scope of legal 
personhood can be expanded even further. Here they receive additional considera-
tion with a view towards the latter effort. Although the legal status of corporations 
was thrust into America’s national spotlight in the wake of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,5 juris-
prudence and legal theory regarding corporate personhood have engaged in fruit-
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Four theories allege to establish a basis for the legal personhood of corpora-
tions: association theory, grant theory, unique entity theory, and reality theory. 
In association (or aggregate) theory, a corporation is considered an entity that 
represents a group of natural persons with a common interest in the operations 
of a business. In this sense, the corporation acts as a placeholder for real people, 
limiting their individual responsibility in light of actions undertaken by the larger 
entity of which they are members. In grant (or fiction) theory, a corporation is rec-
ognized as wholly brought into existence by the state for the purpose of promot-
ing the welfare of its citizens. Under this approach, any duties, powers, or rights 
held by the corporation are expressly contained within its charter, which must be 
approved by the state. In unique entity theory, a corporation is neither an umbrella 
organization representing a group of people with common interests nor an organi-
zational artefact created by the state. Instead, it is an entity distinguishable from 
both natural persons and the state (Kens, 2015, p. 10). Finally, in reality theory, a 
corporation is a sociological person that exists prior to its formal recognition by 
law, which serves to institutionalize but not establish its presence. Whereas grant 
theory treats the corporation as a de jure person, reality theory finds that the cor-
poration exists as a de facto person (French, 1979, pp. 209–210). Although moral 
personhood is seen by some as a prerequisite for legal personhood (Koops et al., 
2010, p. 548), corporations qualify for the latter without necessarily achieving the 
former (Solum, 1992, p. 1248). 
In the U.S. context, Kens (2015) maintains that not only has the Supreme Court 
vacillated between theories of corporate personhood, but also that the birth of the 
legal notion of corporation-as-person stems from the questionable interpretation 
of language found in seminal precedent on the subject. In Santa Clara County 
v. Southern Pacific Railroad,6 the complainant challenged a provision of the 
California Constitution regarding how property values were to be assessed for 
taxation purposes, arguing that it was unconstitutional to treat railroads differently 
from other kinds of property. In its decision, the Supreme Court found in favor of 
the railroad, relying on a technical issue within California law and ignoring the 
argument advanced in lower courts that the 14th Amendment’s equal protection 
clause applied to corporations and natural persons alike. This relatively benign, if 
esoteric, ruling might have gone unnoticed were it not for the curious insertion of 
language by Bancroft Davis, the Supreme Court’s reporter. Davis elected to add 
verbiage from a private memo sent to him by Chief Justice Morrison Waite in 
which the jurist instructed that 
[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provi-
sion in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State 
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.7 
Since this case was decided, scholars have debated the validity of this language, 
with critics arguing that it is not legitimate precedent or that it is perhaps even 
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over the legal basis for corporate personhood among scholarly circles within the 
United States. 
Ships represent another nonhuman entity often invoked in debates about legal 
personhood. Like corporations, sea-going vessels took a circuitous route to gain 
the status of legal persons. According to famed American jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. (1881), the practice of treating ships, slaves, and animals as legal 
persons under common law emerged from the human desire for vengeance. The 
underlying idea was that an injured party needed a way of being compensated for 
harms suffered under circumstances in which the owner of the proximate cause of 
the injury was not herself directly culpable. The origins of liability lie in antiquity. 
Holmes cites the Old Testament and Greek, Roman, and Germanic law as sources 
of inspiration for what would later become liability doctrine. As societies began 
to organize themselves using systems of law, the concept of liability was invented 
to provide a means of resolving this human tendency and obtaining justice for 
injured parties. 
Liability involving vessels constitutes a special case. Ships have been consid-
ered a valid subject of liability since at least the Middle Ages (Holmes, Jr., 1881, 
p. 30). Ships, “the most living of inanimate things” (Holmes, Jr., 1881, p. 26), 
were tangible assets that could be seized by one’s home country in the event of 
a legal dispute. Their capture could thus serve as an immediate form of remedy 
where the offending party is foreign to the conflict. The legal personality of a ship 
was therefore derived “from the compelling fact that it sails the seas between dif-
ferent jurisdictions” (Smith, 1928, p. 288). 
The area of admiralty law in the United States evolved a principle designed to
redress the grievances of a wronged party without finding the owner of a vessel
personally liable—in rem proceedings.8 Present in U.S. law at least as far back
as the early 19th century,9 such proceedings were intended to provide “a form
of action pursued to enforce a maritime lien” (Lind, 2009, p. 45). Judgments
rendered under the in rem principle “affect persons by determining their right to
or interest in property. This is the limit of their effect on persons however; they
cannot subject anyone to a personal liability, not even for costs” (Fraser Jr., 1948,
p. 46). For legal purposes, the vessel, not its owner or captain, is treated as the
offender. However, in rem should not be understood as dealing with rights that
one claims against a thing (as opposed to a person). As Hohfeld (1917) insists,
legal relations can only exist between natural persons (p. 721). In United States
v. Brig Malek Adhel,10 Justice Joseph Story (quoting Justice John Marshall in
United States v. The Schooner Little Charles) summarized the logic of in rem
thusly: 
This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the ves-
sel for an offense committed by the vessel; which is not the less an offense, 
and does not the less subject her to forfeiture because it was committed with-
out the authority and against the will of the owner. It is true that inanimate 
matter can commit no offense. But this body is animated and put in action 
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master. She reports herself by the master. It is therefore not unreasonable that 
the vessel should be affected by this report.11 
Justice Story’s analogical reasoning used to explain the legal status of the brig 
Malek Adhel reflects the fact that “[a]mong inorganic artifacts, none exceeds the 
sailing ship as an object anthropomorphized in Western civilization” (Lind, 2009, 
p. 43). British maritime customs had long imbued ships with personality, as sailors 
referred to their vessels using anthropomorphic language and gave them female 
names (Mawani, 2018, p. 307). The act of anthropomorphizing ships is thus a 
ritual of identification that crept its way into common-law systems. However, as 
demonstrated above, the judges who applied principles that construed seafaring 
vessels as legal persons did so on the basis of practical expediency, not literal per-
sonification derived from religious or cultural beliefs about the ontological status 
of ships. Ships, therefore, are personified culturally but are determined to possess 
liability legally. They do not represent the interests of a group, although they have 
been legalized in ways that shield individuals from responsibility. They are not 
brought into being purely through state action, although they are recognized as a 
legal entity for the purposes of engaging in legal relations. Finally, while they are 
somewhat akin to pre-existing sociological persons, claims of their metaphysical 
or moral personhood do not form the basis for establishing their legal personhood, 
which instead relies on a pragmatic approach to resolving legal disputes involving 
ships. As such, the extension of legal personhood to vessels appears most closely 
aligned with the unique entity theory of corporate personhood given the fact that 
ships are neither natural persons nor creations of the state. 
Increasingly, legal scholars have turned their attention to the application of 
legal personhood to technological entities such as artificial intelligence (AI) and 
robots. The main arguments in this more recent discussion largely fall along 
anthropocentric lines; that is, they center around the extent to which forms of tech-
nology exhibit human-like capabilities or advance human objectives. Although 
the legal personhood of AI was contemplated by Lehman-Wilzig (1981) almost 
40 years ago, Solum (1992) is commonly credited with having articulated one of 
the earliest and most extensive deliberations on the subject.12 His analysis raises 
three objections to affording AI legal personhood: (1) personhood should only be 
granted to natural persons (i.e., humans); (2) AI lacks some property necessary 
to qualify for legal personhood (i.e., consciousness, intentionality, a soul, etc.); 
and (3) human artefacts can never amount to more than human property (Solum, 
1992, p. 1258). In the end, he surmises that the question of legal personhood 
will be answered through an improved understanding of how the human mind 
works (a neurological response) and our experience with AI (a phenomenological 
response). 
Calverley (2008) adds that intelligent machines could overcome the gulf 
between property and legal person as long as they exhibited “a level of mental 
activity in areas deemed relevant to law, such as autonomy and intentionality” 
(p. 527). The author concludes that demonstrating the functional equivalent of 
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entities (Calverley, 2008, p. 534). For Koops et al. (2010), the possibility of 
assigning legal personhood to technological entities will depend on the method 
by which the law is approached (i.e., functionalism, legal positivism, naturalism, 
etc.) and the level of sophistication exhibited by the entity in question. This leads 
to three overlapping evolutionary stages of legal adaptation—“short term: inter-
pretation and extension of existing law,” “middle term: limited personhood with 
strict liability,” and “long term: full personhood with ‘posthuman’ rights” (Koops 
et al., 2010, pp. 554–559). Ultimately, humans will have to decide whether the 
entities in question are merely the products of human ingenuity or intelligent 
machines capable of their own responsibility and will (Andrade et al., 2007, as 
cited in Koops et al., 2010, pp. 560–561, n. 220). 
Hubbard (2011) proposes a behavioral test in which an entity might qualify for 
personhood if it can demonstrate all of the following: 
(1) the ability to interact with its environment and to engage in complex 
thought and communication, (2) a sense of being a self with a concern for 
achieving its plan of or purpose in life, and (3) the ability to live in a com-
munity based on mutual self-interest with other persons. 
(p. 419) 
These capacities ultimately depend on the possession of properties such as ration-
ality, intelligence, (self-)consciousness, and emotions. Putting forth the kind of 
practical reasoning observed in jurisprudence on ships, Pietrzykowski (2017) 
argues that AI might be worthy of legal personhood if granting that status would 
assist humans in determining liability for actions taken by artificial agents. 
Solaiman (2017) offers that robots are artefacts that do not (currently) possess 
sufficient autonomy to render their actions self-controlled, which means they can-
not enjoy rights or fulfill duties, thus precluding them from being deemed proper 
legal subjects. Corporations, by contrast, consist of people; religious idols, though 
not human, have interests tended to by people. In short, the degree of separation 
from humans dictates whether or not an entity might quality for legal personhood. 
Despite the various approaches to legal personhood for corporations, ships, 
or technological entities surveyed here, the literature tends to reflect a human-
centered view that is nearly a century old: 
the function of legal personality … is to regulate behavior, it is not alone to 
regulate the conduct of the subject on which it is conferred; it is to regulate 
also the conduct of human beings toward the subject or toward each other. 
(Smith, 1928, p. 296) 
Yet, at least some analysts have shown a preference for more complex notions
of legal personhood. Koops et al. (2010) identify concentric classes of persons
in order of increasing personality, ranging from abstract or virtual entities in the
outermost ring to abstract or virtual persons, legal persons, moral persons, and
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entities such as AI could potentially constitute legal persons to the extent that
they are attached to certain legal rights or duties. However, only an entity that
possesses both legal capacity and legal competence would be considered a true
legal person. Kurki (2017) goes a step further, suggesting that legal personhood
might be better understood as a “cluster concept” that leaves indeterminate the
line between legal personality and nonpersonality (p. 84). Tasioulas (2019) sug-
gests that the kind of legal personhood bestowed upon robots and AI need not
be the same as that which humans enjoy. Instead, intelligent machines might
qualify for an attenuated form of legal personhood attached to more modest bun-
dles of rights and responsibilities that vary according to the type of technology
under scrutiny. The multi-spectral framework presented in Chapter Five draws
inspiration from some of the above ideas in the hopes of constructing a complex
and contingent conceptualization of personhood that acknowledges its historical
plasticity. 
While the preceding three types of personhood rely on the properties of the 
entity in question, a fourth kind of personhood focuses on the relations among 
entities. A relational personhood (“one among others”) is one in which interper-
sonal relationships constitute identities (Splitter, 2015, p. 2). Although the discus-
sion of relational personhood has spanned several disciplines, it owes a particular 
intellectual debt to anthropology, which has engaged in a productive conversation 
about the differences between Western and non-Western cultural perspectives on 
persons and personhood since at least as far back as the 1930s (Appell-Warren, 
2014, p. 33). In a widely cited article on animism, or the tendency to recognize 
the lifelike quality of things through our relations with them, Bird‐David (1999) 
defends the relational epistemologies of traditional peoples, which entail “know-
ing the world by focusing primarily on relatedness, from a related point of view, 
within the shifting horizons of the related viewer” (p. S69). Such non-Western 
approaches to understanding the world offer alternative views on the kinds of 
beings present in social contexts and how we should navigate our interactions 
with them. 
Although nonhuman entities may not constitute persons according to the stand-
ards of Western empiricism, their treatment by non-Western societies emerges 
from an alternative vision of person-hood.13 For example, a study of the ways in 
which Classic Mayan people engage with objects suggests that “personhood fun-
damentally does not require humans as a source, acting instead as an untethered 
resource that is accessed by entities (human or not) that are able to act in social, 
relational ways” (Jackson, 2019, p. 32). With a nod towards the pioneering work 
of Bird-David, Fowler (2018) argues that “personhood is always relational” (p. 
397). Given the plurality of ways in which personhood is conceived by different 
groups and the qualitatively variable nature and strength of relationships, Fowler 
proposes a dynamic framework for assessing personhood that eschews static 
determinations of properties in favor of examining tensions along four different 
dimensions or axes of relationality—fixed/mutable, independent/interdependent, 
bounded/distributed, and typical/distinctive. This flexible heuristic device cap-
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while paying specific tribute to the relational emphasis identified in the episte-
mologies of traditional cultures. 
In what some have described as a “relational turn” in the study of robotics 
(Jones, 2013, p. 405), literature on the moral status of intelligent machines has 
drawn inspiration from the concept of relational personhood found in anthropol-
ogy.14 Søraker (2007) puts forth a “relational theory of moral status” that consists 
of a Western-derived intrinsic component and a relational component based on 
East Asian philosophy (p. 2). The intrinsic aspect relies on the extent to which an 
entity possesses capabilities or merely abilities (essentially different groupings 
of properties), arriving at a hierarchically organized system of tiers ranging from 
“merely sentient beings” (lowest level) to “merely self-conscious beings” (middle 
level) to “moral persons” (apex level) (Søraker, 2007, p. 5). The relational aspect 
depends on the irreplaceability and constitutivity of an entity and the degree to 
which possession of those qualities contributes to one’s practical identity. The 
result is a fourth tier added just below “merely sentient beings,” which is termed 
“non-sentient entities” (Søraker, 2007, p. 15). This final tier is reserved for those 
entities determined to be irreplaceable to and constitutive of a person’s practical 
identity, which afford them moral status but not moral standing. 
Forms of technology could conceivably satisfy the criteria required for this 
fourth category. For instance, were an intelligent machine to be considered an 
irreplaceable companion whose significance makes a person feel as though life is 
worth living, it might be a non-sentient entity worthy of moral status. Two exam-
ples from science fiction come to mind—the romantic relationship established 
between Theodore Twombly and his AI love interest Samantha in the film Her
(2013), and the maternal relationship between Mother (a humanoid robot) and 
Daughter (a synthetically grown human), who is raised in a repopulation facility 
without any human interaction, as depicted in the film I Am Mother (2019). In 
both of these examples, the combination of intrinsic properties and relational cri-
teria suggest that the technological being in question might qualify for (the lowest 
tier of) moral status. 
Coeckelbergh (2010) takes an approach similar to Søraker’s, largely rejecting 
a properties-based (i.e., intrinsic) account of moral consideration in favor of a 
social-relational (i.e., extrinsic) one. Drawing from Western ecology and non-
Western worldviews, he proposes a “radically relational ecology” that recognizes 
the moral significance of relations among all entities present in a social-ecological 
system (Coeckelbergh, 2010, p. 216). The epistemology of this approach shares 
with Fowler’s anthropological framework for personhood an emphasis on contin-
gency and context, and a reliance on experience and imagination, as opposed to a 
priori assumptions, as tools useful for determining the status of an entity. As such, 
far from using a checklist to separate persons from nonpersons, Coeckelbergh’s 
(2014) relational account makes moral distinctions on the basis of historical and 
phenomenological conditions “entangled with subjectivity” (p. 66). 
Gunkel (2018), leaning on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, argues that how we 
ought to treat another entity precedes our determinations regarding what it is on 
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whom we find ourselves engaging in relations could “be considered a legitimate 
moral subject” (Gunkel, 2018, p. 167). This approach is not only a philosophical 
exercise; it also finds support in empirical studies of the relations between humans 
and machines. The author cites numerous experiments in which humans afford 
social standing to computers. Although perhaps less specified than Coeckelbergh’s 
account, Gunkel’s contemporary application of Levinasian philosophy neverthe-
less provides intellectual and practical foundations for establishing the person-
hood of nonhuman mechanical entities by virtue of our relations with them. 
While Gunkel relies on Western scholarship, he acknowledges the similarities 
that his approach shares with ideas found in non-Western cultures. In particular, 
he references Jones’s (2016) work on personhood and social robotics in Asia. 
Although the space he dedicates to non-Western conceptions of nonhuman enti-
ties is relatively brief, it presents a useful jumping-off point for a more extended 
discussion. One non-Western culture that brings a relational view of personhood 
to bear on technological entities is Japan. Japan has long held a reputation as a 
society hospitable to, if not enthusiastically embracing, robots.15 Its cultural expe-
rience with robots extends at least as far back as the 17th century, when special-
ized machines carried tea for patrons (Vallverdú, 2011, p. 176). Today, Japan is 
known as the “Robot Kingdom” (robotto okoku) (Schodt, 1988).16 
Many observers have written that the basis for Japan’s attitudes towards robots 
lies in Shinto, the country’s Indigenous religion.17 Aspects of Shintoism inform 
cultural predispositions towards robots in Japanese society. First, everything in 
the universe shares the same parents and is thus related. Therefore, Gods (Kami), 
humans, and nature possess a kind of kinship with one another (Herbert, 1967,
p. 21). Second, each object or natural being possesses its own spirit or soul (tama) 
(Kitano, 2006, p. 80). This belief has translated into a culture of animism in which 
even artificial objects not constructed out of purely natural materials, such as 
robots, are thought to possess their own spirit. On this basis, ostensibly non-living 
things enjoy “the same ontological status as living entities” (Vallverdú, 2011,
p. 178). However, it is only when such objects serve as tools or otherwise perform 
tasks in harmony with their human owners that they “come alive” (Mitsukuni
et al., 1985, p. 90). But as Yueh-Hsuan Weng noted in an interview, unlike 
Christian societies of the West, Japanese culture allows robots to be more than 
tools; they can be friends, too. 
Importantly, the Japanese system of ethics governing human–object inter-
actions is only activated in the context of human relationships (Kitano, 2006,
p. 82). In a sense, natural and artificial objects alike gain a kind of personhood 
only through their relations with humans. And just like living beings, artificial 
objects such as robots enjoy a limited time on this Earth. Funerals have even been 
held to memorialize the “lives” of hundreds of defunct Sony Aibo robotic dogs 
and return their souls to their rightful owners before their bodies are harvested for 
mechanical parts (Neuman, 2018). But robots can also outlast their owners. As 
explained by Atsuo Takanishi in an interview, an intelligent machine left behind 
in the wake of its owner’s demise can serve as a conduit through which grieving 
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a practical and emotional place in Japanese society that arguably stems from its 
native religious doctrine. 
Generally speaking, both Western and Eastern “ways of worlding” (Blaser,
2014, p. 53) offer mechanisms that suggest that personhood might be seen through
a relational lens. They range from the abstract to the concrete, and from anthropo-
centric to non-anthropocentric. Each perspective described below conveys a means
by which an entity is thrust into relations with, and thus rendered meaningful to,
an Other. The literature on environmental ethics presents a useful starting point
and takes a nod from the science of ecology. Deep ecologist Arne Naess (1995)
explains how self-realization (i.e., “the fulfillment of potentials each of us has”)
results in a “broadening and deepening of the self,” which animates our concern for
the wellbeing and thriving of other entities (p. 226). As we become more fully real-
ized individuals, we come to identify with others enduring the same struggle. The
more we come to see ourselves in others, the more we will be driven to fight for the
self-realization of those with whom we identify. The endpoint of self-realization is
unity; our interests become inseparable from those of other beings. To be sure, deep
ecology does not help determine which entities are the most deserving of person-
hood. Rather, it specifies the mechanism through which persons come to obtain the
same ontological status as their relata. Fox’s (1990) transpersonal ecology takes
Naess’s ideas further, proposing cosmological, personal, and ontological forms of
identification. While the bases of identification differ across types (i.e., non-West-
ern worldviews, physical or emotional contact, and the notion that all things exist,
respectively), the main idea remains consistent—we relate to nonhuman entities by
expanding ourselves into them. As such, humans don’t locate personhood in other
beings so much as they recognize all with which we stand in relation to.18 
Teubner (2006), although ostensibly discussing legal personhood, asserts that 
personification is a strategy humans employ to manage uncertainty in situations 
where the internal properties of another entity are unknown, such as in the case 
of animals and electronic agents. Drawing on insights from Luhmann and Latour, 
the author holds that personifying nonhumans leads to their admission into dif-
ferent social contexts of the political ecology on the basis of their possession of 
variable degrees of agency. Aaltola (2008), writing about animal ethics, contends 
that one of the strongest contemporary approaches to determining personhood 
focuses on the capacity of entities to interact with (and thus relate to) others. 
Although not specifically addressing the issue of personhood, Coeckelbergh 
(2010, 2011) advocates in favor of a similar approach in the context of moral rela-
tions with animals and robots. He concludes that a phenomenological perspective 
that emphasizes how humans experience a robot’s appearance-in-context dictates 
our relations with it. For Coeckelbergh and Gunkel (2014), the act of naming ani-
mals affords them a face that inserts nonhuman beings into moral relations with 
humans. Darling (2016) argues that the human tendency to anthropomorphize 
entities by projecting human-like qualities onto them could have legal implica-
tions. In particular, social robots might present a compelling case for legal protec-
tion by virtue of their physicality, perceived autonomous movement, and capacity 
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Lewis et al. (2018) discuss how Indigenous worldviews might engage with 
intelligent machines in the context of kinship, the kind of relations in which “per-
sons participate intrinsically in each other’s existence” (Sahlins, 2011, p. 2). For 
the Cree people, both animate and inanimate things might be welcomed into their 
“circle of kinship” (wahkohtowin), but AI in particular might prove to be a hard 
case because of its perceived lack of “humanness” or “naturalness” (Lewis et al., 
2018, p. 7). For the Lakota, the interiority (i.e., consciousness, intentionality, soul, 
etc.) of an entity is crucial to its status, although such attributes of internal life 
may be extended to members of the nonhuman world through their possession of 
spirits. Because AI is constructed out of earth materials that exhibit interiority due 
to the spirits contained within them, its agency lies within the natural elements 
used in its production. In essence, according to Lakota ontology, the ultimate 
materiality of technology establishes the spiritual link that brings humans and 
nonhumans into reciprocal relationships with one another. The diversity of per-
spectives among Indigenous groups briefly described here suggests that the pros-
pects for relational personhood held by intelligent machines might vary greatly 
across traditional cultures. 
The personhoods discussed in this chapter are all crucial to the question of 
rights for robots. However, most work on this question references only one kind 
of personhood, neglecting the important ways in which personhoods connect 
and how these connections affect the conclusions reached. As mentioned above, 
psychological personhood is often viewed as a precursor to moral personhood, 
which some have argued determines legal personhood. Others counter that dem-
onstrating psychological personhood directly qualifies an entity for legal person-
hood. The addition of a fourth kind—relational personhood—renders the picture 
more complex. As detailed in this section, each of the other three personhood 
types relies on assumptions that are, I argue, fundamentally relational in nature. 
The criteria for psychological and moral personhood are properties possessed by 
humans. As such, entities can qualify for either of these types to the extent that 
we, humans, can relate to them. 
While scholars have yet to identify the magical combination of properties that 
conclusively delimits the kinds of entities worthy of psychological or moral per-
sonhood, legal personhood has proven, at least in theory, more bounded, though 
not without controversy. The main argument surrounding legal personhood holds 
that its extension to nonhuman entities is warranted when doing so helps resolve 
conflicts between humans. It is not because courts view natural persons and their 
artificial brethren as literal kin. Legal personhood is “generally accepted as a use-
ful fiction” (Youatt, 2017, p. 43). It is useful to us. 
Western legal systems evolved in such a way so as to grant corporations and
ships admittance to courtrooms full not of their peers, but of humans for whom
treating nonhumans as legal persons is expedient, if awkward, idiosyncratic, and
historically variable. Therefore, the first three types of personhood are relational in
the sense that they reflect human qualities (i.e., the conditions under which we can
relate to other entities) and structure relations between humans and nonhumans
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human-created world). It is through qualities shared or relationships with humans
that nonhuman entities gain identities and qualify for one or another type of per-
sonhood. Importantly, relational personhood also serves to bridge the gap between
Western and non-Western perspectives on personhood. Considering on equal foot-
ing the myriad ways in which humans relate to nonhumans raises the possibility of
disrupting the dominant rights paradigm with more inclusive models. 
Distinguishing among statuses: Moral and legal 
Under the conventional approach that moves from determining what an entity is
to how it ought to be treated, an intermediate step along the path from person-
hood to rights involves assessing an entity’s moral or legal status. The presence or 
absence of certain ontological properties dictates the status of a being in question, 
with attendant consequences for the range of incidents that might apply to it. In 
other words, the properties possessed by an entity determine the form of person-
hood for which it qualifies, which in turn affects whether it can be seen as a moral 
agent or moral patient, and/or a legal subject or legal object. I argue that relations 
are also relevant to this analysis. The kinds of properties deemed integral to moral 
status ascriptions reflect human-like traits that facilitate identification with non-
human entities, and the capacities central to qualifying for legal status represent 
how dominant actors in legal systems construct relations with other beings when 
convenient or normatively appropriate. This section seeks to sketch these ideas in 
greater detail by unpacking the antecedents of and differences between moral and 
legal statuses with an eye towards understanding the kinds of benefits or burdens 
an entity might face. 
First, the properties associated with psychological and moral personhood 
(i.e., consciousness, intelligence, rationality, sentience, etc.) directly influence an 
entity’s moral status. Just like with personhood, there is no precise or widely 
agreed-upon combination of properties that clearly identifies a moral agent or 
moral patient. For present purposes, more general definitions of these terms will 
have to suffice. Broadly speaking, “[w]hereas a moral agent is something that has 
duties or obligations, a moral patient is something owed at least one duty or obli-
gation” (Himma, 2009, p. 21). While moral agents are often also moral patients 
(i.e., adult humans), the reverse is not necessarily true (i.e., human infants). The 
main difference lies in the extent to which an actor can be deemed accountable for 
her actions. To this end, two capacities are associated with moral agency—free 
will and understanding the difference between right and wrong (Himma, 2009, 
pp. 22–23).19 By contrast, moral patiency requires “the capacity to be acted upon 
in ways that can be evaluated as good or evil” (K. Gray & Wegner, 2009, p. 506). 
Of course, this definition indicates more about a given society, its social norms, 
and the kinds of beings it affords moral consideration than it does the characteris-
tics of a particular entity. One need only look at animal-welfare laws around the 
world to observe that domesticated pets like dogs and cats can qualify as moral 
patients in many jurisdictions given contemporary human sentiment regarding 
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Scholars writing on AI and robot ethics have engaged in a vigorous debate over 
whether or not technological entities might qualify for moral agency or moral 
patiency (or both). To begin, Arp (2005) reverses the logical order of the scheme 
outlined in the previous section, arguing that, inter alia, a being needs to be “con-
sidered a responsible moral agent” in order to be a person (p. 121).20 Writing spe-
cifically about androids in the science fiction film series Star Wars, Arp concludes 
that R2-D2 and C-3PO possess other traits inherent to personhood—reason/ 
rationality, mental states, language, and participating in social relationships—but 
he sidesteps the issue of their moral agency entirely. Johnson (2006) adheres to 
the Western philosophical account of moral agency, which privileges behavior 
that exhibits autonomy, intentionality, and responsibility, all of which imply the 
existence of mental states. But to move from moral agency to action, these inter-
nal traits must produce an act rationally directed at a moral patient in the external 
world. In the end, she finds that while computers might be able to satisfy most 
of these criteria, their intentionality is ultimately not their own but rather that 
of programmers, the system, and the user. Therefore, intelligent machines might 
be more appropriately classified as “moral entities but not alone moral agents” 
(Johnson, 2006, p. 203; emphasis omitted). 
Sullins (2006) urges that robots need to satisfy three requirements in order to 
be considered moral agents—significant autonomy from operators or program-
mers, behavior that can only be explained by intentionality, and actions that con-
vey a sense of responsibility towards another moral agent (p. 25). Interestingly, 
he also maintains that evidence of these behaviors directly qualifies a robot for 
moral rights whether or not they enjoy personhood. However, as indicated here, 
the ontological properties that underlie Sullins’s behaviors are the very same that 
determine an entity’s psychological or moral personhood. Gunkel (2012) remarks 
that inquiring about the kind of moral status intelligent machines might possess 
has largely proven to be a failed enterprise. He adds that this line of investi-
gation has instead cast doubt on the moral agency of humans. Previewing the 
argument he makes at length in Robot Rights, Gunkel observes that endeavoring 
to define moral agency prior to encountering another entity is a fool’s errand. 
Determinations regarding moral agency arise in the course of interacting and 
establishing relationships with others. The pertinent issue, as Gunkel sees it, is 
whether or not nonhuman entities are moral patients to whom we have moral 
duties and responsibilities. 
Marx and Tiefensee (2015) proffer strict guidelines governing the demonstra-
tion of moral agency, which hinge on the ability of entities to “be held morally 
responsible for their actions” (p. 72). This responsibility depends upon an actor’s 
rationality and autonomy. The authors conclude that while current robots are not 
sufficiently autonomous to qualify as moral agents, future robots operating under 
strong AI might if they come to understand and act upon moral obligations. More 
recently, Bryson (2018) refers to a moral agent as “something deemed responsible 
by a society for its actions” and a moral patient as “something a society deems 
itself responsible for preserving the well being of” (p. 16). As a skeptic of any 






44 Getting to rights
subject that mirrors the pragmatism described in the context of legal personhood 
for corporations and ships. That is, the only justifications for treating intelligent 
systems as moral agents would be that doing so would enable greater human con-
trol over technology and that the benefits of such AI would outweigh the loss of 
human moral responsibility. Crucially for Bryson, moral status ascription is a 
zero-sum game. At best, society could deem intelligent machines second-order 
moral patients that do not compete with human interests, but avoiding the crea-
tion of such advanced technological entities would be the more preferable route. 
The survey of extant literature provided here offers tentative support for 
Gunkel’s (2012) objection—theory on moral agency in the context of AI and 
robots is “confused and messy” (p. 91). The philosophical works reviewed in this 
section reach a range of conclusions about the moral agency of technological enti-
ties, including that it does not apply, should not apply, does not yet apply, might 
apply, and is less relevant than moral patiency. Most of the scholarship discussed 
above adheres to a properties-based approach to moral status that leads to a com-
petition whose victor remains elusive. In the face of such indeterminacy, it stands 
to reason that alternatives like the relational approach should at least be allowed 
to enter the race. For the moment, the only meaningful conclusion about moral 
agency/patiency that this non-philosopher can endorse is that there is no settled 
upon grouping of ontological properties that one can point to in order to justify 
ascription of one status or the other. However, if we accept that relational person-
hood precedes its psychological and moral variants, we move in what I argue is 
a more productive direction—probing the interaction effects between properties 
and relations to better understand the conditions under which encounters among 
entities lead to recognition in various contexts. 
Second, the equally messy world of legal personhood and its constituent prop-
erties informs the determination of an entity’s legal status. The confusion begins 
with the fact that the term “legal subject” (Rechtssubjekt) is used in civil law 
jurisdictions to denote all legal persons, while those writing from the perspective 
of common law traditions distinguish between natural and artificial persons, as 
mentioned earlier (Kurki & Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. viii). To make matters even 
murkier, as shown above, some observers argue that legal personhood itself is 
ultimately dependent upon the presence of properties associated with psychologi-
cal and moral personhoods. For example, Solaiman (2017) states that in order to 
enjoy legal personhood, an entity needs to be capable of being a legal subject. 
Next, in order to be a legal subject, a being must be able to exercise rights and per-
form duties. Finally, in order to exercise rights, an entity needs to exhibit aware-
ness and choice. These last two traits reflect the cognitive functioning of the entity 
in question, and thus relate to properties identified with psychological and moral 
personhood. As such, Solaiman’s notion of legal subject includes Kurki’s concept 
of legal competence. 
A seemingly minor but nonetheless important definitional divide centers on 
whether it is enough that an entity is capable of holding rights in order for it to be 
considered a legal subject (which itself is determined by evidence of conceptual 
or legal capacity, according to Kurki), or whether it must actively possess rights to 
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achieve that legal status. Solaiman resides in the former camp along with Knauer 
(2003), for whom capacity serves as the linchpin of legal status. She writes that 
“the determination of incapacity represents a crucial dividing line between legal 
subjects and those who are the object of legal protections” (Knauer, 2003, p. 323; 
emphasis added). While legal subjects possess legal competence and can be held 
responsible for their actions, legal objects (i.e., property) lack legal competence 
and cannot be held responsible for their actions. A member of the opposing camp, 
Turner (2019) contends that “[a] legal subject is an entity which holds rights and 
obligations in a given system. The status of legal subject is something which is 
thrust upon a person, animal or thing” (p. 42; emphasis added). Here, it is the 
possession of rights, not merely the capacity to possess them, that determines the 
legal status of an entity already found to obtain legal personhood. Turner adds that 
a “legal agent” is a subtype of legal subject that “can control and change its behav-
iour and understand the legal consequences of its actions or omissions” (Turner, 
2019, p. 43). This subtype evokes the cognitive abilities of an entity, which again 
speak to properties underlying psychological and moral personhoods.21 
Setting aside the properties-based debate between capacity and possession of 
rights, another way of addressing the question of legal status proceeds on rela-
tional grounds. Here, what matters are not the characteristics of an entity, but the 
way in which it relates to other, often more powerful, entities. Ownership and 
recognition are two avenues through which relationships, and thus legal statuses, 
gain clarification. In many jurisdictions, if something is owned it is an object, 
not a legal subject (Cullinan, 2003, p. 77). Objects (not in the purely ontological 
sense, but in the legal world) are considered property, lacking the agency neces-
sary to participate in legal relations. In its classic legal interpretation, property 
represents “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe” (Blackstone, 1766, p. 2). Under this view, the con-
cept of property is laden with imbalanced power relations. A more modern take 
on property advances a relational perspective defined by obligations people have 
towards others (Davies, 2007, p. 2). Thus, while the traditional interpretation of 
property draws a bright line between objects and subjects (affording the latter 
exclusive rights over the former), a more contemporary assessment at least con-
siders how one’s use of property holds implications for those outside of immedi-
ate ownership relations, even if it does not disrupt the object–subject distinction. 
Recognition offers another means of altering legal status. By deliberately ele-
vating the position of a class of entities within a legal system (i.e., recognizing 
their legal personhood), new actors emerge to find themselves suddenly instilled 
with legal competence, if not legal capacity. The progressive extension of legal 
recognition from land-owning men to marginalized groups such as Indigenous 
peoples and women serves as a case in point (Vermeylen, 2017, p. 159). This 
gradual expansion of the legal circle demonstrates the contingent and fictive foun-
dation upon which the concept of legal subject rests. Power dynamics are thus an 
inescapable part of recognition, as status changes are given effect by those who 
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In fairness to the analysts discussed in this section, disciplinary silos and 
appropriately tailored research questions have caused the intellectual quests to 
explain the basis for moral status and legal status to occur in parallel. I have 
argued that there is much these pursuits share in common given their emphases 
on ontological properties. However, the story does not end there. I have also sug-
gested that despite the seemingly separate pathways through which psychological 
and moral personhoods inform moral status and through which legal personhood 
dictates legal status, both of these statuses are influenced by mechanisms of rela-
tional personhood. The extent to which nonhuman entities appear and behave in 
ways similar to us and the degree to which they prove capable of performing roles 
that grant them entrance into institutions designed by us determine the status they 
hold. While at present the properties-driven criteria used for deciphering moral or 
legal status seem unsettled at best and unhelpful at worst, a relational approach, 
though at times anthropocentric in nature, offers a useful alternative for determin-
ing these statuses. The next challenge involves demonstrating how these statuses 
interface with a range of incidents, including our main interest—rights. 
Distinguishing among incidents: Moral and legal 
Defining rights at times seems like a Sisyphean task. Questions abound as to their 
origins, referents, applications, and limits. What is the basis for their extension? 
To whom do they apply? Under what conditions? What do we do when one per-
son’s rights conflict with those of another? The difficulty of establishing precise 
boundaries around the concept of rights is amplified by the fact that the term has 
been used to describe different relationships among actors in the legal system 
(Shestack, 1998, p. 203). In an effort to clarify the range of legal relations that 
may exist among persons beyond the common catch-all categories of rights and 
duties,22 Hohfeld (1913) developed a typology outlining a series of opposite and 
correlative incidents. Pairs of opposites include the following: rights/no-rights, 
privileges/duties, powers/disabilities, and immunities/liabilities. Correlative legal 
relations are also divided into four pairings: rights/duties, privileges/no-rights, 
powers/liabilities, and immunities/disabilities. 
The idea of opposite incidents is fairly self-explanatory. If one possesses a(n) 
right/privilege/power/immunity, the absence of such a benefit would indicate a 
no-right/duty/disability/liability. Correlatives are a bit more complex. In this lat-
ter category, one’s possession of a(n) right/privilege/power/immunity implies the 
reciprocal duty/no-right/liability/disability of another. Of particular interest are 
rights and duties. The former are derived from the latter, which constitute “obliga-
tions to refrain from over-interfering with a party exercising his or her privilege” 
(Manus, 1998, p. 574). For example, if X has a right to vote, Y has a correlative 
duty not to impede on X’s ability to cast a ballot in an election. Thus, correlatives 
describe legal relations in which one’s enjoyment of a legally sanctioned benefit 
necessarily imposes restrictions on another as a means of protecting the first per-
son from potential violations committed by the second. Importantly, this scheme 
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the person possessing the right) or the agent (i.e., the person who has a duty not to 
infringe upon that right) (Gunkel, 2018, p. 29). 
Hohfeldian incidents have been the subject of extensive discussion in philo-
sophical and legal circles, but they are mainly descriptive, not prescriptive (Kelch, 
1999, p. 8); that is, they do not provide a normative basis for the specific content 
of legal duties, rights, and so on. Rather, they simply chart the universe of legal 
relations among human beings, whom the author considered to be the only proper 
subjects of law (Hohfeld, 1917, p. 721). Fortunately, some writers have taken up 
the mantle of unpacking and critiquing this typology in order to assess its utility 
in specific domains of law, especially where nonhuman entities are concerned. 
Sumner (1987) examines the prospect for animal rights using a Hohfeldian 
framework. He finds that animals would not qualify for rights under this scheme 
because they do not possess the capacity to adhere to normative rules. Manus 
(1998) describes how Hohfeld’s incidents apply to environmental matters before 
the law. He determines that the scheme’s usefulness resides in its distinction 
between rights and privileges. In the United States, the legal presumption is that 
relations involving the environment are characterized by privileges, not rights. 
For example, while the privilege of accessing a public beach does not imply a 
legal right to beach access, others have no right to limit our access to or despoil 
this natural amenity. However, still others might simultaneously possess the privi-
lege of exploiting nature.23 Kelch (1999) holds that the Hohfeldian foundation 
for rights—the existence of correlative duties—denies the plurality of sources 
from which rights emerge. The author offers an alternative foundation for rights 
that applies in the specific context of animals. Here, since emotions influence our 
conception of morality, and morality affects the choices we make regarding the 
kinds of entities extended legal rights, emotions must affect our determination of 
rights. Thus, our emotional reactions to animals help us understand their interests, 
and it is through identifying these interests that we can assess the extent to which 
animals deserve rights. 
Gunkel (2018) reiterates the criticism that Hohfeld’s framework “does not 
explain who has a right or why” (p. 30). He adds that while Hohfeldian inci-
dents were initially conceived to flesh out legal rights, they have been adapted to 
describe moral and political rights as well (Gunkel, 2018, p. 27). This is a crucial 
point, as some analysts have equivocated between moral and legal rights with-
out fully acknowledging the different properties, personhoods, and statuses from 
which they stem. Perhaps the most well-known translation of Hohfeld’s work 
into the domain of morality is Wellman’s (1985) A Theory of Rights. Here, the 
author identifies five moral positions that correspond to the legal incidents found 
in Hohfeld’s scheme. Each of these positions has a correlative of sorts, although 
some involve the possessor while others reflect reciprocal obligations held by sec-
ond or (in the case of moral sanctions) third parties. The positions and their correl-
atives (roughly) are as follows: moral duties/sanctions, moral claims/duties, moral 
liberties/no-duties, moral powers/intentions, and moral immunities/no-abilities.24 
Together, these positions constitute moral rights and explain the roles played by 
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As Solum (1992) rightly pointed out nearly three decades ago, determining 
legal personhood (and by extension legal rights) does not follow the same inves-
tigative path used to assess moral status (p. 1240, n. 36). The kinds of legal inci-
dents relevant to parties engaged in legal relations depend on an entity’s status 
as a legal subject/object, which reflects the extent to which it qualifies for legal 
personhood. The kinds of moral positions that apply to actors in a given situation 
can be traced back to an entity’s status as a moral agent/patient and the extent to 
which it qualifies for psychological or moral personhood. However, I argue that 
what legal and moral personhoods have in common are their underlying relational 
characteristics. Indeed, as Wellman (1985) observes, Hohfeld’s legal positions 
are essentially relational in nature. As mentioned in the previous section, legal 
and moral personhoods are predicated on the presence of properties associated 
with humans and the extent to which extending personhood serves human pur-
poses. The legal and moral incidents/positions described in this section represent 
an extension of these subjective rules. That there are moral positions analogous 
to the legal ones and that morals are fundamentally relational in the sense that 
they govern relations among members of society suggests that relationality is a 
conceptual, though not causal, thread that connects legal and moral personhoods 
and their attendant incidents/positions. 
Having defined the requisite properties/mechanisms, personhoods, statuses, 
and positions/incidents, and demonstrated the relationships between them, it now 
becomes possible to construct a visual representation of the concepts relevant to 
this study and how they interface with each other (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 conveys how the various concepts described earlier relate to one
another. The relationships are associational, not causal, in nature. Connectors
featuring arrows depict the directionality of logical sequencing among concepts.
Connectors without arrows simply display related concepts whose direction of
influence remains undefined. The more complete the line of the connector, the
stronger the association between concepts (i.e., solid lines express stronger rela-
tionships than dashed lines, which entail relationships stronger than those denoted
by dotted lines). For instance, under a conventional approach, an entity that exhib-
its rationality might qualify for moral personhood, which is a quality possessed
prior to determining an entity’s status as a moral agent or moral patient. Identifying
whether an entity qualifies as a moral agent or a moral patient influences the kinds
of moral positions (Wellman’s translation of Hohfeldian legal incidents) that apply
to it. The far-left side of the image demonstrates how ontological properties differ
qualitatively from mechanisms. Whereas ontological properties feed into legal
ones and various groups of properties relate to different forms of personhood,
mechanisms (fifth and sixth boxes on the bottom left) lead to determinations about
the existence of relational personhood—the antecedent to other personhoods. Yet,
mechanisms and properties are reflexively related to one another; the directional-
ity of those relationships remains unclear. Then psychological/moral and legal
personhoods shuffle into their respective statuses. Finally, the kind of status an
entity is determined to possess affects the sorts of moral positions or legal inci-
dents to which it is entitled. To summarize, relational mechanisms active in both
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Western and non-Western cultures underlie the extent to which we meaningfully
relate to nonhuman entities and seek to incorporate them into human institutions. 
The penultimate section of this chapter brings us—at last—to rights. In particu-
lar, I review rights theories and explore how they relate to the concepts depicted in 
the above map. The objectives here are to understand the conceptual implications 
associated with alternate rights theories and to assess which theory provides a 
stronger basis for extending rights to nonhuman entities. 
Hohfeld’s lacuna: Will and interest theories of rights 
While Hohfeld’s framework specifies the kinds of legal relations that exist 
between entities, it does not explain the conditions under which entities might be 
entitled to rights. As mentioned above, Hohfeld held that legal relations were the 
province of humans alone.26 He did not consider whether other types of entities 
might participate in such relations, thus denying the possibility that rights could 
be extended to nonhumans. This section seeks to address the gap in Hohfeld’s 
work by introducing theories of rights that offer alternate accounts of their func-
tion and application with an eye towards assessing whether or not nonhuman enti-
ties might be eligible for rights. 
Generally speaking, there are two main schools of thought on the purpose of 
rights. In will (or choice) theory, rights offer a vehicle for the demonstration of 
agency. Their purpose is to “afford the rights-holder the autonomy to control 
duties which are owed to her by others, thereby protecting individual autonomy” 
(Dodsworth et al., 2018, p. 3). Rights respect the choice a person makes “either 
negatively by not impeding it … or affirmatively by giving legal or moral effect to 
it” (Finnis, 2011, p. 204). Only individuals who can elect to impose or waive duties 
that others have towards them are capable of holding rights (Marx & Tiefensee, 
2015, p. 72). Clearly then, a certain level of cognitive functioning is required to 
execute such decisions, which limits the class of entities that may claim rights 
under this theory (Kurki, 2017, p. 79). Intuitively, this logic appears reasonable 
and even defensible. Rights demanded and exercised by the rights-bearer enjoy 
legitimacy. One theorist goes as far as to conclude that “[r]ights are only secure 
and effective when they are an expression of autonomy, the creation and posses-
sion of their bearers” (Ingram, 2008, p. 414; emphasis added). Therefore, will 
theory would seem to require that an entity possess certain ontological properties 
associated with the capacity for agency (i.e., consciousness, intelligence, inten-
tionality, sentience, etc.) in order to qualify as a potential rights-holder. 
Without referencing it directly, Shelton (2014) invokes the spirit of will theory 
when she elaborates on the characteristics of an entity that entitle it to rights: 
[r]ights … presuppose autonomous and aware agents, capable of rational 
choice and moral deliberation, and thus capable of being held responsible for 
their actions. Such agents must also engage in the basic act of mutual recogni-
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Here, legal rights depend on a demonstration of moral agency, although, as dis-
cussed earlier, these concepts are not necessarily connected because they speak 
to different kinds of statuses and personhoods. One thing that interpretations of 
will theory have in common is their reliance on a menu of ontological properties 
from which a number of items are selected. The property(ies) selected become 
the basis(es) against which eligibility for rights is judged. The problems with this 
approach are that (1) there is little agreement among experts as to which property 
or combination of properties is sufficient to justify the extension of rights, and 
(2) finding a way to operationalize and empirically demonstrate the possession of 
certain properties has thus far proven elusive. 
One might argue, however, that will theory is not fully foreclosed to the pos-
sibility of rights for nonhuman entities. In order to make a compelling case for 
rights eligibility, such a being would have to exhibit some semblance of auton-
omy, consciousness, rationality, and so on that could be readily interpreted as 
such by human observers. Thus, one could apply Danaher’s (2020) “ethical 
behaviourism” (see Chapter One) to the realm of rights in an effort to determine 
which nonhuman entities act in ways that are performatively equivalent to those 
entities already deemed to possess rights on the basis of the aforementioned prop-
erties. On its face, externally approximating the possession of ontological proper-
ties poses less of an obstacle for humanoid robots operating under strong AI than 
it does for animals or nature. Should such a robot advocate for rights of its own, it 
might present humanity with a hard case for the extension of rights since “rights 
arise from, and must be based on, the activity of their bearers” (Ingram, 2008,
p. 413). So far, neither animals nor nature have made such political overtures. 
The opposing perspective is represented by interest (or benefit) theory, which 
stipulates that the purpose of rights is to protect a person’s core interests. Instead 
of affording rights to only those entities capable of claiming or rejecting entitle-
ments given their possession of certain properties, interest theory finds “that any 
subject which possesses or is capable of possessing interests may bear rights, 
as long as the corresponding interest is sufficiently important to justify ascrib-
ing duties onto others” (Dodsworth et al., 2018, p. 3). Applying this theory to 
Hohfeld’s framework, interests and duties would form a pair of correlative inci-
dents. Of course, such interests would need to be adequately defined and deter-
mined to be “sufficiently important” in order to justify requiring others to uphold 
concomitant duties. For Caney (2006), such “highly valued interests” include 
“liberty of conscience, association, and expression” (p. 259). 
How do we know which and whose interests are integral to determining rights, 
and whether some interests might take precedence over others? By adapting a 
theoretical classificatory scheme developed by Lee (1999, pp. 184–185), inter-
ests can be arrayed along two sets of axes that identify a range of core concerns 
according to the centrality of humans and the scope of subjects involved—(1) 
anthropocentric versus non-anthropocentric, and (2) individualist versus holist. 
When considered in tandem, the positions along these axes can be combined, pro-
ducing four distinct categories. I describe each position in terms of the interests 
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To begin, anthropocentric individualism is an unlikely platform for pushing 
rights into the realm of the nonhuman. This position, emerging from the canon 
of Western philosophy in general and the work of Descartes in particular, prior-
itizes the individual human on the basis of interests intrinsic to the human species, 
such as autonomy and liberty. One interpretation of this position contends that 
human rights are grounded in possession of “normative agency,” or “the capac-
ity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life” (Griffin, 2008,
p. 45), and only humans (presently) have this ability. This capacity presupposes 
the possession of certain properties like consciousness and rationality. However, 
if a nonhuman entity could define its own conception of a worthwhile life (i.e., 
interests) and takes steps to pursue this vision, it might qualify for moral person-
hood, moral agency, and thus moral rights. Still, this approach seems unable to 
look beyond what are perceived as exclusively human interests that serve the ulti-
mate purpose of safeguarding the uniquely human quality of normative agency. 
Anthropocentric holism offers an arguably more encouraging route. One
example of this position creates space for considering the interests of nonhu-
mans, but only insofar as they relate to human values. This “weak anthropo-
centrism” (Norton, 1984) stipulates that nonhuman entities do not necessarily
hold interests of their own that warrant protecting, but rather it is through the
pursuit of human-centered interests (i.e., continued access to natural resources)
that other beings such as ecosystems find themselves the objects of concern.
Here, the focus is not so much on the qualities of nonhuman entities that suggest
humans have moral obligations towards them. Instead, it is through the satisfac-
tion of human interests that other kinds of entities might enjoy spillover effects
that positively impact interests relevant to their flourishing or survival. This
kind of indirect moral concern does not translate into rights for nonhumans,
however, as such beings are not capable of fulfilling the minimum conditions
necessary to possess rights (Norton, 1982). 
Non-anthropocentric individualism identifies interests that apply across spe-
cies but to singular entities. Interests related to this position include, inter alia, 
enjoying a quality life (Regan, 1987) and not being harmed (Pietrzykowski, 2017). 
Importantly, these interests stem from consciousness and sentience—ontological 
properties associated with psychological personhood. In terms of distinguishing 
rights theories, this is problematic, as the properties required for the possession 
of interests are some of the same found in will theory. If we accept that these 
properties are in some sense dispositive of an entity’s eligibility for moral or legal 
consideration, then the rights theories become epiphenomenal to a certain set of 
characteristics, which would take on a more fundamental role in the determination 
of rights. At the risk of seeming redundant, I maintain that this position suffers 
from the same flaws that tarnish the utility of will theory—there is no agreement 
regarding which properties are the most important to have, and we lack ways of 
empirically verifying their presence in other beings.27 For the moment, suffice 
it to say that non-anthropocentric individualism might only duplicate some of 
the challenges regarding the ascription of rights for nonhuman entities observed 
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Finally, non-anthropocentric holism concerns the interests of all things com-
prising the whole, not just humans. Such interests include protecting the integ-
rity, stability, and beauty of ecosystems (Naess, 1973; Fox, 1984), and promoting 
the wellbeing of all living beings (Taylor, 1981).28 This position seems the most 
inclusive of the four, as potentially anything that advances interests pertaining 
to the maintenance of entire ecosystems could be entitled to rights designed to 
protect that function. Here, it is not the properties possessed by individual sub-
jects that secure their admission to the community of rights bearers. Rather, rights 
serve the purpose of safeguarding the functioning of larger systems consisting 
of a wide range of entities, all of which play some part in preserving the whole. 
Although animals and nature are among the most obvious nonhuman members of 
this community, in principle anything that contributes to the vitality of a social-
ecological system might possess rights. Moving from a strictly natural science-
oriented ecology to a “radically relational ecology” (Coeckelbergh, 2010, p. 216) 
could expand the list of potentially rights-bearing entities to include nonhuman, 
inorganic technological beings.29 
While Hohfeld is rightly credited with having defined the range of legal rela-
tions that may occur between subjects, his framework neglected to describe the 
kinds of entities eligible to partake in such relations. Reviewing the two major 
rights theories—will theory and interest theory—offers both clarity and complex-
ity on the issue. Will theory unapologetically affords rights to only those capable 
of exercising their individual agency, which renders this approach vulnerable to 
the criticisms that we still don’t know what property or mix of properties provides 
the soundest basis for rights, and that we don’t have a universally accepted way 
of assessing the presence or absence of these properties. In addition, realizing that 
setting such a high bar might infringe upon the would-be rights of humans with 
cognitive deficiencies, courts have determined that such individuals still qualify 
for legal personhood and thus legal rights due to the inherent dignity they possess 
as humans (Cupp, 2017, p. 488). As I have argued, this circular reasoning does lit-
tle to help us understand whether entities other than humans might enjoy rights.30 
Interest theory suggests a wider array of possibilities. Positions relating to 
individualism entail interests that appear to require the possession of ontologi-
cal properties, making them akin to will theory on a fundamental level. These 
positions leave little leeway for nonhuman entities aside from those who possess 
human-like cognitive capabilities that remain empirically challenging to define 
and verify. By contrast, positions promoting holism speak more broadly to, or 
are at least more ambivalent about, the kinds of interests integral to rights. These 
positions seem more amenable to extending rights to nonhumans.31 While non-
anthropocentric views are hospitable to the idea of interests possessed by nonhu-
mans, even some anthropocentric perspectives find value in interest theory. For 
instance, one scholar holds that, of the two rights theories reviewed here, interests 
offer the “better view … because otherwise humans who are incapable of making 
choices (such as infants, the handicapped and comatose) would not have rights” 
(Peters, 2016, p. 43). Overall, interest theory appears more likely than will theory 











54 Getting to rights
Conclusion 
The main objectives of this chapter were to clear up terminological inconsisten-
cies among cognate concepts and demonstrate how they logically relate to one 
another. A subsidiary objective involved interrogating these concepts to assess 
the extent to which they might accommodate nonhuman entities. I have shown 
how different ontological properties or relational mechanisms are associated with 
different forms of personhood. Importantly, I have also argued that properties are 
themselves relational in nature, as are the conventional types of personhood. This 
argument has three implications for the assignment of rights. First, the traditional 
view in philosophy that what an entity is precedes how we ought to treat it is not 
as cleanly linear as many allege. Human tendencies and normative approaches to 
embracing alterity are intrinsically bound up with properties that entities reveal to 
us through the process of interaction. Thus far, no one has been able to definitively 
state which property(ies) is/are required for personhood and, eventually, rights. 
For the time being, it is enough to conclude that human relations with nonhuman 
entities are complex, contingent, and culturally determined, so to err on the side 
of caution, we should remain open to the possibilities that inhere in relationships 
of all kinds when questions of rights for nonhumans arise. Second, relational per-
sonhood undergirds both moral and legal status and, by extension, the designa-
tion of moral or legal rights. Whether an entity appears similar to us or useful for 
advancing our interests, it is the relational nature of the dyadic arrangement that 
determines whether the entity is worthy of rights. Finally, while extant theories 
of rights offer alternative views on the purpose of rights and the kinds of beings 
eligible for them, both will and interest theories are grounded in relations between 
those who determine the rights of others and those who have rights bestowed 
upon them. However, I contend that given the methodological issues associated 
with the verification of ontological properties, will theory and individualist posi-
tions within interest theory are more analytically troublesome for determining 
which entities qualify for rights. A more helpful approach can be found in holist 
positions on interest theory, although they vary in terms of the degree to which 
interests are based primarily on human concerns. A non-anthropocentric holist 
position potentially offers the strongest basis for extending rights to nonhuman 
and even non-living beings. The next task is to analyze the extent to which theory 
and practice regarding the rights of nonhuman living entities might inform the 
debate over rights for nonhuman technological ones. 
Notes 
1 French (1979) also identifies three forms of personhood, but he refers to what some call 
psychological personhood as “metaphysical” personhood (p. 207). 
2 Although Scott (1990) is clearly describing moral persons, he uses this term synony-
mously with moral personhood (p. 81). 
3 There are several different interpretations of intentionality. In its philosophical under-
standing, intentionality is defined as “that feature of certain mental states by which 
they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world” (Searle, 2008, 
p. 333). In law, intentionality “is concerned more with the concept that people act for 
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reasons which they themselves control” (Calverley, 2008, p. 528). Folk psychology 
offers yet another definition, this time related to actions undertaken to achieve a desired 
outcome, assumptions about the consequences of those actions, and possession of the 
skills required to execute these actions. 
4 But see Grear (2015), who argues that in fact “[t]he so-called ‘natural person’ of law is 
not an embodied, corporeally ‘thick’, flesh and blood human being at all, but a highly 
selective construct” (p. 237). 
5 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
6 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
7 Ibid., at 396. 
8 It is worth mentioning that there exists a rift between the United States and other com-
mon law countries in terms of their legal basis for in rem proceedings. While the U.S. 
has long adhered to a personification doctrine, the U.K. and other common law jurisdic-
tions have moved towards a procedural theory in which “the statutory right of action 
in rem is regarded as a procedural device to flush out the liable shipowner” (Myburgh, 
2005, p. 283). 
9 See United States v. The Schooner Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 
1818); The Phebe, 19 Fed. Cas. 424, No. 11,064 (D. Me. 1837). 
10 United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). 
11 Ibid., at 234. 
12 Confusingly, the author refers to legal personhood as “rights of constitutional person-
hood” (Solum, 1992, p. 1255). I use the phrase legal personhood when discussing the 
author’s argument for the sake of consistency. 
13 For an extensive discussion of the differences between personhood, person, self, and 
identity in the context of anthropological research, see Appell-Warren (2014, Part 
Two). 
14 In most cases, the philosophers discussed here do not actually employ the phrase 
relational personhood, as they are mainly referring to the moral status of nonhuman 
entities. However, what they are arguing for is a kind of moral consideration emerg-
ing from the relations between humans and other beings. Therefore, I am categorizing 
their writings on this subject, which find significant resonance with the anthropological 
works described earlier, as constituting arguments in favor of personhood established 
on a relational basis. 
15 This does not mean, however, that Japanese society is more accepting of robots than 
other cultures or that the reasons for and impacts of such widespread adoption of robots 
are benign. One study showed that Japanese and American faculty members exhibit 
similar attitudes towards robots (MacDorman et al., 2009), while another found that 
Japanese respondents hold more negative attitudes towards robots than do Americans 
(Bartneck et al., 2005). In addition, given Japan’s rapidly aging and shrinking popula-
tion and antipathy towards foreign workers (Tomiura et al., 2019), some have surmised 
that introducing robots into Japanese society will help keep the country’s economy 
afloat while avoiding the need to import migrant labor (Robertson, 2014). A skeptical 
view alleges that the notion of a uniquely Japanese receptivity to robots is deliber-
ately advanced by academia, industry, and government, and researchers in particular 
feed into this trope through work that fails to reflexively examine its own underlying
assumptions about cultural values and the desirability of robots in society (Šabanović, 
2014, p. 360). 
16 To wit, there is a famous robot hobbyist retail store in Akihabara, Tokyo, called 
Tsukumo Robot Kingdom. See https://robot.tsukumo.co.jp/. 
17 But see Stone (1972), who dismisses Shinto myths as “quaint, primitive and archaic” 
(p. 498). 
18 Deep ecology and transpersonal ecology are reviewed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
19 To these two criteria Wetlesen (1999) adds a third—“linguistic competence,” which he 
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answers given” (p. 298). However, for reasons related to a later argument described in 
Chapter Three, I leave this tertiary qualification aside for the moment. 
20 As an example of the terminological inconsistency noted at the outset of this chapter, 
Arp (2005) uses the terms “person” and “personhood” interchangeably, despite the 
conceptual differences identified by anthropologists. 
21 In order to avoid further confusion, I refrain from utilizing this latter category of legal 
entity in favor of adopting Turner’s broader definition of a legal subject. 
22 Theorists disagree about the extent to which Hohfeld’s framework describes different 
kinds of legal relations or different manifestations of rights. While some (i.e., Wenar, 
2005; Rainbolt, 2006; Gunkel, 2018; Turner, 2019) treat all Hohfeldian incidents as 
kinds of rights, others (i.e., Wellman, 1985) argue that only the entire suite of Hohfeldian 
incidents can constitute a right. For present purposes and following Hohfeld’s original 
intentions, I do not treat all legal relations as synonymous with rights. 
23 Hohfeld takes an agnostic position on the subject of competing privileges. This is a 
weakness of his admittedly descriptive framework. 
24 The correlatives listed here represent the interpretive work of this author. Wellman did 
not explicitly enumerate pairs of moral incidents in his work. 
25 Following Hohfeld’s own synonyms, Wellman (1985) prefers to use the term “claim” 
instead of “right” and swaps “privilege” for “liberty.” 
26 But see Rainbolt (2006), who argues that a neo-Hohfeldian understanding of rights 
based on justified-constraint theory would not necessarily prohibit nonhuman entities 
(i.e., rocks) from having rights (p. 197). 
27 I expand on this critique in Chapter Three, which focuses on animal rights. 
28 Taylor (1981) explicitly notes that the interests he describes support the extension of 
legal, not moral, rights (p. 218). 
29 I engage with this argument more fully in Chapter Four. 
30 To wit, Wise (2013) maintains that certain animals possess dignity because of their 
capacity for practical autonomy. I expand on Wise’s argument in Chapter Three. 
31 Non-anthropocentric individualism and non-anthropocentric holism are explored in 
greater detail, respectively, in the context of animal rights (Chapter Three) and the 
rights of nature (Chapter Four). 
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3 The rights of animals 
In search of humanity 
After all, how little we know of the inner life of animals. How few our facts are, 
and how little certain we are of them. 
(Archibald Banks,1874, p. 809)1 
Having clarified the content of concepts that lead to rights and how such concepts 
relate to each other, we now possess firm grounding for exploring theory and prac-
tice regarding rights for certain classes of nonhumans. This chapter focuses on 
animals. It seeks to understand the extent to which the debate over animal rights 
can inform responses to the machine question. In order to accomplish this task, I 
review religious beliefs and intellectual positions about the treatment of animals; 
compare properties-based, direct/indirect, relational, and legal approaches to ani-
mal rights; and examine recent cases in which petitioners attempt to secure rights 
for nonhuman creatures. I argue that while properties-based and direct/indirect 
arguments have resulted in an impasse unlikely to be overcome any time soon, 
relational approaches offer a more promising avenue for animal rights. Further, I 
explain how issues involving anthropocentrism, duties, properties, and inclusive-
ness commonly observed within scholarship and case law on animal rights frus-
trate the translation of this model to the realm of technology. Finally, I conclude 
by describing the conditions under which philosophy and law on animal rights 
might contribute to the discussion regarding rights for robots. 
The treatment of animals: 
Religious and intellectual perspectives 
The treatment of animals has been addressed by a variety of faiths since antiquity 
and debated among intellectuals for centuries. Both Western and Eastern religions 
have advanced a variety of perspectives on the subject, and the ideas put forth 
during the Enlightenment continue to influence conversations about animal ethics 
today. In the space below, I offer a brief overview of how major religious tradi-
tions have characterized their respective ethical orientations towards animals and 
then summarize arguments about the status of animals according to Enlightenment 
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The view found among members of the Jewish faith stems from the Old 
Testament and rabbinic interpretations of the ancient tome, which advocate in 
favor of treating animals with compassion while also permitting the slaughter of 
animals under certain restricted conditions (Vogel, 2001). Christian thought about 
animals, based largely on Biblical scripture and sectarian theology, is often framed 
in terms of the unique place humans occupy in the creation of the world and the 
dominion they enjoy over beasts of the land and sea (Linzey & Regan, 1990,
p. 3). Although for Catholics animals are seen as having neither moral status nor 
moral rights (Linzey, 1989, p. 134), a more charitable reading of the Bible sug-
gests that humans should treat animals with love and compassion due to our moral 
responsibility as creatures created in the image of God (Regan, 1990; Phelps, 
2002). Despite the diversity observed among its sub-traditions, Buddhism in gen-
eral affords ethical significance to animals other than humans (Waldau, 2000). In 
particular, the First Precept of Buddhism, “Do not Kill,” applies to humans and 
animals in equal measure (Phelps, 2004, pp. 48–49). Jainism, while ordaining the 
existence of an ontological divide between humans and animals, nevertheless pro-
motes the ideas that all sentient beings hold the potential for self-transcendence 
and that humans must treat nonhumans in a conscientious and nonviolent man-
ner (Vallely, 2014, p. 52). Hindu faiths support the extension of moral stand-
ing to animals on the basis that they possess a good of their own, which can be 
harmed or advanced by humans (Framarin, 2014, p. 42). However, conflicting 
interpretations of ancient texts suggest that the Hindu perspective on human–ani-
mal relationships is not as uniformly benevolent as many allege (Mawdsley, 2006, 
p. 384). Buddhism, Jainism, and Hindu traditions alike all promote the doctrine of 
ahiṃsā, or “non-injury to all living things and reverence for all life” (DeGrazia, 
2002, p. 6), which is often described as providing a religious foundation for the 
compassionate treatment of animals. In Confucian thought, humans retain a posi-
tion of superiority over animals based on the notion that they are naturally closer 
to one another than they are to nonhumans. Although beings of all kinds hold 
moral value, the worth of animals is assessed according to “how they affect or are 
affected by human beings” (Bao-Er, 2014, p. 88). Followers of Islam observe that 
while Allah created the world for the benefit of humans, the resulting power they 
have over animals comes with certain responsibility. The Qu’ran stipulates that 
animals should only be killed when absolutely necessary, and the very presence 
of animals serves to compel “humans to reflect upon the divine Beneficence they 
receive” (Szűcs et al., 2012, p. 1503). In short, religions across the world con-
vey a diversity of views regarding the relationship between humans and animals, 
although all arguably share a common capacity for doctrinally derived moral and 
ethical consideration for members of the animal kingdom. However, the degree to 
which such religions provide theological footing for a non-anthropocentric ethic 
that affords animals a moral status on par with that bestowed upon humans is still 
the subject of much debate. 
Several notable figures central to the advancement of human reason during 
the Enlightenment have commented on the place of animals in human ethical 
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the tenor of contemporary discourses surrounding animal ethics and animal rights. 
I briefly recount some of the most significant contributions to these discourses 
made by European philosophers, which set the intellectual backdrop for modern 
ethical debates about animals. To begin, French mathematician René Descartes 
(1596–1650) proposed a view of animals that comports with a philosophical 
outlook defined by strict dichotomies—mind/body, man/nature, and nature/cul-
ture. According to Descartes, animals consist of a body without a mind, whereas 
humans possess both. Bereft of reason, language, or a soul, animals are more like 
machines than people (Descartes, 1637/1924, pp. 59–63). For instance, the sea-
sonal migration of swallows demonstrates that they operate with the mechanical 
precision of a clock (Descartes, 1970, p. 207). This view has come to be known as 
Descartes’ doctrine of the “animal machine” (bête-machine) (Cottingham, 1978, 
p. 551). However, his use of a mechanistic analogy should not be taken to mean 
that Descartes believed that animals lack the capacity to feel. On the contrary, his 
writings indicate that he remained “cautiously agnostic on the whole question”
(P. Harrison, 1992, p. 227). 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that animals were 
“not mere machines” because they have a soul that causes the matter comprising 
them to become animate (Kant, 1997, p. 86). However, this conclusion does not 
suggest that animals possess inherent worth or independent moral value, qualities 
that justify the receipt of ethical concern. For Kant, responsibility towards animals 
is intrinsically bound up with our interest in preserving human dignity (Wilson, 
2017, p. 12). The reasoning proceeds as follows. The manner in which humans 
treat animals affects how we come to treat each other. When we practice kindness 
towards animals, we cultivate good moral behavior that guides our interactions 
with other humans. By learning to treat each other well, we advance human dig-
nity. As Kant explained, “[t]ender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane 
feelings towards mankind” (Kant, 1963, p. 240). Importantly, this approach holds 
that animals are not valued for their own sake because they possess a soul. After 
all, they “are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end” (Kant, 
1963, p. 239). For Kant, humans do not have direct duties towards animals. Our 
treatment of animals reflects indirect duties we have towards other humans. 
The final voice of Enlightenment thinking regarding animals discussed here is 
English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). While Bentham wrote little 
about animals and is more well known for founding the moral theory of utili-
tarianism, his brief remarks on the topic greatly influenced arguments made by 
animal liberation advocates such as Peter Singer.2 In the span of a long footnote, 
Bentham raised four contentions about animals in the context of a comment on the 
kinds of entities capable of experiencing happiness. First, upon questioning why 
animals had not been afforded protection through legislation, he concluded that 
there is no good reason for this omission other than human fear and the inability of 
animals to convey their interests. Second, Bentham found that withholding rights 
on the basis that a being is an animal was just as unjustifiable as doing so because 
of a person’s skin color, given that both animals and slaves are sensitive beings. 
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is problematic, as some animals are more rational than human infants.3 Fourth, 
Bentham proposed his own criterion for ethical consideration—a being’s capacity 
to feel pain. His now-famous line of inquiry stated that “the question is not, Can 
they reason? nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, 1879, p. 311; 
emphasis in original). Although Bentham was by one account “the first Western 
philosopher to grant animals equal consideration from within a comprehensive, 
non-religious moral theory,” he did not reject the practice of killing animals “as 
long as a pointless cruelty could be avoided” (Kniess, 2019, p. 556). Thus, while 
Bentham is widely credited with having contributed positively to the case for ani-
mal rights, this legacy glosses over the complexity of his perspective about animal 
treatment more generally. 
The Enlightenment resulted in some significant developments in the area 
of animal ethics that were largely untethered from religious doctrine. While 
Descartes argued for a clean separation between humans and animals by virtue of 
the latter’s mechanical, not mental, existence, Kant created space for the ethical 
consideration of animals, but it was carved out in unmistakably anthropocentric 
terms. Bentham’s relatively minor contribution has had perhaps the most pro-
found impact of the three perspectives recounted here. He posited that the capac-
ity for suffering was the true measure by which an entity’s eligibility for ethical 
treatment under the law should be assessed. As we shall see in the next section, 
these ideas have continued to shape conversations about animal ethics as they 
pertain to concepts such as personhood, status, and rights. 
Animal rights: Properties-based, direct/ 
indirect, relational, and legal approaches 
The field of animal ethics has long had as its central (normative) goal deriving a 
philosophical formula for the substantiation of animal rights. In some ways, the 
literature on this topic has led to important insights that have invigorated broader 
discussions about what it means to be human and the scope of the moral circle. In 
other ways, its focus on the qualities that animals share with humans has almost 
inevitably fostered a rather stale debate over the type of human trait that offers the 
most compelling grounds for treating animals like more than mere machines. In 
this section, I review arguments from philosophy and law that address the ques-
tion of animal rights. I also discuss efforts that seek to apply lessons from the 
animal rights debate to the machine question. I close by revealing some of the ter-
minological, conceptual, and empirical issues that aggravate the ability to obtain 
consensus and move forward with practical implementation of animal rights. 
Most arguments in favor of extending rights to animals adopt a non-anthro-
pocentric, individualist stance. That is, humans are not the only entities worthy 
of rights, which are bestowed upon individuals, not collectivities such as ecosys-
tems.4 However, the underlying reasoning employed in these arguments is often 
implicitly anthropocentric, as it hinges on how well animals approximate human-
like qualities (i.e., properties-based approaches); how the treatment of animals is 
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mechanisms by which animals are recognized involve human tendencies or action 
(i.e., relational approaches); or a range of human-centered ideas about the status 
of animals in the domain of law (i.e., legal approaches). As shown in the previous 
chapter, the determination of rights begins with an accounting of properties or 
mechanisms that leads to a given form of personhood, followed by the evaluation 
of an entity’s moral or legal status. Figuring out which rights apply in accordance 
with a certain rights theory constitutes the final step along this path of inquir-
ies. As we shall see, the literature on animal ethics makes an Olympic sport out 
of jumping around this sequentially organized conceptual scheme. In practical 
terms, this makes it very difficult to compare the various approaches to animal 
rights with any kind of logical consistency. 
Properties-based approaches to animal ethics have largely dominated the 
debate over animal rights. One approach develops a positive case for the moral 
status of animals by arguing that the presence of certain attributes justifies the 
expansion of the moral circle to include nonhuman beings. Another approach 
advances a negative case that denies moral status to animals because of properties 
they are said to lack (Zamir, 2007, p. 18). Two of the most famous arguments in 
favor of granting rights to animals find home in the former camp. Singer (1974), 
divining inspiration from Bentham, maintains that sentience—understood here 
as the ability to experience suffering or happiness—is the trait possessed by both 
humans and animals that qualifies an entity for rights. Only sentient creatures, the 
argument goes, are capable of having interests that can be fulfilled or frustrated. 
It is on the basis of possessing cognizable interests that the extension of rights is 
legitimated. 
Regan (1987) takes a broader view, locating in both animals and humans a 
common state of existence—being the subject-of-a-life. This capacity for real 
lived experience requires consciousness, sentience, and other abilities such as 
autonomy, belief, desire, intentionality, and memory (Regan, 1983, p. 153). 
Entities in possession of these properties hold inherent value, thus entitling them 
to rights. Animals that exhibit consciousness and sentience but which lack other 
mental capacities are still worthy of moral concern, but not as much as that which 
is afforded those in possession of the larger suite of abilities mentioned above. 
However, both of these groups—“higher” and “moderate” objects worthy of 
moral concern, respectively (Sun, 2018, p. 547)—are considered moral patients, 
as opposed to moral agents. 
Regan also dismisses the contractarian argument that only beings rational 
enough to understand and accede to the terms of a social contract are worthy 
of moral consideration. Under this logic, the only basis for concern regarding 
non-rational entities is the sentimental value they hold for people. At best, this 
sentimentality suggests that humans have only indirect duties towards animals, 
because ultimately what matters are the feelings of other humans, not of animals 
themselves. As an exemplar of the positive case, Regan’s (2004) argument rests 
on the observation that animals share with humans a number of morally relevant 
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Rowlands (1997) refutes the dismissal of the contractarian argument through 
an analysis of Rawlsian contractarianism. He concludes that rationality is only 
required of the architects of the contract, not its referents. As such, rationality is 
morally arbitrary and cannot function as the litmus test for the possession of moral 
personhood and thus moral rights. However, in agreement with Singer, Rowlands 
contends that sentience is the appropriate criterion for determining moral consid-
erability. Since animals are sentient, even under a contractarian approach they 
would be eligible for moral rights. 
The import of sentience is again evoked by Pietrzykowski (2017), who con-
curs with Regan that possession of this quality makes animals subjects-of-a-life. 
Sentience entails “subjective mental states” that alert animals to how their “exist-
ence may be better or worse for them” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 58). Given their 
capacity to be aware of their present condition, animals may be said to have inter-
ests of their own, entitling them to legal rights. However, this does not mean 
that animals should be treated as nonhuman legal persons; instead, they should 
be deemed members of an entirely separate category—“non-personal subjects of 
law” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 59). This maneuver inoculates against the problems 
associated with drawing a rhetorical analogy to humans and results in the exten-
sion of a single right, the “right to have one’s own individual interests considered 
as relevant in all decisions that may affect their realization” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, 
p. 59). However, this category might only pertain to vertebrate animals whose 
sentience suggests that they have an inherent good and an interest in obtaining 
that good. 
Other theorists have claimed that animals possess interests and therefore 
deserve rights, but the means by which they arrive at that conclusion varies. 
Feinberg (2013) lays out a philosophical argument that he develops in the context 
of individual animals and then applies to a number of borderline cases for rights 
eligibility, including, inter alia, vegetables, dead persons, and future generations. 
The logical pathway he derives from the animal case highlights the importance, in 
the first instance, of having a “conative life,” which involves a being’s possession 
of “conscious wishes, desires, and hopes … urges and impulses … unconscious 
drives, aims, and goals … [and] latent tendencies, direction of growth, and natural 
fulfillments” (Feinberg, 2013, p. 374). Interests, which are crucial to determin-
ing whether or not an entity has a good of its own, arise out of such conations. 
Therefore, the capacity for conative life dictates whether an animal has interests 
worth protecting. The author takes one final step, which is to assert that if humans 
agree that these interests should be safeguarded for the animal’s sake and not just 
to placate human sensibilities, it stands to reason that animals must also have 
rights. 
Wise (2013), the famed animal rights litigator who heads the Nonhuman Rights 
Project (NhRP),5 approaches the subject pragmatically, not philosophically,6 
through inductive reasoning. Observing the logic employed by common law 
judges in modern American cases, he surmises that autonomy, the factor underly-
ing dignity, appears to be the main characteristic by which the potential to possess 
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rights hinges on demonstrating “practical autonomy,” which comprises cognitive 
complexity, intentionality, consciousness, and sentience. However, positive dem-
onstration of practical autonomy is only a sufficient, not necessary, condition for 
legal personhood. Entities that satisfy the criteria for practical autonomy may be 
said to possess fundamental interests and legal personhood, which entitles them 
to so-called “liberty rights” to “bodily integrity and bodily liberty” (Wise, 2002, 
p. 38). 
But not all animals are created equal. Acknowledging the diversity present 
among members of the animal kingdom, Wise devises a continuous measurement 
of autonomy that ranges from 0.0 (least autonomous) to 1.0 (most autonomous). 
In accordance with their autonomy value, animals are then grouped into four dis-
crete categories that indicate progressively greater legal consideration. Animals 
with a score ranging from 0.0 to 0.49 (Category 1) have little autonomy and thus 
do not possess liberty rights, whereas animals with a score ranging from 0.9 to 
1.0 (Category 4) exhibit a level of autonomy that is sufficient for the enjoyment 
of such rights. This non-dichotomous classification scheme pushes the discussion 
of animal rights in a direction not often found in the pages of philosophical texts 
by recognizing the complexity and variation found in the nonhuman world as 
opposed to applying bright either/or lines. 
To be sure, not all philosophers respond to the animal question by advancing a 
positive case for their moral status. There are those who espouse the negative case, 
in which the absence of some morally relevant property prohibits animals from 
joining the moral circle.8 One of the more prominent torchbearers of this approach 
is Frey (1980), who forcefully argues against the idea that animals have interests 
that justify granting them moral rights. He rejects this premise for three reasons. 
First, contra Feinberg, Frey contends that while animals indeed possess interests 
in terms of having a good or wellbeing that can be harmed or helped by the actions 
of another, this assertion is logically problematic as a pathway for establishing 
their rights because it would mean that human artefacts might also have interests 
and thus moral rights. Therefore, due to the slippery slope that would seem to 
accept that even inanimate objects have interests, this line of reasoning is fatally 
flawed. Second, if interests stem from the possession of wants that can be fulfilled 
or denied, animals do not hold such interests because they have physical needs 
in the form of biological imperatives that serve to promote survival, not conative 
wants. If needs were synonymous with wants, everything from tractors to trees 
to tarantulas would have interests and a claim to moral rights. Again, the slippery 
slope renders animal interests logically untenable. Third, contra Regan, Frey finds 
that the absence of an intelligible language exhibited by creatures in the animal 
kingdom casts doubt on their case for having interests. His logic proceeds thusly: 
without language, you cannot have beliefs; without beliefs, you cannot have 
desires; without desires, you cannot have interests; and without interests, you are 
not entitled to moral rights. Further, behavior alone does not provide a sufficient 
basis for determining whether or not an animal grasps beliefs (Frey, 1980, p. 114). 
Interrogation of the negative case shines a light on the role that human exception-
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If humans deserve rights even when they lack some property alleged to distin-
guish them from brutes (i.e., autonomy, consciousness, intelligence, intentionality,
rationality, sentience, etc.), why can’t beings in possession of such traits qualify for
moral consideration? This line of inquiry is known as the “argument from marginal
cases” (Narveson, 1977, p. 164). The answer to this question forces us to draw the
moral circle with clearer boundaries by “demand[ing] consistency in our thinking
about animals” (Tanner, 2009, p. 52). Both Singer and Regan propose versions of
the argument from marginal cases that they deploy in order to strengthen their logi-
cal foundations for the extension of rights to animals. Singer (1979) holds that all
sentient beings, be they animals or intellectually disabled humans, have interests
under a basic principle of equality in which “we give equal weight in our moral
deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions” (p. 19). This
“[e]qual consideration of interests allows us to treat different beings differently,
but only when their interests differ” (Dombrowski, 1997, p. 20). Living entities
(i.e., all sentient beings) are qualitatively different from persons, who are rational,
self-conscious beings that possess self-awareness (Singer, 1979, p. 78). Marginal
cases such as impaired humans would qualify as sentient beings but not persons,
whereas great apes would be both sentient beings and persons. The practical effect
of this distinction is that mentally undeveloped humans could be subject to the same
treatment that would befall lower animals because their interests would be similar
and neither would be considered persons. While this conclusion would no doubt
seem noxious to the sensibilities of most people, Singer offers the rejoinder that it
is our attitudes towards intellectually disabled human beings that need to change.
To briefly summarize, Singer’s view on the argument from marginal cases rests on
three claims: (1) sentience serves as the floor for moral consideration; (2) equality
dictates that all living beings should be treated the same on the basis of their inter-
ests; and (3) persons have interests different from those of merely living entities.
Therefore, the way to deal with such cases is to treat like beings equally, even if we
aren’t particularly enthusiastic about the practical implications of such an approach. 
Regan tackles the argument from marginal cases from a slightly different posi-
tion. As mentioned above, Regan (1983) promotes the idea that some animals 
are subjects-of-a-life, which qualifies them for moral status and therefore moral 
rights. His reasoning proceeds thusly: 
P1: Some animals have beliefs, desires, perception, memory, preferences, inter-
ests, etc.; 
P2: All beings that have beliefs, desires, perception, memory, preferences, inter-
ests, etc., are subjects-of-a-life; 
P3: All subjects-of-a-life have inherent value; 
P4: All beings with inherent value are moral agents or moral patients; 
P5: All moral agents or moral patients are entitled to moral rights; 
C: Some animals are entitled to moral rights. 
En route to establishing a philosophical basis for animal rights, Regan (1979) 
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animals have certain rights because these [marginal] humans have these rights” 
or “(2) if these [marginal] humans have certain rights, then certain animals have 
these rights also” (p. 189). The response to these arguments depends on the qual-
ity possessed even by marginal humans that entitles them to moral rights. If, in the 
absence of other traits, such humans still have moral rights, it demonstrates that 
those traits are not necessary for the enjoyment of said rights. Comparing candi-
dates in the running for “most reasonable criterion for right-possession” (Regan, 
1979, p. 189), the author anoints inherent value as the victor. Therefore, both 
some animals and marginal humans have moral rights because of their inherent 
value that is independent of the interests held by others. Of course, inherent value 
depends on the possession of qualities associated with being a subject-of-a-life. 
Cupp (2017), writing from the perspective of law and not philosophy, disagrees 
with the conclusions reached by both Singer and Regan on practical grounds. 
His refutation focuses on how courts and legislatures have addressed the legal 
rights of cognitively impaired humans. Cupp contends that legal institutions have 
overwhelmingly relied on the concept of human dignity, not cognitive capabili-
ties, when assessing the legal personhood and legal rights of marginal people. 
Furthermore, the consequences of using cognitive factors as the basis for animal 
rights “could unintentionally lead to gradual erosion of protections for these espe-
cially vulnerable humans” (Cupp, 2017, p. 499), whom courts might be tempted 
to view as mentally equivalent to animals. Interestingly, it is this very same dig-
nity that Wise (2013) argues could provide a platform for animal rights because 
of its underlying emphasis on autonomy, which he asserts some animals (i.e., 
chimpanzees and elephants) possess. 
Analyzing the argument from marginal cases is an important intellectual exer-
cise. It helps us to understand which criteria are not essential to an entity’s case 
for moral rights. Recognizing that some humans will lack certain properties that 
philosophers have associated with moral status, the question then becomes—at 
what point in the process of eliminating morally relevant traits do animals or other 
nonhumans possess enough similarity with people to warrant including them in 
the moral circle? The danger of developing a rubric that could potentially jus-
tify harm to humans figures prominently in the debate over the correct answer 
to this question. At the same time, animal rights theorists have found the exclu-
sion of creatures from the moral circle equally offensive. The difficulty inherent 
in resolving this quandary stems from the employment of an epistemology that 
emphasizes the significance of properties. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, properties-based approaches to defining the 
moral status of nonhuman beings are inherently subjective and, thus far, suffer 
from a lack of consensus.9 As Nagel (1974) discusses in his provocatively titled 
article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, it is nearly impossible to access another 
entity’s “subjective character of experience” without relying on our own imagi-
nation (p. 436). However, a few scholars have sought to address critical flaws of 
properties-based approaches in the hopes of paving a productive way forward. 
Chan (2011) offers one such suggestion. He argues that there is a non-zero prob-
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properties are continuous, not dichotomous), and that uncertainty about the extent 
to which these properties are present in a being is not a valid reason for excluding 
it from moral consideration. Instead of gatekeeping the moral circle on an all-
or-nothing basis, humans should scale their moral responsibilities towards other 
organisms according to the likelihood that they hold morally relevant traits. Our 
duties towards other creatures rise commensurate with the probability that they 
are sentient or conscious. Coeckelbergh and Gunkel (2014) similarly acknowl-
edge the uncertainty intrinsic to efforts to determine the existence of internal states 
in other entities. Regardless of whether one is interested in assessing an animal’s 
capacity for sentience (i.e., Singer) or being a subject-of-a-life (i.e., Regan), the 
“problem of other minds” (Dennett, 1981, p. 173) looms large. Therefore, because 
at present humans do not have the technological capability to directly observe 
what goes on in the minds of other beings, we can only render judgments about 
moral standing based on our perceptions of their externally available behaviors. 
Finally, Thompson (2019) concludes that “[t]here seems to be no empirical way 
to determine when different sentient beings are sufficiently alike to justify basic 
equality” (p. 23). As such, it is up to scientists to more rigorously define and 
identify concepts like autonomy. Research should equip judges with the kind of 
scientific clarity that can assist them in making decisions about the legal status of 
nonhumans. 
Direct/indirect approaches offer an alternative to properties-based approaches 
to animal rights. The logic of these approaches reflects the Kantian view that 
the ethical treatment of animals is predicated not on a property they possess, but 
on the concern humans have for them or the apprehension that harming animals 
might lead to harm against humans (Zamir, 2007, p. 25). A few authors have pur-
sued this line of argumentation, which balks at assigning independent moral status 
to animals. Two indicative examples are discussed below. 
Writing at the turn of the 20th century, Salt (1900) urges that humans and 
animals are equals in kind, separated only by degrees of difference in terms of 
intelligence and sensibility. If we excuse the inhumane treatment of animals on 
the basis that they have lower quantities of these traits than normal humans do, 
criminals and savages, too, should suffer the same fate as that which befalls their 
animal kin.10 While animals do not lay claim to full legal rights, we have duties 
towards them dictated by our senses of justice and reciprocity (i.e., the Golden 
Rule). The basis of ethics is this kinship of life, which does not depend upon 
duties being reciprocated among living beings.11 In closing, Salt quotes Frederic 
Harrison (1904), who delivered the following remarks as part of a speech before 
the Humanitarian League, “[o]ur relation to the animals … is part and parcel of 
our human morality … Our duties towards our lower helpmates form part of our 
duties towards our fellow-beings” (p. 6). To summarize, our obligations towards 
animals are a function of our duties towards each other, not the attributes we share 
in common with nonhuman creatures. 
Nearly a century later, Kelch (1999) pushes back against the idea that there 
is a single determinant of legal rights, arguing that human compassion should 
count among the reasons that such rights are extended to animals.12 Contra both 
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Singer and Regan, Kelch seeks to find a place for emotions in moral theory. Far 
from functioning separately from reason, emotions reveal our values, focus our 
interests, and spur us to act, especially on behalf of others. Compassion in particu-
lar serves as the wellspring of our moral sensibilities. Our sense of compassion 
allows us to interpret the interests of animals, which are analogous to our own. 
While the manner in which compassion manifests itself in our relations with ani-
mals varies (i.e., attachment, kinship, or awe), the point remains that our emotions 
should be incorporated into the calculus we use to assess the extension of rights. 
This might be achieved by actually experiencing the kinds of conditions animals 
face in the laboratory, on the farm, or in the slaughterhouse. It is through the 
fusion of emotion and reason that humans can establish a moral basis for granting 
legal rights to animals. 
These direct/indirect approaches are unabashedly anthropocentric—the 
treatment of animals depends on human duties towards others or human emo-
tions. Duties emerge from our sense of justice, which Salt believes is universal. 
However, the myriad forms of animal ethics found in major world religions sug-
gest otherwise. The notion of the kinship of life, on the other hand, provides a 
glimmer of daylight for disrupting the centrality of humans in an ethical system, 
hinting at the potential for radical equality among all living beings. Yet, the idea 
that duties towards animals are epiphenomenal to the duties we have towards 
other people unquestionably places the status of nonhuman creatures below that 
of humans. While including emotions in moral theory seems intuitively reason-
able, this approach, too, assumes a kind of universalism belied by experience. 
Quite bluntly, not everyone feels compassionately towards animals. Some people 
may have limited interactions with animals and thus feel less attached to them 
(Hawkins et al., 2017). Others might experience only low levels of compassion, 
making them less inclined to act kindly towards humans, animals, or both. Still 
others may not consider themselves to be lacking compassion while using animals 
for pleasure, leisure, or sport in ways that cannot be seen as advancing the inter-
ests of nonhuman creatures (Tymowski, 2013). Therefore, despite evidence of its 
prevalence across cultures (Goetz et al., 2010), “advocating for compassion as a 
form of trans-species affinity is fraught with complication” (Chiew, 2014, p. 66). 
As stated earlier, both the duties and emotions arguments are essentially 
anthropocentric. This is problematic because Western anthropocentrism is an 
“obsession” (Wu, 2014, p. 416) that in practice has elevated certain humans above 
others (Grear, 2013) and represents “the philosophical driving force behind eco-
logical crises” (Hajjar Leib, 2011, p. 27). In the context of animals, anthropocen-
trism inevitably leads to prioritizing human interests over those of other creatures 
when concerns of the former run into conflict with concerns of the latter. As such, 
accepting that humans occupy a unique and superior position among living beings 
offers ethical cover for engaging in actions that may pose harm to other species. 
A potential antidote to the conceptual, ontological, empirical, and moral issues 
associated with properties-based and direct/indirect approaches resides in rela-
tional approaches to animal rights. Analysts in this latter camp reject assigning 
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emotions. Instead, they promote a phenomenological perspective that draws moral 
conclusions based on how humans and other entities interact with animals. After 
all, animals are “relational beings who interact in diverse ways with the diverse 
other beings who share their home places” (Peterson, 2013, p. 12). Relying sub-
stantially on the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), one pair of relational 
scholars argues that, for advocates of the approaches described above, moral sta-
tus is determined prior to encounters with other beings. Therefore, the moral act 
occurs before interactions between entities ever take place. But Levinas posits 
that “the sequence is exactly the other way around: the ethical relationship, the 
exposure to the other, precedes the usual ontological decisions” (Coeckelbergh 
& Gunkel, 2014, p. 722). Reversing the Humean thesis, how we ought to treat an 
entity informs what it is. 
Although Levinas did not write much about animals, he describes how the act 
of facing another entity fosters a “demand for recognition,” a “moment that one 
becomes primordially aware of the ethical responsibility one bears towards the 
Other” (Crowe, 2008, p. 316). But facing is meant to be interpreted figuratively, 
not literally. There are many ways in which one can “face” an Other. Naming is 
one such mechanism. Absent being given a name, an Other “can be objectified, 
used, and even slaughtered since it is withdrawn from the sphere of moral con-
siderability” (Coeckelbergh & Gunkel, 2014, p. 726). A pig is just potential pork 
until it is “Wilbur.” Naming animals is an ancient practice permeated by power 
relations (Borkfelt, 2011). By giving names to animals, we distinguish them from 
others of their kind and signify their mortality (Derrida, 2002, pp. 378–379). 
Another mechanism by which animals face us is legal recognition. For instance, 
in 2019, the Punjab and Haryana High Court of India rendered a judgment find-
ing that all animals are legal persons possessing the same rights and duties as 
humans (Malik, 2019).13 Upon determining that animals share many qualities in 
common with humans, the High Court brought nonhuman creatures into the moral 
orbit through a legal declaration. In short, facing constitutes a range of practices 
through which responsibilities towards and rights of animals emerge. 
Of course, one might criticize relational approaches on the grounds that they 
neither disentangle properties from animals involved in the act of facing nor extri-
cate human interests from the moral calculus. Naming is something humans do 
to interpret the world around them and the entities within it. Names are thrust 
upon animals by humans. Legal recognition occurs because of human conflicts 
generated by human activities that are resolved through human institutions using 
human qualities as benchmarks. Therefore, it seems as though anthropocentrism 
inevitably invades virtually any effort to extend rights to nonhuman entities. 
As demonstrated above, the literature on animal ethics has yet to reach a con-
sensus regarding the optimal approach to deriving animal rights. However, this 
intellectual stalemate has resulted in a number of creative legal arguments con-
ceived with the same intended objective in mind—protecting animals through 
existing systems. Several innovative legal pathways are reviewed below. 
While agreeing with Bentham and Singer that the capacity to suffer is suffi-
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pragmatic issue concerning who has standing to represent the interests of animals 
in court. He offers that in the absence of legislative action that would expand the 
scope of persons recognized before the law, humans can file suit to protect ani-
mals under the guise of seeking redress for injuries to human interests. Using a 
quasi-Hohfeldian concept of rights, Sunstein also argues that laws against animal 
cruelty are functionally equivalent to legal rights because they provide animals 
with an immunity or guarantee against ill-treatment. 
In a subsequent article, Leslie and Sunstein (2007) expand upon this latter 
point. The authors recognize that animal cruelty laws feature certain limitations 
that inhibit their ability to fully secure rights-like protection for animals. First, 
the only route to enforcing animal-welfare statutes is through public prosecution 
of offenders, and there are practical reasons why such violations are not likely to 
result in legal action. Second, animal cruelty laws are severely under-inclusive. 
That is, they do not pertain to the treatment of animals used in laboratory testing 
or food production. Realizing these weaknesses, the authors propose an alterna-
tive means of safeguarding animals—disclosure requirements (i.e., food labeling). 
Food labels constitute a hallmark of the “informational turn in food politics” in 
which responsibility associated with consumption is shifted from public to private 
institutions (Frohlich, 2016, p. 162). Labeling food products could signal compli-
ance with animal welfare standards, providing consumers with information about 
a producer’s treatment of animals. This in turn would generate market pressure 
that might inspire a race to the top among producers. As a concrete example, “a 
label might disclose the frequency (or absence) of bruises, broken wings, and 
birds that are dead on arrival at the processing plant, all of which can result from 
rough handling” (Leslie & Sunstein, 2007, p. 134). To recap, the authors suggest 
that laws against animal cruelty serve the same function as legal rights, although 
because of issues with their enforcement, market-based mechanisms such as labe-
ling provide an alternative route to achieving the same objective. 
While this kind of innovative thinking is a welcome addition to the animal rights 
literature, the emphasis on animal welfare, as opposed to animal rights, proves 
problematic for several reasons. First, the pervasiveness and strength of animal 
welfare laws vary widely across jurisdictions, meaning that animals will enjoy 
more or less robust protection depending on where they live (Park & Valentino, 
2019). For instance, according to the Animal Legal Defense Fund (2020), Illinois 
(rated the best overall state) affords animals far greater legal protection than does 
Mississippi (rated the worst overall state). Clearly, animal welfare is distributed 
on a highly unequal basis because it means different things in different places. 
Second, rights provide animals with “a stronger and more sustainable protection” 
than that which is available through anticruelty laws (Peters, 2016, p. 49). Such 
laws place animal welfare in direct competition against other interests, with those 
held by humans typically being prioritized at the expense of animals, even when 
they are trivial by comparison (Peters, 2018, p. 356). Third, as Leslie and Sunstein 
note, anticruelty statutes don’t protect the majority of animals, so perhaps a more 
effective means of curtailing harm to animals would be to shift the focus to limit-
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2008, p. 256). Fourth, animal cruelty laws are essentially anthropocentric, as they 
were conceived “to protect human sensibilities,” not respect the interests of ani-
mals themselves (Cullinan, 2003, p. 77). Given the ubiquity of animal welfare 
laws, one way of building the case for their insufficiency is by engaging in a “liti-
gating to lose” strategy whereby suits are filed under the assumption that they will 
be unsuccessful but generate significant media attention, highlighting the need 
for greater protections (Vayr, 2017, p. 873). Despite the potential upside of costly 
legal efforts predestined to fail, as long as animals are considered human property 
and not independent beings with interests of their own, they will be denied entry 
into the moral circle and unable to access its attendant benefits. 
Two recent contributions to legal scholarship on animal rights present strat-
egies designed to overcome the persistence of the personal property paradigm, 
albeit from different angles. Abate and Crowe (2017), like Wise before them, pro-
ceed inductively, looking to the decisions of jurists for inspiration. Recognizing 
that while owned things are considered property and thus legal objects (Cullinan, 
2003, p. 77), there already exists legal precedent for treating a range of nonhuman 
entities as legal subjects entitled to legal personhood. The central inquiry there-
fore revolves around whether or not the same logic used to determine that nonhu-
man entities can be considered legal subjects applies to animals as well. To begin, 
the authors describe animals as members of “the community of the voiceless,” a 
group of legal subjects that “cannot assert and vindicate their interests without 
legal personhood recognition and ‘guardians’ to act on their behalf” (Abate & 
Crowe, 2017, p. 71, n114). Among the constituents of this community, which 
includes artificial intelligence (AI) and future generations, natural resources 
such as ecosystems, mountains, and rivers serve as the closest analog to animals. 
Natural resources have been afforded legal personhood in countries around the 
world on the basis of their inherent value. Both natural resources and animals pos-
sess inherent value “as critical components of our ecosystem and as entities that 
hold deep cultural, spiritual, and emotional value in our lives” (Abate & Crowe, 
2017, p. 77). In addition, humans inarguably enjoy apex legal status, and animals 
are more similar to humans than are elements of nature because they possess sen-
tience and the capacity to suffer. Therefore, there is no reason why animals should 
not also qualify for legal personhood and its accompanying rights.14 
Bradshaw (2018) seeks to shift the focus of the animal rights debate away from
those beings humans encounter in farms, homes, and zoos, and towards those ani-
mals affected by unsustainable land practices—wildlife on the land and in the sea.
The problem, as she sees it, is not that such animals are considered human property.
After all, wildlife creatures are not owned by anyone. Rather, the issue is that these
animals are excluded from the property rights regime; that is, they are deprived
of legal authority over the lands and seas on/in which they reside. Therefore,
Bradshaw proposes a novel solution—granting property rights to animals. While
wildlife would possess these rights, these legal protections would be administered
by “human representatives vested with a fiduciary duty to oversee the intergenera-
tional wellbeing of all creatures within an animal-owned ecosystem” (Bradshaw,
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endeavors to protect the interests of animals often neglected by the animal rights
movement, whose homes are constantly threatened by human activity. 
While both of the aforementioned legal strategies—comparing animals to nat-
ural resources and granting property rights to wildlife—offer innovative, practi-
cal solutions to the property paradigm problem, they are not without drawbacks. 
First, Abate and Crowe’s natural-resources analogy leans on the notion of inher-
ent value drawn from environmental ethics. While they do not elaborate on what 
they mean by inherent value, the phrase speaks to an ethical orientation that is 
at least “weakly anthropocentric” (Norton, 1984, p. 134). Briefly, when humans 
ascribe value to nature, it becomes an object worthy of protection. This view has 
been critiqued extensively in the literature (i.e., Weston, 1985; Morito, 2003), 
with one scholar going so far as to assert that “there is no basis for this claim 
that is not rooted in either theism or some other form of arbitrary value judgment 
that, in a materialistic worldview, has no basis outside of the believer’s mind” 
(Snyder, 2017, p. 59). Ironically, Callicot (1995) compares intrinsic value15 to 
consciousness, arguing that we know that both exist because we experience them 
internally. However, as detailed in Chapter Two, consciousness is an empirically 
elusive quality whose presence in other entities remains inaccessible. Therefore, 
while animals might be akin to natural resources, the analogy suffers from a lack 
of clarity regarding what inherent value means and how it applies in both cases. 
The matter is complicated further when Abate and Crowe draw a parallel between 
humans and animals given their common possession of sentience. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, sentience is a property that is alleged to qualify an entity for 
psychological personhood. Thus, the authors’ reliance on sentience makes 
their legal argument philosophically committed to the flawed properties-based 
approach advanced by Singer. Second, while Bradshaw seeks to offer legal shelter 
to wildlife in a way that does not require demonstrating how animals are similar 
to humans, her approach restricts the kinds of animals eligible for protection. As 
the author herself admits, a revised property rights regime would not address the 
plight of animals found in farms, laboratories, or zoos. To Bradshaw’s credit, she 
maintains that granting property rights to wildlife should be viewed as a strategy 
complementary to, rather than replacing, other efforts to expand rights to animals. 
As such, animal property rights represent both a radical departure from current 
legalized forms of animal protection and an incremental step towards the ultimate 
goal of animal liberation. 
Philosophers writing on the moral status of intelligent machines have paid 
great attention to the literature on animal ethics. In particular, they have assessed 
the extent to which theories of animal rights might apply to technological beings. 
Identifying key similarities and differences between these types of entities might 
help inform responses to the machine question, refining the boundaries of the 
moral circle in the process. As Gunkel (2012) points out, “the extension of moral 
rights to animals would, in order to be both logically and morally consistent, need 
to take seriously the machine as a similar kind of moral patient” (p. 81). In the 
space here, I summarize some of the main contributions in this area according to 
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First, are animals and machines sufficiently similar such that useful compar-
isons can be drawn? While Descartes found animals to be much like machines
(P. Harrison, 1992), recent scholarship suggests an answer in the negative. For
Calverley (2006), the fact that technological forms are created directly and delib-
erately by humans, and considering that animals possess autonomy and conscious-
ness, an analogy between animals and machines might be inapt. Gunkel (2012),
too, casts doubt on the utility of attempting to establish an animal–machine paral-
lel. Citing philosophical work on animal rights, he observes that the presence or
absence of sentience appears to divide entities worthy of moral consideration from
those that are not. Referring back to the problem of other minds, he notes that “[w] 
e are ultimately unable to decide whether a thing—anything animate, inanimate, or
otherwise—that appears to feel pain or exhibits some other kind of inner state has or
does not have such an experience in itself” (Gunkel, 2012, p. 100). Thus far, the dif-
ferences between animals and machines seem to make a helpful analogy unlikely. 
Second, despite the dissimilarities between the two types of entities, could the-
ory on animal rights provide a basis for robot rights? On this question, responses 
vary. Some squarely reject the animal rights model. For McGrath (2011), the 
lack of consensus among animal rights theorists suggests it is “perhaps best to 
not approach the muddy waters of robotic rights by way of the almost equally 
cloudy waters of animal rights” (p. 135). Torrance (2013) explains that animal 
rights extend from a biocentric environmental ethic that emphasizes an entity’s 
capacity for moral experience and sentience. Artificial agents that do not possess 
these qualities would not have a serious claim to moral interests, and thus not be 
entitled to moral rights. Hogan (2017) observes that intelligent machines serve 
as a “limiting case, whose very exclusion from the ethical realm is necessary for 
animal rights discourse” (p. 32). In other words, robots function as a device that 
strengthens the argument in favor of animal rights when conducting an inven-
tory of morally significant qualities identified among various entities. Therefore, 
robots clarify the case for animal rights. Michalczak (2017) argues nearly the 
opposite. Software agents, he maintains, are more likely than animals to be rec-
ognized as legal subjects because their ethical status rests on pragmatic, anthro-
pocentric considerations amenable to existing human institutions. Whereas the 
legal subjectivity of animals often depends on the demonstration of certain prop-
erties and can pit human interests against those of nonhuman creatures, the legal 
subjectivity of intelligent machines advances human interests similar to the way 
in which the personhood of corporations and ships was manufactured to resolve 
human conflicts.16 More concretely, legal subjectivity could be a tool useful in the 
adjudication of disputes involving autonomous weapon systems and algorithmic 
trading programs, especially in cases where establishing the party responsible for 
causing an alleged harm proves troublesome. Thus, an ethical framework that 
leans into human interests suggests that robot rights are unlikely to follow the 
animal rights model, and intelligent machines might therefore be more likely than 
animals to obtain legal status and legal rights. 
Others adopt a more conditional stance. Calverley (2006) holds that if an intel-
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moral consideration to animals, humans would have to treat such an entity as a 
being with value in order to avoid charges of speciesism. Interestingly, Singer has 
offered commentary on the applicability of animal rights theory to the realm of 
technology. Writing with Agata Sagan, Singer (2009) posits that if robots were 
programmed in such a way that they developed consciousness spontaneously, as 
opposed to being deliberately designed to mimic consciousness, we would be 
compelled to seriously entertain their case for rights. Finally, Marx and Tiefensee 
(2015) draw a distinction between (domesticated) animals and robots, conclud-
ing that while the former possess rights but not moral agency, the latter could in 
theory possess both.17 In order to qualify for rights, an entity needs to be sentient 
and have interests worth protecting. If there is no “moral difference whether frus-
tration or pain is felt the human or the robot way,” intelligent machines might be 
said to have interests and thus rights (Marx & Tiefensee, 2015, p. 86). Advocates 
of strong AI contend that sentience and interests are theoretically possible, and 
some robots already behave in ways that suggest a functional similarity to human 
actions. 
In brief, philosophers have looked to animals and theories of animal rights 
for guidance on the machine question. But they have found animals to be vastly 
different from robots in morally meaningful ways and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
determined that animal rights offer robot rights insights that apply mostly under 
speculative conditions. Therefore, the prospects of arriving at a theory of robot 
rights through literature on animal ethics seems quite remote, at least for now. 
The limited degree to which animal rights theories can be usefully translated 
to a technological context stems from problems endemic to extant animal ethics 
scholarship. A few main weaknesses are discussed here. First, setting aside for a 
moment the obvious differences between philosophical and legal arguments, much 
of the writing on animal ethics concentrates intensively on how requisite proper-
ties determine rights while almost entirely neglecting the conceptual importance 
of personhood (Aaltola, 2008).18 This is surprising not only because many scholars 
have painstakingly sketched out paths leading from certain properties to various 
types of personhood, but also because “[i]n law, personhood is a precondition for 
holding rights” (Peters, 2018, p. 357). To wit, neither Singer’s Animal Liberation
nor Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights mention the word “personhood” even 
once.19 Second, the explicitly non-anthropocentric, individualistic orientation of 
major animal rights theories implicitly accepts anthropocentric, dualistic thinking 
while “ignor[ing] the importance of the web of life within which all species are 
situated” (Bryant, 2008, p. 266). This Cartesian mindset tends to produce animal 
rights theories that are under-inclusive (i.e., pertaining only to animals in captiv-
ity, domestic pets, or wildlife) and thus of limited utility as ethical frameworks. A 
more robust ethic would “[account] for and [do] justice to all of nature, including 
individual nonhuman subjects and entire ecosystems, as well as the many natural 
places and entities in between” (Peterson, 2013, p. 141). Third, and most impor-
tantly, animal rights theories rely on the demonstration of one or more ontological 
properties that serve to validate the presence of interests held independently by 
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the empirical to the intuitive to the emotional to the jurisprudential. However, as 
of yet, no one has been able to identify a single attribute or hierarchy of attributes 
capable of fostering consensus among animal rights theorists. The indeterminacy 
of the argument from marginal cases illustrates this in spades. These critiques sug-
gest that theories of animal rights might prove unhelpful to the task of assessing 
the extent to which other kinds of nonhumans, be they organic or technological, 
might be eligible for moral or legal rights. 
In order to clarify the differences between the four approaches to animal 
rights described above, I briefly remark on how each of them respond to several 
important questions. First, what is the basis for moral or legal consideration?
Properties-based approaches put forth one or more attributes (i.e., consciousness, 
intentionality, sentience, etc.) deemed necessary or sufficient for the extension 
of moral consideration and moral rights. Direct/indirect approaches translate 
human interests or human emotions into moral concern for animals. Relational 
approaches depend on the nature of interactions between humans and animals, not 
preconceived notions about the kinds of properties that qualify other entities for 
moral consideration. Legal approaches offer a mix of justifications for legal con-
sideration, including animal suffering (Sunstein, 2000; Leslie & Sunstein, 2007); 
inherent value, the capacity to suffer, and sentience (Abate & Crowe, 2017); and 
property interests (Bradshaw, 2018). Second, what is the ontological orientation?
All of the approaches are individualist with the potential exception of relational 
approaches, whose orientation could be individualist or holist depending on the 
ontological scope of the encounter (i.e., human-and-animal, human-in-ecosystem, 
etc.). 
Third, what is the extent of human centrality? Properties-based approaches 
tend to be non-anthropocentric in the sense that they afford moral rights to entities 
other than humans, but the properties themselves privilege human characteris-
tics over those of animals. Direct/indirect approaches are also conceptually non-
anthropocentric because they accept the possibility of animal rights, but the only 
way to arrive at that destination is through human interests or feelings. Relational 
approaches are more non-anthropocentric than the other two types given that they 
remain open to rights for any entities humans may encounter and they do not 
prescribe ethical guidelines in advance of interactions with nonhumans, but the 
mechanisms by which animals are recognized as moral patients require human 
intervention. Legal approaches entail varying degrees of human emphasis. While 
animal welfare is fairly anthropocentric due to its lack of commitment to animal 
rights and reliance on human sentimentality, a belief in the inherent value of non-
human creatures that results in their obtaining legal personhood and legal rights is 
decidedly non-anthropocentric, despite the fact that their case is bolstered by the 
similarities they share with humans. 
Weaving the threads of philosophy and law together, how might animal ethics 
serve as a foundation for extending rights to nonhuman inorganic entities such as 
intelligent machines? First, assuming that philosophers can eventually agree on 
the single property or set of properties that necessitate(s) moral consideration, we 
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nonhuman inorganic entities in order to validate their eligibility for moral rights. 
With respect to the properties-based approach, autonomy, consciousness, or sen-
tience would be the most likely candidates. At present we are far off from being 
able to recreate these properties technologically or determine their presence scien-
tifically. However, there do exist potential work-arounds available in the interim. 
Following Chan (2011), we could utilize a probabilistic model to determine the 
level of uncertainty we have regarding an entity’s possession of a given trait and 
calibrate the strength of our moral consideration accordingly. Moral rights could 
be extended where the degree of uncertainty falls below a certain threshold. Wise 
(2013) applies a similar logic with his continuous measurement of practical auton-
omy that results in four categories of ascending legal consideration. However, for 
both of these techniques, we would still need to know which property or proper-
ties is/are the most philosophically defensible for the purposes of analyzing the 
level of uncertainty or determining a numerical value. The level of uncertainty 
or number ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 obtained would dictate first whether or not an 
entity qualifies for moral/psychological personhood or legal personhood; then, 
whether it is a moral agent/patient or legal object/subject; and finally, whether it 
is entitled to moral or legal rights. 
Second, in line with Kelch (1999), nonhuman inorganic entities could be 
afforded moral consideration based on the level of emotional attachment humans 
have towards them. The stronger the emotional attachment, the greater the case 
for moral concern. Practically speaking, this strategy might be difficult to imple-
ment because each relationship would need to be evaluated independently, and 
the depth of compassion that humans feel towards such entities will vary widely.20 
But that isn’t the only area where consistency might present a problem. For exam-
ple, if someone were to love their Amazon Alexa but hate all dogs, would violence 
against the latter, but not the former, be permissible? Therefore, emotion might 
be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a logically coherent approach to 
determining moral consideration. 
Third, observing that intelligent machines constitute voiceless legal subjects 
(Abate & Crowe, 2017), one way to extend protection to members of this misfit 
group involves recognizing their value to ecosystems and humans. As natural 
resources have already been determined to possess legal personhood on this basis, 
in principle there is no reason why robots could not also be afforded the same dis-
tinction. Although this argument will be developed more in Chapter Five, for the 
moment it suffices to say that under certain conditions robots can also hold value 
due to the roles they play in social-ecological systems, which qualify them for 
legal personhood and thus legal rights. Of course, this maneuver requires adoption 
of a holistic conception of the environment that collapses the Cartesian nature/ 
culture divide. 
Fourth, facing artefactual entities through the mechanisms of naming and 
legal recognition presents another means of rendering others with whom humans 
interact worthy of moral consideration. Indeed, humans already have a legacy 
of engaging with technology in these relational ways. The human tendency to 
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1996),21 and governments have begun discussing the legal status of technological 
agents (European Parliament, 2017). It seems like only a matter of time before 
Michalczak’s (2017) intuition about the legal subjectivity of intelligent machines 
comes to fruition, as the practical benefits of bringing technological entities into 
the legal domain will come to outweigh the costs to human exceptionalism. The 
idea that moral status might be determined by legal recognition seems confusing 
at first unless we refer back to the conceptual mapping exercise from the previous 
chapter, in which facing is considered a mechanism by which relational person-
hood and thus both legal and moral personhoods are demonstrated. 
To conclude, each group of approaches presents a different benchmark for 
moral or legal consideration—possession of a property or combination of proper-
ties, the activation of human interests or emotions, the extent of human encoun-
ters with and recognition of other entities, or a medley of legal strategies ranging 
from the abstract (i.e., inherent value) to the concrete (i.e., food labeling). Each 
contain their own strengths and weaknesses. Properties-based approaches offer 
conceptual parsimony, but suffer from empirical and philosophical indetermi-
nacy. Direct/indirect approaches rely on more readily verifiable human condi-
tions, but overlook the moral or legal subject itself and obscure the variability 
among humans that could lead to incoherent standards. Relational approaches 
privilege real experiences with nonhuman entities, but the tenor of those encoun-
ters is shaped by some of the very characteristics that these approaches seek to 
avoid. Legal approaches provide a range of solutions steeped in pragmatism, but 
their diversity often leads to under-inclusiveness. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, none of the approaches described above put forth the 
argument that animals should have rights according to will theory. Instead, it is 
the interests of nonhuman creatures or their human guardians that lead to animal 
rights.22 As mentioned previously, it is a curious feature of animal ethics literature 
that personhoods and statuses are virtually absent from the debate. The previous 
chapter showed how forms of personhood are integral to the determination of 
moral or legal status and then moral or legal rights. Finally, while some doubt 
the applicability of animal rights models to technological entities, a few of the 
arguments reviewed here suggest potential pathways worthy of further explora-
tion. The next section evaluates how animal rights have fared in courts around the 
world, with a view towards understanding which approaches appear to have trac-
tion and how the successes and failures of animal rights advocacy might elucidate 
the potential for robot rights. 
Animal rights in court 
Although modern philosophy on animal rights emerged in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Cupp, 2017, p. 3), animals have stood trial for alleged offenses since the medi-
eval period (Girgen, 2003). In these early cases, animals were tried as legal per-
sons in criminal proceedings. Over the past decade, however, there has been a 
dramatic rise in cases seeking to advance the rights of animals themselves. In 
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jurists across the globe. This section of the chapter reviews several recent cases on 
animal rights in the United States, India, Argentina, and Colombia. The purpose 
is to evaluate the extent to which the approaches to animal rights detailed above 
have proven persuasive in courts of law. While this comparative exercise is by no 
means exhaustive, the cases selected for analysis represent major developments 
in the field of animal rights. In the course of this analysis I pay special attention 
to the use of concepts such as personhood and status in an effort to derive insights 
that might be applicable to the question of rights for nonhuman inorganic entities. 
In People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I),23 the 
NhRP sought to appeal a New York State Supreme Court judgment denying the 
group’s application to initiate a habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of Tommy, 
a chimpanzee, whom they argued was being unlawfully detained. According to 
NhRP, Tommy was “living along in a cage in a shed on a used trailer lot along 
Route 30 in Gloversville, New York” (Nonhuman Rights Project, n.d.). The 
case revolved around the question of whether or not Tommy qualified as a “per-
son” capable of possessing an “interest in personal autonomy and freedom from 
unlawful detention.”24 The NhRP argued that chimpanzees exhibit cognitive abili-
ties similar to those found in humans, including autonomy and self-awareness. 
Therefore, they should be considered persons eligible for the protections available 
under the writ of habeas corpus. The court declined to expand the definition of a 
legal person to include animals, finding that “animals have never been considered 
persons for the purposes of habeas corpus relief.”25 
In rendering its decision, the court examined the concepts of person and legal 
personhood, and evaluated the extent to which they might apply to nonhumans. To 
clarify these terms, the judges looked to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defined 
“person” as both “[a] human being” and “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that 
is recognized by law as having the rights and duties [of] a human being” (empha-
sis omitted).26 Finding the possession of rights and duties central to the descrip-
tion of a person and thus required for the demonstration of legal personhood, the 
court then cited domestic case law in the U.S. supporting this connection between 
incidents and personhood. The specific aspect in which chimpanzees fell short 
and corporations proved defensible was legal accountability. For the judges, 
the “incapability to bear any legal responsibilities and societal duties” made the 
extension of legal personhood and thus legal rights to chimps “inappropriate.”27 
Further, the court held that New York’s animal cruelty laws offered sufficient 
safeguards for animals, and encouraged the petitioners to press the legislature to 
enhance the legal protections available to chimpanzees. Following several unsuc-
cessful attempts to appeal the court’s decision and the filing of a second habeas 
corpus petition,28 which was also denied, appealed, and denied again, the case 
came to an end in 2018, when the New York Court of Appeals denied a motion to 
allow NhRP to appeal. 
Aside from the facts that the court appears to have conflated natural persons 
with artificial persons, referring to both simply as kinds of “persons,”29 and that 
“persons” and “legal personhood” are used interchangeably,30 a small but mean-
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legal status. As attorney for the petitioner Elizabeth Stein indicated in her letter to 
the Clerk of the Court in the First Department’s Appellate Division, the definition 
of “person” featured in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edition) misquoted two of 
its supporting sources, which actually promoted the idea that a “person” entails 
a being who has rights or duties (Stein, 2017). Although this was an important 
oversight, the case failed to muster the judicial support necessary to proceed. 
The tortuous path that the Lavery I case traveled along the way to validating the 
status quo illuminates the gap between legal arguments advanced by animal rights 
advocates and the jurists charged with deciding their merits. The NhRP utilized 
a properties-based approach to extending rights to animals that would have such 
nonhuman entities qualify for moral and/or psychological personhoods, which 
serve as a prerequisite for legal personhood. But the New York State Supreme 
Court rebuffed this argument, observing a dearth of precedent finding that animals 
are persons, relying on a definition of legal personhood that requires entities to be 
capable of exercising both rights and duties, and finding that chimpanzees do not 
possess either of these capabilities. 
Two key insights from this judgment foretell the likelihood that courts might 
extend rights to robots. First, at least in the U.S. context, the properties-based 
approach to animal rights is insufficiently persuasive for obtaining judgments in 
favor of protecting nonhuman entities on the basis of their individual rights. Short 
of demonstrating that intelligent machines can effectively execute duties and be 
held legally accountable for their actions, they are unlikely to be deemed persons 
under the law. Pursuit of this objective is frustrated by the fact that legal scholars 
and technologists have yet to come to an agreement regarding how to best address 
the myriad legal accountability issues intrinsic to AI (i.e., Lehmann et al., 2003; 
Hallevy, 2010; Doshi-Velez & Kortz, 2017). As the court indicated, corporations, 
unlike chimpanzees, are associations of humans that bear legal duties. Only those 
entities in possession of moral agency and the capacity for societal responsibility 
can exercise duties and thus be considered legal persons entitled to rights. 
Second, if the category of legal persons comprises only those entities capable 
of duties, responsibility, and accountability, then, absent scientific evidence sug-
gesting technological beings are capable of these things, the only way they can 
obtain legal rights would be through one of the theories extending legal person-
hood to corporations. For instance, a robot rights group could form an association 
on the grounds that they possess a common interest in the welfare of AI, with 
all of the attendant privileges, responsibilities, and liabilities contained therein. 
Then the robot could be considered a legal person whose accountability reaches 
back to the humans who incorporated on its behalf. However, this strategy would 
likely fail to protect all intelligent machines, and it would depend on a property 
rights–like model that might invite controversy among animal liberationists. An 
alternative would be to classify robots as legal minors and designate humans as 
persons in loco parentis who serve as their guardians. Such humans could then 
be considered responsible for the actions of technological entities. This approach 
has already been deployed in an Indian case involving the personhood of rivers 
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In Karnail Singh and others v. State of Haryana (Karnail Singh),32 several truck 
drivers and conductors had previously been found guilty of violating the Punjab 
Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act for exporting a total of 29 cows from the State 
of Haryana to the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners appealed the conviction, 
but they received only a reduced sentence and the ruling was not overturned. 
Thereafter, the Punjab and Haryana High Court agreed to review the revised peti-
tion against the lower court’s verdict. After quickly dispensing with the judgment 
that upheld the conviction and sentenced the petitioners to time served, the court 
turned to the issue of animal cruelty. 
The sprawling, 104-page decision steadily builds towards an outcome in 
favor of extending legal personhood and legal rights to animals by drawing upon 
Indian regulations and case law, American jurisprudence, legal scholarship, non-
Western religious doctrine, quotes from renowned Eastern leaders, and the Indian 
Constitution. The evidence might be summarized as advancing the following 
arguments: (1) some nonhuman entities have already been classified as juristic 
or legal persons under Indian or American law; (2) scientific evidence shows that 
animals possess certain human-like traits; (3) Eastern religions support the per-
sonhood of animals and the need to be compassionate towards them; (4) the Indian 
Supreme Court has interpreted the fundamental right to life as applying to all spe-
cies, including animals;33 (5) the law must respond to ecological destruction by 
creating new instruments designed to protect the environment; and (6) the Indian 
Constitution articulates a duty to have compassion for all living creatures,34 and 
mandates that the state organize agricultural practices35 and safeguard the envi-
ronment, which includes animals.36 The ruling closes with a sweeping declaration: 
The entire animal kingdom including avian and aquatic are declared as legal 
entities having a distinct persona with corresponding rights, duties and liabil-
ities of a living person. All the citizens throughout the State of Haryana are 
hereby declared persons in loco parentis as the human face for the welfare/ 
protection of animals. “Live and let live.”37 
The Karnail Singh decision relies on several of the approaches to animal rights 
described in the previous section. First, following an analysis of legal personhood 
in the American and British contexts, the judges give credence to the properties-
based approach by citing David Boyd’s The Rights of Nature (2017), which offers 
evidence that animals possess emotions, intelligence, self-awareness, and altru-
ism. Second, the Court advances a direct/indirect approach through its attention to 
the principle of ahiṃsā and the way in which practicing compassion towards oth-
ers reflects compassion towards oneself. Another direct/indirect approach speaks 
more broadly to how the concept of juristic persons is used to advance the needs 
of society. Finally, the ruling applies two legal approaches to the question of ani-
mal rights. The first involves animal welfare laws, which the Indian Supreme 
Court has interpreted as guaranteeing animals five freedoms: “(i) freedom from 
hunger, thirst and malnutrition; (ii) freedom from fear and distress; (iii) freedom 
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and (v) freedom to express normal patterns of behavior.”38 The second recognizes 
the inherent value or intrinsic worth of animals, which emerges from an ecocen-
tric ethical orientation towards nature.39 Recognizing that animals have a right to 
life, they cannot be considered mere property40 and their existence is not predi-
cated on the instrumental value humans assign them. 
To be sure, the judgment rendered in Karnail Singh presents a multi-pronged 
justification for animal rights that divines inspiration from different jurisdictions. 
But how might this landmark decision inform the debate over rights for AI? The 
answer is that the extension of rights depends on the sophistication of the tech-
nology, the manner in which humans interact with other entities, the potential 
benefits obtained by treating nonhuman inorganic beings as legal persons, and 
the ontological scope of the moral circle. It remains unclear whether the factors 
enumerated above serve as conditions sufficient or necessary for the enjoyment 
of legal rights. The Indian approach could be a multi-criterial anomaly with little 
prospect of translating intelligibly to other legal systems. However, the court’s 
reasoning applied in Karnail Singh does suggest that responses to the question 
of legal rights for robots will probably require an examination of several factors, 
including characteristics of the legal subject; domestic and foreign jurisprudence; 
local, national, and international cultural contexts; the current capacity of law to 
address existential threats; and the ontological boundaries of the environment. 
In Orangutana Sandra s/ Recurso de Casación s/Habeas Corpus (Sandra I),41 
the Association of Professional Lawyers for Animal Rights (AFADA) sought 
relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus for Sandra, an orangutan born in 
Germany and living in the Buenos Aires Zoo in Argentina. AFADA claimed that 
Sandra was being deprived of her freedom and subject to conditions imperil-
ing her health, and called for her immediate transfer to a primate sanctuary in 
Brazil (de Baggis, 2015, p. 2). After the argument was rejected by two inferior 
criminal courts and twice appealed, at the end of 2014 the Federal Chamber of 
Criminal Cassation ruled on the issue, remanding the case to the criminal court of 
Buenos Aires for jurisdictional reasons (Wise, 2015a). In its terse 2-1 decision, 
the Chamber issued the following provocative statement: 
That based on a dynamic rather than a static interpretation of the law, it is 
necessary to recognize the animal as a subject of rights, because non-human 
beings (animals) are entitled to rights, and therefore their protection is 
required by the corresponding jurisprudence (citations omitted).42 
This part of the ruling gained international media attention, resulting in hyper-
bolic claims about the far-reaching implications of the decision.43 However, as 
Wise (2015b) points out, “the court had neither issued a writ of habeas corpus, nor 
granted Sandra personhood for any purpose, nor ordered her moved to a sanctu-
ary.” Further, the statement alleging that animals have rights amounted to dicta, 
which refers to propositions used in the course of legal reasoning that are not actu-
ally decided, are not based upon the facts of the case, or do not lead to the ultimate 























86 The rights of animals
Despite these issues, it is worth examining the underlying rationale the judges
applied to reach this controversial conclusion, which can be gleaned from the
internal citations provided at the end of the statement. Both of the sources refer-
enced were penned by Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, a former member of Argentina’s
Supreme Court of Justice and current judge on the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.44 In the first work, Zaffaroni et al. (2002) argue that direct/indi-
rect approaches to animal rights have proven to be flawed, and that nonhuman
subjects (i.e., animals) provide socially valuable “legal assets” (bienes jurídicos) 
such as the preservation and conservation of different species (p. 493).45 In the
second work, Zaffaroni (2011) contends that the legal asset in animal cruelty
cases is the “right of the animal itself not to be the object of human cruelty” (p.
54).46 He also pushes back against the argument that animals do not have rights
because they are incapable of demanding them (i.e., they lack legal capacity and
are ineligible for rights under will theory), citing marginal cases of humans who
are similarly ill-equipped to partake in legal matters. Therefore, despite their
brevity, the judges in this case had in fact supported their dynamic assertion
of animal rights using a legal approach supplied by one of Argentina’s famed
jurists. 
Sandra’s legal status left unresolved, AFADA pursued an acción de amparo, a 
legal mechanism conceived to protect basic rights by providing “a quick solution 
to urgent circumstances” (Thompson, 2019, p. 16).47 On October 21, 2015, Judge 
Elena Amanda Liberatori issued a ruling on the case (Sandra II).48 Agreeing with 
the precedent set by the previous court in 2014, Judge Liberatori found no reason 
why Sandra should not be considered a nonhuman person49 and subject of rights. 
Her decision focused on the application of Argentine Civil Code, which she inter-
preted in light of 2015 reforms to the Civil Code in France. In January of that 
year, the French Parliament voted to change the legal status of domestic pets and 
wild animals held in captivity from “movable property” to “living beings gifted 
sentience” (Hervy, 2015).50 Judge Liberatori argued that the French development 
should be used to inform the interpretation of Argentina’s own Civil Code, thus 
designating Sandra a nonhuman person on the basis of her sentience, which was 
demonstrated by a panel of experts. 
In support of applying new categorizations in the context of law, she cited 
Zaffaroni’s discussion of the rights of nature, specifically those found in the 
Ecuadorian Constitution. Ecuador’s governing charter, and to a lesser extent 
Bolivia’s, invoke an “andean ecology” (Bandieri, 2015, p. 33) that recognizes 
Earth as a subject of rights. The larger point that Judge Liberatori sought to make 
about legal subjects reflects the jurisprudential outlook of legal positivism—cat-
egories are social constructions that are inherently dynamic, not natural and static. 
They change according to the evolving social context. Furthermore, she held that 
“it is necessary to denature and problematize the way in which one thinks on 
a daily basis, since this way of thinking has been socially and historically con-
structed for centuries and can enclose relations of domination and inequality.”51 
Thus, interrogating how humans have classified reality allows us to reveal power 
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After Judge Liberatori’s ruling, Sandra’s situation remained mired in uncer-
tainty. The Buenos Aires Zoo closed and turned into an eco-park, and the issue 
again came before the judge, who temporarily rejected AFADA’s request to have 
Sandra transferred to a primate sanctuary (GAP Project, 2017). Due to the dearth 
of accredited sanctuaries in Argentina, Judge Liberatori requested that Sandra 
be relocated to the Center for Great Apes (CGA) in Wauchula, Florida (Elassar, 
2019). After a month-long quarantine at the Sedgwick County Zoo in Kansas, 
Sandra was moved to CGA, where she has resided since 2019. 
Both of the decisions regarding Sandra touch upon a variety of the approaches 
to animal rights discussed in this chapter. In the former case, direct/indi-
rect approaches were implicitly rejected in favor of non-anthropocentric legal 
approaches viewed through the lens of legal positivism, with a nod towards prop-
erties-based approaches via the argument from marginal cases. In the latter case, 
a legal approach was informed by a properties-based approach, presented through 
an explicitly non-anthropocentric (though still largely individualist) application 
of Indigenous ideas, legal positivism, and critical theory. In summary, both cases 
weave several approaches together, proffering legal arguments for animal rights 
that reinterpret the concept of legal subject using combinations of pragmatism, 
dynamism, science, and external ideas. 
The decisions rendered in both Sandra cases provide uneven support for 
extending rights to intelligent machines. In the first case, while a dynamic inter-
pretation of the law might enable the possibility of rights for artefactual entities, 
the logic employed by the court seems to reverse the order of concepts described 
in Chapter Two; here, rights lead to the determination of legal status (i.e., object 
or subject). This process entails demonstrating that an entity possesses legal rights 
prior to assessing its legal status. Given that the court did not explain how animals 
were adjudged to possess rights in the first place, the only clues available come 
from the sources cited, which suggest that finding animals to be legal subjects 
serves primarily to benefit those creatures and secondarily to confer social value to 
humans. In the second case, a similar preference for disrupting the static nature of 
law shines through, leaving the door open to new ideas and potentially new legal 
subjects. Revisiting old ways of legal thinking is necessary in order to address 
power imbalances and inequality. Further, a willingness to look outside one’s 
own jurisdiction for inspiration via “transjudicial communication” (Slaughter, 
1994, p. 101) or “legal transplantation” (Schauer, 2000) could very well result in 
alterations to existing legal paradigms. Therefore, at least in theory, extant legal 
categories could be altered in the face of changing circumstances. However, the 
extent to which this dynamism might facilitate the rights of nonhuman non-animal 
entities remains unclear. 
In a 2017 decision from Colombia’s Supreme Court of Justice,52 Judge Luis 
Armando Tolosa Villabona granted a writ of habeas corpus to a spectacled bear 
named Chucho, overturning a ruling by the Civil Family Tribunal of the Superior 
Court of the Judicial District of Manizales. Luis Gómez, the lawyer and peti-
tioner acting on Chucho’s behalf, argued that in transferring the bear from his 
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Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas “had deprived Chucho of his right to 
liberty, severely compromising his physical and emotional well-being” (Choplin, 
2019). Further, Gómez maintained, the endangered bear was currently being held 
under conditions tantamount to “permanent imprisonment” (Stucki & Herrera, 
2017). As such, he sought relief for Chucho in the form of permanent relocation 
to the La Planada Natural Reserve in the state of Nariño. 
In the process of evaluating the petitioner’s claim, Judge Tolosa expounded a 
critical, context-specific legal argument for animal rights steeped in environmen-
tal ethics, legal theory, domestic law, and international soft law. He began by lay-
ing the blame for ecological destruction at the feet of Enlightenment philosophers, 
whose rationalism, individualism, and capitalism enabled humanity’s rapacious 
exploitation of the environment. Humans have become conquerors, “immoder-
ate and irresponsible beings,” who have “ignor[ed] that it is they who belong to 
nature, to the Earth and to the universe.”53 Against these thinkers stand notable 
advocates of animal rights, including, inter alia, Jeremy Bentham, Henry Salt, 
Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Eugenio Zaffaroni. 
Recognizing the ills of anthropocentrism, Judge Tolosa argued that society
must transition to an “ecocentric-anthropic worldview … in which human beings
are the main wardens of the universe and the environment, and which promotes a
universal and biotic citizenship.”54 Looking to holistically minded environmental
ethicists such as Aldo Leopold and Arne Naess,55 the magistrate asserted that “[w]e
are all part of a reconstructive and resilient juridical natural community, and we are
citizens that are subjects of proactive rights and members of an organized society
that evolves among plants, animals and abiotic agents.”56 This new way of think-
ing about humans and their place in the world depends on “a sense of respect and
responsibility that supersedes the individual and personal level, and that encour-
ages us to see, think and act out of the understanding of the other, of the Earth and
of nature.”57 One way to upend the dominant paradigm is to “actively construct …
a conception of the nature–subject couplet” (emphasis in original)58 that will allow
us to reconsider our place in the universe and our relationship with nature. 
Following his normative assessment of the causes underlying the existential 
crisis facing humanity, Judge Tolosa then proceeded to explain how survival of 
the human species depends on a recalibration of relevant legal concepts. In par-
ticular, he urged, we need to alter our current conceptions of legal personhood, 
legal status, and legal rights. This task can be accomplished in three moves. First, 
we should recognize that nonhuman entities such as corporations and associations 
are already viewed as legal subjects with legal rights that possess legal person-
hood despite not being alive or sentient. Second, we must relax the idea that only 
those entities capable of reciprocating duties are eligible for rights. Third, we can 
extend legal personhood/status/rights to nature and other beings on the basis of 
their sentience. This method avoids exclusive reliance on biological, moral, or 
emotional arguments, and instead advances a “different and creative philosophic-
juridical frame.”59 
Judge Tolosa held that domestic and foreign law support the practical imple-
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was amended in 2016 to distinguish entities that exhibit the quality of sentience 
(i.e., all animals) from those considered merely movable goods (Contreras, 2016, 
p. 4). The Constitutional Court of Colombia previously found this updated leg-
islation to withstand the test of constitutional scrutiny, explaining that preserv-
ing nature is important not only for human survival, but also because parts of 
nature possess rights of their own.60 Second, animals are also jointly protected 
under Articles 8, 79, and 95 of the Colombian Constitution61 because they are 
considered a significant part of the state’s natural resources. As Judge Tolosa 
remarked, animals are part of the “natural context, the context where every holder 
of rights exists and evolves.”62 Third, animal welfare is regulated under Law 84 
of 1989,63 which promulgated the National Animal Protection Statute. Finally, 
looking to external sources for guidance, Judge Tolosa cited the Ecuadorian, 
German, and Swiss constitutions, along with the Universal Declaration of Animal 
Rights (1978), the World Charter for Nature (1982), and a resolution passed by 
the European Parliament in 1988. 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, Judge Tolosa granted a writ of habeas 
corpus to Gómez, who represented Chucho, and ordered the bear’s transfer back 
to the Río Blanco Nature Reserve within 30 days. However, the next month, the 
Colombian Supreme Court reversed the decision, which Gómez subsequently 
appealed (Semana, 2017). Then, in early 2020, Chucho’s case came to a halt when 
the Constitutional Court upheld the previous ruling by a 7–2 margin. The presi-
dent of the Constitutional Court, Judge Gloria Ortiz, stated that animals do not 
possess a right to freedom because “there is no such category in the Colombian 
legal system” (City Paper, 2020). 
Despite the ultimate failure of Gómez’s attempt to free Chucho from captivity, 
Judge Tolosa’s decision illustrates how a multi-faceted animal rights argument 
might be presented. While the magistrate invoked a properties-based approach 
through his emphasis on sentience, he also applied a direct/indirect approach, 
although here the focus was on the survival of all species, not just humans. Judge 
Tolosa also employed a relational approach when he espoused a decidedly holistic, 
non-anthropocentric worldview that recognized both the unique status of humans 
and their concomitant responsibility towards other forms of life. Crucially, he 
expressed the idea that humans occupy a place among (not above) other entities. 
Finally, Judge Tolosa adopted a critical legal approach64 that rejects individual-
ism and Cartesian dualism in favor of radical concepts such as the nature–subject 
couplet, legal personhood for all sentient beings, and eliminating reciprocal duties 
from the conditions necessary for an entity to hold rights. Through this multi-
pronged analytical exercise, the magistrate concluded that “[i]n an ethical and 
ontological sense, rights cannot be an exclusive endowment of human beings.”65 
Although an initial reading of the Chucho case suggests that the rights of tech-
nological entities are not readily forthcoming, Judge Tolosa’s philosophic-juridi-
cal approach to animal rights offers a few potential entry points. First, the collapse 
of the human–environment divide and its replacement with nature–subject cou-
plets leaves open the possibility that other nonhuman beings may emerge as mem-
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although perhaps less likely, were robots to be considered sentient beings, they 
would be easily accommodated as legal subjects with legal personhood worthy 
of rights in an ecocentric-anthropic worldview. Third, the removal of reciprocal 
duties from the list of qualities needed to possess rights would provide an avenue 
for nonhuman entities to be reclassified as moral patients eligible for moral (and 
perhaps legal) rights. 
A brief comparison of the cases reviewed in this section summarizes how 
courts in different jurisdictions have decided cases pertaining to animal rights 
(see Table 3.1). 
The above cases provide evidence of both similarity and differentiation in the 
adjudication of animal rights across legal contexts. First, the causes of action tend 
to be alleged infringements of human rights applied to nonhuman creatures. This 
is not surprising, as the petitioners acting on behalf of animals seek to initiate 
claims that immediately resonate with judges operating within existing legal sys-
tems. Second, jurists have looked to a range of sources, especially legal schol-
arship, to inform their decision-making. However, the degree to which external 
laws and jurisprudence are referenced varies considerably. Third, virtually all the 
cases reviewed here appeal in some form or other to properties-based or legal 
approaches to animal rights, while the relational approach was not embraced with 
the same fervor. At the same time, properties-based and legal approaches did 
not yield consistent outcomes, suggesting that their efficacy may depend on the 
specific context in which they are deployed. As such, their appeal as legal argu-
ments can hardly be described as universal. Critical and pragmatic arguments, on 
the other hand, while creative, may not be received well in systems less open to 
new legal ideas. Fourth, a few of the concepts described in Chapter Two proved 
integral to the decisions reached. These include legal personhood, legal subject, 
and legal rights. Despite the occasional confusion regarding the definition of a 
person in the general sense, the evidence suggests that future efforts to secure 
animal rights should carefully consider how, if at all, these categories apply to 
nonhumans. 
Conclusion 
What pearls of wisdom might the theory and practice regarding animal rights 
contribute to the discussion of rights for technological entities? First, at least some 
degree of anthropocentrism inevitably invades any moral or legal calculus. None of 
the approaches discussed above is immune from this charge. However, the extent 
of anthropocentrism present in the animal rights literature ranges from absolute 
(i.e., direct/indirect approaches) to marginal (i.e., certain legal approaches). While 
the act of deciding whether or not an entity should have rights may be an ines-
capably anthropocentric exercise, we should also recognize the environmental 
devastation that has befallen the Earth as a result of placing human interests above 
all others. Therefore, it pays to remain cognizant of anthropocentrism’s ongoing 
destructive capacities, and actively seek to keep them in check so as to avoid 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































92 The rights of animals
this more critical stance to intelligent machines means adopting a weaker, almost 
enfeebled, version of anthropocentrism similar to the ecocentric-anthropic ethic 
proposed by Judge Tolosa.66 Practically speaking, this would require focusing less 
on qualities other entities might share with humans, and more on ways in which 
human decision-making could lead to more ethically justifiable determinations, as 
opposed to continued human supremacy. 
Second, the role that duties play in the process of granting rights needs clarifi-
cation if robots (or any other nonhuman entities for that matter) are ever to enjoy a 
status above mere machines. On the one hand, duties are the correlative of rights. 
Watson argues that the capacity to reciprocate duties is necessary for an entity to 
be considered a moral agent and thus entitled to moral rights. Hohfeld maintains 
that only human beings can engage in such reciprocal exchanges, limiting the 
types of beings eligible for legal rights. On the other hand, these logical relation-
ships ignore moral patients, who are capable of holding rights even if they cannot 
discharge duties, and discount the perspectives of cultures across the world that 
have afforded legal rights for reasons other than the capacity for mutual account-
ability. Referring back to the Chucho case, Judge Tolosa explicitly entertained the 
suggestion made by Salt a century earlier to relax the reciprocal duties require-
ment that has for so long prevented the expansion of legal rights to nonhumans. 
Once moral patients and legal subjects are no longer shackled by the expectation 
of reciprocity, radical possibilities, such as rights-bearing technological entities, 
seem possible. 
Third, while some emphasis on the properties of individual entities seems una-
voidable, what remains less clear is which qualities should be held in higher regard 
than others and the relative importance of properties compared to other factors. 
The answers to these questions have substantial implications for the debate over 
rights for AI. A promising and increasingly science-based case can be made for 
promoting sentience above other properties, as suggested by Judge Liberatori’s 
careful consideration of evidence regarding Sandra the orangutan’s cognitive 
abilities. Further, as Boyd illustrates, plenty of research supports the presence 
of other morally significant properties among members of the animal kingdom. 
But the properties-based approach still suffers from a general lack of consensus 
in both philosophy and law, which is due in large part to the yet-unresolved prob-
lem of other minds. Even the relational approach, which I have argued may offer 
the best path forward, relies on the nature of interactions between entities whose 
responses to each other are shaped by the properties they appear to possess. In 
addition, the utility of properties-based approaches is further complicated by the 
argument from marginal cases, which casts doubt on our ability to set an inter-
subjectively acceptable floor for moral consideration. All of this is to say that the 
properties quandary remains unsettled in both literature and litigation, although 
the traits associated with certain entities—be they animal or mechanical—are 
likely to figure somewhere in moral and legal analyses. 
Fourth, the plight of animal rights manifests in the difficulty scholars and
jurists experience when attempting to prescribe the boundaries of the moral cir-
cle or determine the inclusiveness of legal categories. Philosophers applying









































The rights of animals 93 
rights, but these efforts have relied on subjective, anthropocentric, and empiri-
cally problematic individual qualities. Those promoting a relational approach
have encouraged a shift away from ontological properties. However, properties
have not been completely expelled from the equation. Their implicit relevance
has instead introduced a level of analytical uncertainty that might frustrate the
practical application of this strategy. Legal scholars have put forth arguments that
excel in precision but fall short in terms of inclusiveness. It seems that we can
offer greater legal protections for animals found in farms, zoos, or the wild, but
not all at once.67 Courts around the world have also varied considerably as far as
coverage is concerned. In Lavery I, the imposition of a strict (albeit erroneous)
definitional requirement involving the capacity for rights and duties successfully
foreclosed the possibility of finding Tommy the chimpanzee to be a legal person
entitled to legal rights. In Karnail Singh, by contrast, a multi-faceted legal judg-
ment set in the context of developing state granted legal rights to all animals.
Thus, both the philosophy and law on animal rights have failed to develop coher-
ent and inclusive programs that could be profitably applied to questions regarding
the rights of other entities, such as intelligent machines. 
To be direct, the answer to the machine question will not likely come from the
intellectual cage of animal rights. However, the animal rights model could prove
useful if any of the following three conditions are satisfied. First, if philosophers
ever come to an agreement about the existence of properties like consciousness or
sentience in animals, perhaps as a result of scientific evidence made possible by new
technologies, the inquiry might then shift to whether or not robots possess the same
capability. Following Singer, if they are determined to have the same property,
there would be no reason why they should not be eligible for moral/psychological
and legal personhood, and, consequently, moral or legal rights. Second, if societal
needs ever compel moral or legal recognition for AI, this whole debate might prove
moot. As discussed in Chapter Two, American jurisprudence supports the idea that
corporations and ships should be treated as legal persons for practical reasons. In
both Karnail Singh and Chucho, extending legal rights to animals was similarly
deemed necessary, although in these cases it was because of the need to address the
impacts of environmental degradation and insure the survival of different species,
respectively. Therefore, should society find it useful to consider artificial agents
legal persons, the paradigm will adjust accordingly, irrespective of whether or not
philosophers have made progress on their own front. Finally, if Western philosophy
and its accompanying ontological worldviews ever cede ground to Eastern and crit-
ical perspectives, the categorization and treatment of technological beings will be
primed for tectonic alteration. Inputs provided by non-Western sources may include
recognizing that the human–animal divide is a social construct (Peters, 2016, p. 27),
a relic of Cartesian dualism that overlooks temporal and spatial variations in the
ontological status of nonhuman creatures; respecting Indigenous knowledge about
and ways of conceiving the world; moving away from the focus on human prop-
erties towards embracing the kinship that exists among all beings; and replacing
individualism with holism. It is this final point that I examine in greater detail in the
next chapter, which analyzes developments regarding the rights of nature and how
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Notes 
1 This quote is often attributed to Henry David Thoreau, but it does not appear in any of 
his writings. It was likely misattributed to him by Salt (1900), who quoted the passage 
on page 206 in his article, “The Rights of Animals” (J. Cramer, personal communica-
tion, March 16, 2020). Archibald Banks was one of the many pseudonyms used by 
British journalist Oswald John Frederick Crawfurd. 
2 Singer’s work is discussed at greater length below. 
3 This line of reasoning is known as the “argument from marginal cases” (Narveson, 
1977, p. 164). The utility of this argument is discussed in the following section. 
4 Although different approaches to environmental ethics, such as biocentrism and eco-
centrism, are germane to the discussion of animal rights, for the sake of simplicity I 
focus mainly on animal ethics in the present chapter. Environmental ethics are pursued 
in greater detail in the next chapter. 
5 See https://www.nonhumanrights.org/. 
6 As Wise (2002) explicitly notes, “philosophers argue moral rights; judges decide legal 
rights. And so I present a legal, and not a philosophical, argument for the dignity-rights 
of nonhuman animals” (p. 34). As argued in Chapter Two, this intellectual divide has 
produced much confusion regarding the antecedents of rights and the kinds of entities 
entitled to them. 
7 I elected to include Wise in the section on properties-based approaches to animal rights 
as opposed to the later section on legal approaches because his argument, while induc-
tively derived from case law, focuses exclusively on how rights emerge from the pres-
ence or absence of certain traits. 
8 Interestingly, Regan (2004) applies the logic of the negative case to plants, whom, he 
argues, do not share enough in common with humans to be considered subjects-of-a-
life (p. 63). 
9 Any semblance of consensus quickly dissipates once both Western and non-Western
perspectives on properties are considered on equal footing. For instance, adherents
of Vajrayana Buddhism in Bhutan acknowledge a range of sentient beings, including
deities that are not visible to the naked eye (Allison, 2019). While this Eastern cos-
mology assigns value to sentience, Western scholars would likely struggle with the
idea of affording moral consideration to entities whose existence cannot be observed
directly. 
10 See the discussion on the argument from marginal cases earlier in this section. 
11 For Watson (1979), the capacity to reciprocate duties is necessary for an entity to pos-
sess rights, because only those who act according to the duties they owe others qualify 
as moral agents, and only moral agents have rights. 
12 Tarabout (2019) suggests that compassion might be a source of animal protection that 
need not be expressed in the language of legal rights. Citing the case of India, he dis-
cusses how the constitutional duty to “have compassion for living creatures” (India 
Const., pt. IVA, art. 51A, §g) has been interpreted by the courts as placing limits on the 
actions of humans in order to prevent animal suffering. 
13 This case is analyzed in detail in the next section. 
14 The rights of nature and the issue of legal personhood for natural resources are dis-
cussed more extensively in Chapter Four. 
15 For Norton (1984), intrinsic value is synonymous with inherent value (p. 137, n11). 
16 Legal personhood is extended under the assumption that doing so will advance human 
interests in the legal domain. The personhood of animals, by contrast, serves to “restrain 
rather than expand the ways in which human good may be legitimately pursued by 
means of the instrumental use of animals” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 57). 
17 For these authors, the determination of rights is an inquiry separate from the ques-
tion about an entity’s moral agency. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, these 















               





            
      
  
               









The rights of animals 95 
both are incidents associated with moral status—agency and patiency. While Marx and 
Tiefensee focus on whether or not animals or robots qualify as moral agents, nowhere 
do they mention the possibility that either might be moral patients. 
18 Notable exceptions include Maddux (2012) and Staker (2017), who place legal person-
hood at the center of legal scholarship on animal rights advocacy. 
19 Regan, however, does write about moral agency and moral patiency quite extensively. 
See Sun (2018). Pluhar (1987) maintains that the stronger of Regan’s two responses to 
the argument from marginal cases actually precludes characterizing animals as persons 
altogether according to Feinberg’s (1980) notion of “commonsense” personhood (p. 
260), which, ironically, consists of properties similar to those associated with being a 
subject-of-a-life. This is all to say that perhaps personhood is addressed implicitly in 
Regan’s animal rights philosophy. 
20 For instance, I love my dog Shiva, but I cannot be assured that every stranger she meets 
on our walks will feel similarly towards her. 
21 Anthropomorphism in the context of robots is explored in greater detail in Chapter 
Five. 
22 But see Cupp (2017), who argues that “although one could argue that animals have 
interests and thus should have some form of ‘rights’ under an expansive view of the 
interest theory that goes beyond its usual focus on humans and human proxies, such a 
conclusion is not in any way compelled under the theory” (p. 44). 
23 People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (‘Lavery I’), 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), available at https://casetext.com/case/people-v-lavery-6. 
24 Ibid., at 249. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., at 250. 
27 Ibid., at 251. 
28 In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (‘Lavery II’), 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2017), available at https://casetext.com/case/nonhuman-rights-project-inc-e
x-rel-tommy-v-lavery. 
29 Ibid., at 250. 
30 Ibid. 
31 This case is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
32 Karnail Singh and others v. state of Haryana (‘Karnail Singh’), Punjab & Haryana 
High Court, CRR-533-2013 (2019), available at https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/p
df_upload-361239.pdf. 
33 See Animal Welfare Board of India v. Nagaraja and Ors (‘Animal Welfare Board’), 
7 SCC 547 (2019), available at https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/Ani
mal-Welfare-Board-v-A.-Nagaraja-7.5.2014.pdf.
34 “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India … to protect and improve the natural 
environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for 
living creatures” (India Const., pt. IVA, art. 51A, §g). 
35 “The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern 
and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the 
breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught 
cattle” (India Const., pt. IV, art. 48). 
36 “The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard 
the forests and wild life of the country” (India Const., pt. IV, art. 48A). 
37 Karnail Singh, at 104. 
38 Animal Welfare Board, at 35. These freedoms are listed in the World Organisation for 
Animal Health’s Terrestrial Animal Health Code. See OIE (2019, Chapter 7). 
39 Ecocentrism is explained in the following chapter. 
40 Citing the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Animal Welfare Board, the Court in 
Karnail Singh recounted that the Indian Constitution’s fundamental right to property 




      















                      
             
                      








          
          
 
 
     
                
 
 
96 The rights of animals
44th Amendment in 1978, affording Parliament more flexibility to pass laws pertaining 
to animal rights. See Animal Welfare Board, at 35. 
41 Orangutana Sandra s/ Recurso de Casación s/Habeas Corpus (‘Sandra I’), Cámara 
Federal de Casación Penal, CCC 68831/2014/CFC1 (2014), available at https://ww
w.nonhumanrights.org/blog/copy-of-argentine-court-ruling/. Translated by Mountain 
(2014). 
42 Ibid., at 86. 
43 For instance, news articles featured headlines such as “Court in Argentina Grants Basic 
Rights to Orangutan” (BBC News, 2014) and “Argentina Grants an Orangutan Human-
Like Rights” (Román, 2015). 
44 Zaffaroni’s scholarship on animal rights has been compared to that of Peter Singer and 
Tom Regan. See Bandieri (2015). 
45 It should be noted that Alejandro Slokar, one of Zaffaroni’s co-authors on the book, was 
also one of the two judges in this case who held that Sandra was entitled to rights. 
46 Translation author’s own with the assistance of Google Translate. 
47 Importantly, an amparo is designed to protect all basic rights except for the right to 
physical freedom, which is addressed through the habeas corpus procedure (Adre, 
2018, p. 139). 
48 Asociacion de Funcionarios y Abogados por los Derechos de los Animales y Otros 
contra GBCA sobre amparo (‘Sandra II’), EXPTE. A2174-2015/0 (2015), available at 
https://ijudicial.gob.ar/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sentencia-Orangutana.pdf. 
49 Liberatori explicitly borrowed this phrase from Italian lawyer and sociologist Valerio 
Pocar. See Pocar (2013). 
50 For a more detailed analysis of how changes in the French Civil Code affect the legal 
status of animals, see Neumann (2015). 
51 Ibid., at 10. Translation author’s own with the assistance of Google Translate. 
52 AHC4806–2017 (‘Chucho’), Radicación no. l7001–22–13–000–2017–00468–02, 
available at http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/radicado-n-17001-22-13
-000-2017-00468-02.pdf. Translated by Javier Salcedo, available at https://www.non
humanrights.org/content/uploads/Translation-Chucho-Decision-Translation-Javier-S
alcedo.pdf. 
53 Ibid., at 4. 
54 Ibid., at 5. 
55 These and other environmental ethicists are discussed more extensively in the next 
chapter. 
56 Chucho, at 5. 
57 Ibid., at 6. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., at 8. 
60 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-041 (2017), available at https://www.animallaw.inf
o/case/sentencia-c-041-2017. 
61 “It is the obligation of the State and of individuals to protect the cultural and natural 
assets of the nation” (Colombia Const., tit. I, art. 8); “Every individual has the right to 
enjoy a healthy environment. An Act shall guarantee the community’s participation in 
the decisions that may affect it. It is the duty of the State to protect the diversity and 
integrity of the environment, to conserve the areas of special ecological importance, 
and to foster education for the achievement of these ends” (Colombia Const., tit. II, ch. 
III, art. 79); “The following are duties of the individual and of the citizen: … To protect 
the country’s cultural and natural resources and to keep watch that a healthy environ-
ment is being preserved (Colombia Const., tit. II, ch. V, art. 95, §8). 
62 Chucho, at 9. 
63 Law 84 of 1989, Official Diary 39120, of December 27, 1989, available at https://www
.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=8242. 
64 Critical environmental law is described in the following chapter. 
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66 I write “weaker” and not “weak” so as to distinguish my argument from that of Epting 
(2010), who writes that weak anthropocentrism dictates “approach[ing] technology in 
a manner that is conducive to the permanence of genuine human life, which requires 
ecological sustainability” (p. 21). 
67 The lone exception worth mentioning here is the approach advocated by Abate and 
Crowe, although their argument rests in part on making an analogy between animals 
and humans by virtue of their shared properties (i.e., sentience). This argument remains 
suspect for reasons specified above. 
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4 The rights of nature 
Ethics, law, and the Anthropocene 
Mitákuye oyás’į 
(We are all related) 
(Lakota people of North America) 
The rights of nature (RoN) movement, with its origins in Indigenous traditional 
knowledge and ancestral cultures, has obtained concrete expression in courts, 
constitutions, and citizen referenda in numerous places around the world. The 
ontological premise underlying this global initiative is that the Cartesian separa-
tion between man and nature is illusory; all organic life is intimately connected. 
At the same time, the arrival of the Anthropocene has exposed frailties in the con-
cept of legal personhood and invited a debate over the boundaries of nature itself. 
Responding to these developments, in this chapter I detail how the RoN move-
ment, scholarship in environmental ethics and law, and recent case law expand 
the scope of rights to include nonhuman entities. Beginning with an overview of 
the RoN movement, the chapter proceeds by reviewing biocentric and ecocentric 
environmental ethics and the extent to which both offer space for extending rights 
to nonhuman entities. Next, relying on advancements in critical environmental 
legal scholarship, writing on law in the Anthropocene, and New Materialism, I 
argue for an expansive definition of the environment and observe that the collapse 
of the human/nonhuman binary opens up the possibility of widening the range 
of entities that qualify for rights. Then, I examine how rights have already been 
extended to natural nonhuman entities under the auspices of the RoN, which have 
been adjudicated successfully in courts within Ecuador, Colombia, and India. 
Finally, from the foregoing evidence I demonstrate how a critical, Anthropocene-
informed approach to environmental law supports widening the concept of rights 
to include artefactual entities that exist in and comprise the larger built environ-
ment, such as robots. 
Origins of the rights of nature 
The notion that nature possesses rights emerged from the uncommon and
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This marriage occurs at a time of acute environmental crisis on a global scale.
Indigenous cultures and ancient religions have long observed a complex rela-
tionship between humans and the environment involving respect for all forms
of life commensurate with human responsibilities towards nature (Boyd, 2017,
p. xxix). For instance, the concept of Buen Vivir (living well) that emerged in
Latin America as a reaction to the negative consequences of development was
imbued with Indigenous meaning through the terms sumak kawsay (kichwa)
and suma qamaña (aymara), which emphasize a holistic view of the world based
on reciprocity between humans and nature (Gudynas, 2011, p. 442). These
terms have influenced the content of and underlying inspiration for the current
Ecuadorian Constitution1 and recent Bolivian statutes,2 respectively (Calzadilla
& Kotzé, 2018, p. 399). Yet for hundreds of years, Indigenous knowledge has
been subjugated by powerful Western interests (Borrows, 1997, p. 425). Its
newfound exposure and resonance across the world augurs the arrival of a
mounting popular resistance to widespread ecological destruction that decries
the impotence of current environmental law to provide adequate protection for
nature (Collins, 2019). 
Numerous examples of the conflict between Indigenous cultures and modern 
developmental imperatives abound. In the United States, thousands joined the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe for several months in 2016 to protest construction of 
the Dakota Access pipeline over Native burial sites (Meyer, 2016). In Ecuador, 
Indigenous communities marched together to oppose environmentally destructive 
mining activities on Native territory (Brown, 2018). In Brazil, the Karipuna peo-
ple witnessed deforestation due to logging and raging wildfires in their sections 
of the Amazonian rainforest (Magalhaes & Pearson, 2019). In New Zealand, a 
massive housing development project situated on sacred Māori land drew thou-
sands of protestors (Reuters, 2019). In these situations and others, environmental 
degradation caused by economic development has posed an existential threat to 
Indigenous peoples, igniting concerns that violations of their traditional relation-
ships with nature may amount to “cultural genocide” (Kingston, 2015, p. 63). 
The protection of Native communities and the environments in which they live 
is often frustrated by the fact that much Indigenous knowledge is not written, but 
rather transferred orally (Maurial, 1999, p. 63). As such, Indigenous ideas often 
lack the kind of concrete instantiation or legalization that grants them legitimacy 
in the Western legal order. One way that Indigenous communities have found 
success in gaining recognition for their rights is through strategic framing. By 
explicitly articulating how provisions in international human rights treaties relate 
to the specific concerns of Native peoples, they have been able to marshal sup-
port for legal protections at the international level (Morgan, 2004). Another way 
that Indigenous knowledge has penetrated legal discourse is through its deliber-
ate incorporation into Western institutions by advocates and allies. For example, 
Ecuador granted rights to nature in its 2008 constitution due in large part to the 
opportunistic combination of “radical Western ecological perspectives, politi-
cized indigenous beliefs, and legal rights discourse” advanced by activists and 
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Recently in the United States, Native groups have applied traditional concepts
to modern environmental problems by legalizing the rights of natural entities.
For example, in 2016 the Ho-Chunk Nation of Wisconsin included the RoN in
their tribal constitution in order to counteract oil and gas exploration on sacred
lands (Margil, 2016). The next year, in an effort to call attention to and pre-
vent further hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) on or around their reservation,
the Ponca Nation of Oklahoma passed a statute recognizing the RoN (Biggs,
2017). At the end of 2018, the White Earth band of Ojibwe passed a law giv-
ing rights to manoomin (or “wild rice”) to protect this traditional dietary staple
from industrial activities that harm water quality and introduce genetically modi-
fied organisms into the ecosystem (LaDuke, 2019). In each of these instances,
Indigenous peoples pushed back against exploitation and degradation of their
resources by translating cultural concepts into tools intelligible to modern legal
systems—rights. 
On the Western front, perhaps no intellectual input has proven more influential
in the RoN movement than Christopher Stone’s (1972) seminal article “Should
Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.”3 In this pro-
vocative work, Stone proposed to grant legal rights not only to natural objects,
but “to the natural environment as a whole” (1972, p. 456). Extending rights to
nature, Stone argued, requires creative interpretation of both legal-operational
and psychic or socio-psychic concerns. The former entails determining whether
or not an entity qualifies as a holder of legal rights, a project quite similar to
deciphering whether or not an entity satisfies the criteria for legal personhood.
According to Stone, an entity may enjoy legal rights when 1) an authoritative
body is willing to review actions that threaten it; 2) it can institute legal actions
on its own accord (i.e., judicial standing); 3) a court considers injury to the entity
when granting legal relief; and 4) the relief provided by the court benefits the
entity (1972, p. 458). The latter involves “effecting a radical shift in our feelings
about ‘our’ place in the rest of Nature” (Stone, 1972, p. 495). This shift would
advance a kind of ecological consciousness whereby the Earth is viewed as a
single organism and humans are perceived as different from, but functionally part
of, nature. 
That Stone’s innovative and thought-provoking article found its way into 
American jurisprudence was no accident. The staff of the University of Southern 
California Law Review deliberately inserted the piece into a special issue of the 
journal, which was reviewed by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
(Stone, 1987, p. 4). Justice Douglas, an avid environmentalist, thus read an early 
version of the essay prior to the Supreme Court rendering its judgment in Sierra 
Club v. Morton,4 a case regarding an organization’s standing to sue on the basis 
that its members would suffer an injury in the event that a development project 
in Mineral King Valley would proceed as planned. Although the Court ultimately 
decided that Sierra Club did not possess standing due to the group’s general and 
not particularized injury, Justice Douglas penned a dissent that would become 
legendary in modern environmental law because of its assertion that nature itself 
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Contemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium 
should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for 
their own preservation. See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). This suit 
would therefore be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. Morton.5 
Justice Douglas went on to explain the precedent that exists for granting nature 
legal personhood, citing the examples of ships and corporations that have enjoyed 
such elevated status when deemed convenient for adjudicatory purposes, and 
arguing in favor of extending the same recognition to natural entities like rivers. 
In particular, Justice Douglas reasoned that a river 
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have 
a meaningful relation to that body of water … must be able to speak for the 
values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.6 
Importantly, in the preceding statement, the famed jurist observed a kind of 
reflexive relationship whereby, ontologically speaking, nature encompasses all 
life that comprise it while, practically speaking, those with direct ties to that part 
of nature must be eligible to defend its interests in human institutions. Here, 
Douglas afforded Stone’s legal-operational and socio-psychic concerns concrete, 
jurisprudential instantiation. 
Stone’s influential article and Douglas’s practical application of the RoN in 
a U.S. Supreme Court decision paved the way for further uptake of the concept 
in legal systems around the world. In 2006, Tamaqua Borough in Pennsylvania, 
U.S., became the first municipality to adopt a RoN ordinance (Cano-Pecharroman, 
2018, p. 4). The ordinance, which sought to enjoin the dumping of sewage sludge 
by corporations, includes in the long form of its title a legislative intent motivated 
by the RoN: “By Recognizing and Enforcing the Rights of Residents to Defend 
Natural Communities and Ecosystems” (Tamaqua Borough, 2006, p. 1). Later in 
the ordinance, the scope of entities granted legal personhood is explicitly defined: 
“Borough residents, natural communities, and ecosystems shall be considered to 
be ‘persons’ for purposes of the enforcement of the civil rights of those residents, 
natural communities, and ecosystems” (Tamaqua Borough, 2006, p. 6). 
Instrumental in this initial effort was the training and advocacy provided by
the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF), a U.S.-based
public interest law firm.7 CELDF has since assisted dozens of local communi-
ties within the United States, as well as other countries, with writing and garner-
ing support for RoN laws. Only two years after the Tamaqua Borough ordinance
passed, Ecuador enacted RoN in its 2008 constitution with the help of CELDF.
In this capacity, CELDF consulted with Indigenous members of the Ecuadorian
Constitutional Assembly and drafted the national charter’s RoN provisions
(O’Gorman, 2017, p. 447). 
While both Indigenous ideas and Western legal thought have played a major 
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environmental ethicists regarding human duties towards the environment and 
the boundaries of the moral circle has quietly occurred in parallel ever since the 
1960s. In the next section, I review the main arguments put forth by some of the 
most notable participants in this ongoing discussion in order to determine the 
range of entities potentially eligible for consideration within their ethical uni-
verses and the kind of rights that might be bestowed upon them. 
Environmental ethics: 
biocentrism, ecocentrism, and nonhuman rights 
The field of modern environmental ethics has engaged in a robust debate over 
the ideal ethical orientation towards nature and its inhabitants at least since Aldo 
Leopold (1966) encouraged “thinking like a mountain” (p. 137). An anthropo-
centric ethic places human interests and needs above those of all other beings. As 
Taylor (1981) explains: 
We may have responsibilities with regard to the natural ecosystems and biotic 
communities of our planet, but these responsibilities are in every case based 
on the contingent fact that our treatment of those ecosystems and communi-
ties of life can further the realization of human values and/or human rights. 
We have no obligation to promote or protect the good of nonhuman living 
things, independently of this contingent fact. 
(p. 198) 
Generally speaking, two approaches seeking to move beyond a human-centered 
view have emerged—biocentrism and ecocentrism.8 In the space below, I review 
both of these paradigms with an eye towards understanding how they figure into 
the question of rights for nonhuman entities. 
Taylor (1981) writes that a biocentric ethic features four central tenets: (1) 
Earth’s community of life includes humans, who are members of this group on 
the same basis as nonhuman entities; (2) ecosystems consist of a complex array 
of interconnected parts whose proper biological functioning relies on a system of 
mutual interdependence; (3) every organism within the ecosystem serves a pur-
pose of its own and pursues its own good, which involves striving to achieve its 
full biological potential; and (4) humans are not superior to any other biological 
organism (pp. 206–7). Taylor refers to this approach as a “life-centered theory of 
environmental ethics” (1981, p. 197). The logic of this theory proceeds as follows: 
P1: Humans have moral obligations toward things that possess inherent worth; 
P2: All living things possess inherent worth; 
P3: All members of the biotic community are living; 
C: Humans have moral obligations toward members of the biotic community. 
Two concepts relevant to biocentrism require further explanation—intrinsic 
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possesses intrinsic value “insofar as some person cherishes it, holds it dear or pre-
cious, loves, admires, or appreciates it for what it is in itself, and so places intrin-
sic value on its existence” (Taylor, 1984, p. 151).9 Such entities may be living 
(i.e., plants) or non-living (i.e., places). Key here is the idea that humans bestow 
intrinsic value on an entity by virtue of their interest in it. Inherent worth, on the 
other hand, refers to the “value something has simply in virtue of the fact that it 
has a good of its own” (Taylor, 1984, p. 151). Only living beings have inherent 
worth. Yet despite the cognizable inherent worth of nonhuman living beings, only 
humans have rights. Moral rights can only be held by moral agents, and humans 
are the only moral agents. However, humans have duties towards entities that 
possess inherent worth. To simplify, humans have a duty to protect nonhuman 
members of the biotic community like plants and animals not because of the rights 
they possess, but rather because of their inherent worth. 
Interestingly, Taylor briefly contemplates the question as to whether a machine 
might satisfy tenet three above, specifically the extent to which an entity might 
possess a good of its own that it strives to pursue. In particular, he limits the discus-
sion to only those machines that are goal-directed and self-regulating. However, 
Taylor notes that the functions and goals of such machines are programmed by 
humans, so they do not possess their own sense of good. As such, artificial entities 
like intelligent machines might have intrinsic value, but not inherent worth. He 
ultimately arrives at the kind of functionalist argument described in the context of 
artificial intelligence (AI) in the introduction to this book: “When machines are 
developed that function in the way our brains do, we may well come to deem then 
proper subjects of moral consideration” (Taylor, 1981, p. 200, n. 3). This quali-
fication represents something of an odd departure from Taylor’s main argument, 
as it places greater emphasis on the cognitive basis for a being’s sense of good 
than on the position of an entity within an ecosystem. Perhaps it is just “biological 
chauvinism” (Manzotti & Jeschke, 2016, p. 180) masquerading as “biotic egali-
tarianism” (Taylor, 1984, p. 156, n. 9). 
Writing 15 years after the publication of his famous law review article, Stone 
(1987) addresses the extent to which machines might be said to have a good of 
their own. Anticipating the kinds of issues now facing AI ethicists, he observes 
that “as programs grow more complex, the outputs will become less foreseeably a 
product of any programmer’s original intentions” (Stone, 1987, p. 29). This spec-
ulative intervention in the logic from which inherent worth is derived suggests 
that intelligent machines might be owed respect, if not rights, by moral agents 
such as humans. 
Spitler (1982) critiques biocentrism on the grounds that despite Taylor’s best 
efforts, it is impossible to escape an anthropocentric perspective that prioritizes 
“human values and experiences” (p. 256). Instead of pretending to consider nature 
on equal footing with humans while denying the practical implications of such a 
view,10 we should “view other forms of life as precious without necessarily declar-
ing them equally precious to human life” (Spitler, 1982, p. 260). In a rejoinder to 
Spitler’s article, Taylor (1983) clarifies that while the biocentric approach may 
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should take priority above those of other species. In fact, Taylor contends that the 
charge of inescapable anthropocentrism is not significant, as it conflates the sub-
stance, practical implementation, and psychological acceptance of biocentrism. I 
return to this tension later in the section on critical environmental law. 
Nearly two decades later, Wetlesen (1999) attempts to revive and revise bio-
centrism. Rejecting the argument from marginal cases proffered by animal rights 
theorists and Taylor’s premise that all living things possess inherent worth, the 
author assigns gradual moral status for nonpersons on the basis of their inher-
ent properties and the degree to which they share similarities with humans. The 
properties that establish a rubric for determining inherent value include being 
subject-of-a-life, consciousness, and sentience.11 The greater the presence of these 
properties in a given entity, the stronger the case for inherent value, the higher 
the moral status ascribed to the entity, and the more duties we have towards it. In 
short, Wetlesen eschews a relational approach to moral status in favor of a prop-
erties-based approach that only considers the ethical treatment of organic beings. 
In some ways, Wetlesen’s work represents a step backwards for advocates of 
a biocentric ethic. He anchors an entity’s inherent value to the degree to which it 
satisfies a delimited set of properties that closely approximate human character-
istics. He denies equal moral status to all living things, electing instead to erect a 
hierarchy that positions humans above nonhumans. Finally, he promotes biologi-
cal individualism over ecological holism, essentially seeing the trees, but not the 
forest. This last move is somewhat surprising given Taylor’s occasional nods to 
a more ecologically oriented biocentric perspective. For instance, Taylor (1981) 
writes that “the good of the population” is dependent upon maintaining “a coher-
ent system of genetically and ecologically related organisms” (p. 199). In Taylor’s 
biocentric outlook, all living beings are interdependent, and the good of individ-
ual biotic communities cannot be achieved in the absence of a stable ecosystem. 
These tropes—community, ecology, population, system—offer a foundation for 
an ecocentric environmental ethic, which I turn to next. 
Ecocentrism stands as a “natural progression from biocentrism” (Torrance, 
2013, p. 405). Whereas a biocentric ethic focuses on individual biological organ-
isms within an ecosystem and observes that although humans are the parties 
capable of identifying inherent worth in other entities, they are not more morally 
significant than other living beings, an ecocentric ethic treats the whole ecosystem 
as the unit of ethical concern and values the preservation of ecological integrity 
and stability.12 This “nature-centered” (Hoffman & Sandelands, 2005, p. 144) 
approach is concisely articulated in Leopold’s (1966) famous maxim: “A thing 
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (p. 262).13 
Among philosophical efforts to develop an ecocentric ethic, perhaps none is 
better known than the intellectual movement of deep ecology. As an explicitly 
normative environmental philosophy, deep ecology promotes “[r]ejection of the 
man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total-field image” (Naess, 
1973, p. 95; emphasis in original). As opposed to shallow ecology, an anthropo-
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of improving the lives of people in highly industrialized countries, deep ecology 
urges a transition from biotic to biospherical egalitarianism. The biosphere (also 
called ecosphere) consists of “individuals, species, populations, habitat, as well as 
human and non-human cultures” (Naess, 1995d, p. 68). In the biosphere, humans 
are viewed as part of the natural environment, not separate from it. Instead of 
viewing the world as an assortment of islands, deep ecology perceives life as a 
web in which humans are but a single strand (Capra, 1995, p. 20). 
Although deep ecology has multiple roots, its normative system finds particu-
lar compatibility with non-Western spiritual traditions such as Buddhism (Naess, 
1995d, p. 79). More specifically, the idea that humans are not the center of the eth-
ical world but rather part of a larger assemblage of ongoing processes is reflected 
in the Buddhist idea of non-substantiality of the self (anattaa) or simply “non-
self” (Sponberg, 2000). This dynamic ontology dislocates and destabilizes the 
self, making it possible and perhaps necessary to identify with all beings. Indeed, 
the Japanese philosopher Dōgen, whose work has served as a source of inspiration 
for deep ecologists, interprets the scope of Buddha-nature as encompassing both 
sentient and non-sentient beings (Curtin, 2014, p. 269). For some Buddhists, the 
notion that the world consists of independent entities is merely an illusion. Only 
one who comes to the realization that everything is united in a web of relations 
can be considered an enlightened being (bodhisattva) (James, 2000, p. 361). This 
realization results in the “enlargement of one’s sphere of identification,” which 
compels us to recognize that all life shares the same fate “not because it affects us 
but because it is us” (Fox, 1984, p. 200; emphasis in original).14 
Importantly, deep ecologists interpret “life” more broadly than do advocates 
of the biocentric view. In this ecocentric platform, “life” is construed “in a more 
comprehensive non-technical way” to include organic but “non-living” entities 
such as ecosystems, landscapes, and rivers (Naess, 1995d, p. 68). All forms of 
life possess intrinsic value15 that exists irrespective of their practical usefulness 
for or appreciation by humans (Naess, 1995d, p. 69). Fox (1990) suggests that 
life as it is conceived in deep ecological circles concerns a “symbiotic human 
attitude” directed “not only toward all members of the ecosphere but even toward 
all identifiable entities or forms in the ecosphere” (p. 116; emphasis in original). 
To this point Fox adds the important qualification that adherence to deep ecology 
does not necessarily require adoption of an ecological variant of hylozoism, the 
view that “[e]very physical object is alive” (Rucker, 2008, p. 364). This brief 
observation will resurface in the discussion of New Materialism that appears later 
in this chapter. 
As suggested above, deep ecology operates under a gestalt ontology in 
which “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Naess, 1995a, p. 241). 
This ontology rejects the idea that humans are separate from the environment in 
favor of a holistic view that sees everything as interrelated (Wu, 2019, p. 439). 
Relationships, not individual qualities, provide the foundation for ethical consid-
eration. Crucially for deep ecologists, “there is no firm ontological divide in the 
field of existence” (W. Fox, 1984, p. 196). However, this ontological orientation 
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For one, deep ecology shifts between holism and individualism. James (2000) 
questions the coherence of an ethic that affords pride of place to both holism and 
the intrinsic value of individuals. Deep ecology appears to feature this flaw given 
its simultaneous recognition of the biosphere, forms of life within it, and relation-
ships among members of it. But James reconciles this apparent contradiction by 
arguing that deep ecology advances a kind of two-step “thing-centered” holism 
(2000, p. 367) in which deep experiences of nature include both perceived inter-
connectedness and acknowledgment of the integrity of individual beings. 
Another tension involves whether or not rights have a place in deep ecology. 
While some anthropocentric environmental ethicists reject rights for nonhumans 
out of hand (i.e., Norton, 1982),16 Naess (1995a) holds that all living beings, from 
the mole to the mountain, possess a right to live and flourish. When the interests of 
living beings come into conflict, however, two main factors help determine which 
entity’s interests should be awarded priority over the other—nearness (i.e., how 
close in terms of culture, space, species, and time) and vitalness (i.e., how crucial 
to a being’s existence). To these factors Naess adds a third (which is really a sub-
type of the first)—felt nearness (i.e., how close in terms of emotional and physical 
distance). This last factor “determines our capacity to strongly identify with a cer-
tain kind of living being, and to suffer when they suffer” (Naess, 1995b, p. 224). 
Writing about the concept of the ecological self in Buddhism, Sponberg (2000) 
pushes back against the ecocentric project and its extension of rights to the natural 
world. The problem, as the author sees it, is that this effort applies a “Western 
notion of a permanently fixed sense of selfhood” to determining moral considera-
tion and the possession of rights (Sponberg, 2000). By contrast, Buddhism seeks 
to reveal the moral consideration of other entities through a transformation in how 
one sees herself along the path to enlightenment. For example, by engaging in the 
Buddhist meditative practice of progressively “generating the emotion of loving 
kindness” towards one’s self and eventually all beings, one can develop beyond 
environmentally destructive tendencies without resorting to an affirmative dec-
laration of rights for living entities (Sponberg, 2000). This practice (mettaa) is 
reflected in the deep ecological idea of “self-realization,” which offers that “[t] 
hrough identification, [people] may come to see that their own interests are served 
by conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a widened and deepened 
self” (Naess, 1995c, p. 229). 
Finally, deep ecology fails to completely evade the charge of anthropocen-
trism. Aside from the fact that this ethical movement is designed and implemented 
by humans, the manner in which nonhuman entities gain recognition as identi-
fiable forms (i.e., self-realization) or conflicts of interests among living beings 
are resolved (i.e., felt nearness) relies on and privileges human experience. Even 
in its earliest manifestations, deep ecology explicitly noted the exalted status of 
humans and their interests relative to the interests of nonhumans. For instance, 
Naess (1973) writes that the quality of life humans enjoy “depends in part upon 
the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other 
forms of life” (p. 96). For Fox (1984), the value inherent to relations with other 
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itself a marker for assessing the degree to which nonhuman forms possess suffi-
ciently human-like cognitive abilities. These tensions indicate the persistence of 
unresolved (or even unresolvable) aspects of an environmental ethic that seeks to 
capture a larger set of entities than that included in biocentrism’s ethical universe. 
Another ecocentric approach, this time drawing on deep ecology and transper-
sonal psychology, deserves mention here. In an effort to capitalize on the strengths 
of deep ecology and address some of its weaknesses (mainly that the fundamen-
tal tenets of the ethical worldview can be used to justify both anthropocentric 
and ecocentric positions), Fox (1990) proposes a transpersonal ecology. Seizing 
upon deep ecology’s notion of self-realization, transpersonal ecology infuses eco-
centric ethics with psychological insights regarding the self. Importantly for our 
purposes, this approach entails three bases for one’s identification with other enti-
ties—cosmological, personal, and ontological. Cosmological identification, with 
its origins in non-Western worldviews, emerges from the “deep-seated realization 
of the fact that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality” 
(W. Fox, 1990, p. 252). This realization can occur through the empathic adoption 
of any number of different cosmologies, each of which may be capable of demon-
strating the unity that exists among all beings in the world. Personal identification 
results from physical or emotional contact with concrete or abstract entities that 
are meaningful to us. Such entities are psychologically bound to our own identity; 
we feel hurt when they suffer, we feel happy when they are well. Finally, onto-
logical identification, a concept whose ineffable character relates closely to the 
Buddhist pursuit of enlightened consciousness, stems from the “realization of the 
fact that things are” (Fox, 1990, p. 250; emphasis omitted). More precisely, onto-
logically based identification suggests that all things that exist are set in brilliant 
contrast against a void of nothingness. As such, the environment renders itself 
not as a mere backdrop against which our privileged egos and those entities 
with which they are most concerned play themselves out, but rather as just as 
much an expression of the manifesting of Being (i.e., of existence per se) as 
we ourselves are. 
(W. Fox, 1990, p. 251) 
These modes of identification, distinguished by their respective emphases on real-
ity, identity, and being, offer different ways of relating the self to the world that 
lies beyond us. Importantly, they specify how we might conceive an ethical out-
look that acknowledges the role that humans play in determining the boundaries of 
the moral circle without privileging human desires and wellbeing in the process. 
To briefly summarize the environmental ethics explored here, it helps to ask sev-
eral questions designed to elucidate some of the meaningful differences between 
them. First, what is the basis for ethical consideration? For biocentrists, it is being 
an organic living thing, as all living things possess inherent worth. For ecocen-
trists, it is relationships among members of the biotic community, which includes 
organic but non-living entities and other forms. Second, what is the ontological 
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although they are acknowledged to pursue their own good within the same com-
munity of life. For ecocentrists, it is holism;17 the biosphere is irreducible to its 
constituent parts, and the idea that the world comprises separate entities is effec-
tively dissolved. Third, what is the status of humans relative to the environment?
For biocentrists, humans are morally equivalent to other living beings and, despite 
their individual value, all are bound together in the fate of the ecosystem. For eco-
centrists, humans are not distinct from any other members of the ecosphere; they 
are merely “knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations” (Naess, 
1973, p. 95). Finally, what place is there, if any, for rights? For biocentrists, under 
a life-centered environmental ethic, rights involve “acknowledging a diversity of 
competing interests of living entities, human and non-human” (Emmenegger & 
Tschentscher, 1994, p. 579).18 However, while nonhuman entities such as plants 
and animals do not possess moral rights, they nonetheless may qualify for legal 
rights, which would merely concretize the protection they are entitled to by virtue 
of their inherent worth (Taylor, 1984, p. 218). For ecocentrists, all living and 
non-living beings in the ecosphere possess the right to live and “pursue their own 
evolutionary destinies” (W. Fox, 1984, p. 194), although an ecological reading of 
Buddhism would emphasize transforming how one views one’s self and relations 
with others through the pursuit of enlightenment instead of adopting the Western 
notion of individual rights (Sponberg, 2000). 
Considering the above, what insights might biocentric and ecocentric envi-
ronmental ethics bring to bear on the discussion regarding the extension of rights 
to nonhuman inorganic entities?19 First, both approaches hold differing views 
regarding the kinds of entities afforded ethical consideration and the extent to 
which rights might be extended to them. While biocentrism privileges organic 
beings that pursue their own good (i.e., humans, plants, and animals), it leaves 
room for inorganic intelligent machines so long as they operate in a way that 
approximates the functioning of the human brain. However, such machines, like 
plants and animals, would not be entitled to moral rights. Rather, they would be 
subject to ethical treatment that does not place human concerns above theirs (pro-
vided they were sufficiently intelligent). Further, although both living and non-
living beings may be said to hold intrinsic value, possession of such value does 
not translate into moral rights, which are extended only to humans. 
Ecocentrists, on the other hand, offer some rhetorical cover for including inor-
ganic beings in the ethical universe, as suggested by recognition of “identifiable 
entities or forms in the ecosphere” (W. Fox, 1990, p. 116) and the Latourian 
observation that there is “no firm ontological divide in the field of existence” (W. 
Fox, 1984, p. 196). Unlike biocentrism’s individualist, life-centered approach to 
ethics, ecocentrism’s ethical system maintains a focus on the “relational, total-
field image” (Naess, 1973, p. 95; emphasis omitted) that attempts to acknowledge 
the whole of the ecosystem along with its constituent parts. Ecocentrism is also 
more amenable to the idea of rights for nonhuman inorganic entities, although not 
without some creative interpretation. Naess quite clearly indicates that all living 
things possess the right to live. Yet, his approach to resolving conflicts among 
competing interests pertaining to the exercise of this right opens the door for 
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considering other kinds of entities. In particular, the concepts of nearness, vital-
ness, and felt nearness can be applied to matters involving virtually any beings due 
to their emphasis on the physical needs of entities and the psychological connec-
tion between certain entities and humans. For instance, in accordance with these 
concepts, an entity that (1) holds cultural significance, (2) could cease to function 
in the face of a threat to its operation, and (3) is sufficiently life-like to inspire 
humans to become emotionally invested in its continued existence might qualify 
for the right to live by de facto. As described above, Fox’s transpersonal ecol-
ogy offers three different pathways through which humans might experience the 
kind of identification with another entity advanced by felt nearness—cosmologi-
cal, personal, and ontological. To summarize, although at first blush ecocentrism 
appears to limit ethical consideration to only organic living beings, its holistic 
ontology and experiential epistemology create a space capable of recognizing a 
wider range of entities, including inorganic technological forms. Such entities 
might, at a minimum, satisfy the conditions necessary to deserve the right to live 
based on the extent to which humans identify with them. 
Second, biocentrism and ecocentrism characterize entities in different ways 
that lead to alternative forms of personhood, resulting in their eligibility for dif-
ferent kinds of rights. For biocentrists, all living beings (i.e., individuals and com-
munities) possess inherent worth because they have a good of their own (i.e., 
realizing their/its biological potential) that can be impacted positively or nega-
tively by moral agents (i.e., humans). Possession of such a good qualifies an entity 
for the status of moral patient (Lee, 1999, p. 141). Sentience and consciousness, 
traits normally associated with psychological personhood (Vincent, 1989, p. 703), 
are not required for moral patiency (Taylor, 1981, p. 200). Further, nonhuman 
living entities do not possess rationality, responsibility, or the capacity to articu-
late their interests—characteristics necessary for demonstrating moral person-
hood (Vincent, 1989, p. 701). Their actions cannot be judged on moral grounds, 
and they cannot be said to deliberately violate the rights of others (Taylor, 1984, 
p. 157). However, moral agents (i.e., humans) have moral obligations towards 
nonhuman moral patients (i.e., plants and animals) that find concrete expression 
in legal rights. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, while humans are pres-
ently the only entities that might qualify for moral personhood, other living beings 
may appropriately be categorized as moral patients that can enjoy legal, though 
not moral, rights. Yet, nonhuman inorganic entities might fall under the purview 
of moral personhood to the extent that they can demonstrate a capacity for act-
ing rationally and determining their own interests. Theoretically speaking, then, 
intelligent machines could conceivably be considered moral persons under a bio-
centric approach, assuming their cognitive abilities exceed those of plants and 
animals. Still, this would not entitle them to moral rights, since only moral agents 
possess such rights, and only humans can be moral agents. 
For ecocentrists, especially advocates of deep or transpersonal ecology, replac-
ing an individualist orientation with a holistic one and focusing on the ways in 
which entities are identified and humans identify with them highlights relations 
among, as opposed to the specific properties of, beings. In the biosphere, all living 
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and non-living beings co-exist, with no entity worthy of more ethical considera-
tion than another. From Naess’s concepts of self-realization and felt nearness to 
Fox’s three modes of identification, ecocentrism clearly emphasizes the impor-
tance of relations in an ethical worldview (Coeckelbergh, 2010, p. 216). This 
focus on relations helps to overcome the tendency of philosophers to view entities 
in isolation when assessing their moral status (Rodogno, 2016, pp. 52–53). The 
move from a properties-based evaluation to a relations-based evaluation precludes 
attachment to some forms of personhood while invoking another. In particular, 
ecocentrism casts aside psychological and moral personhood, while remaining 
somewhat agnostic about legal personhood, in favor of relational personhood. 
As some have argued, “personhood is always relational” (Fowler, 2018, p. 397), 
so establishing that nonhuman entities might enjoy the status of a person on a 
relational basis ultimately feeds into the extent to which they can be seen through 
the prism of other forms of personhood, with implications for the assignment of 
moral or legal rights. Therefore, under an ecocentric orientation, living and non-
living beings alike might satisfy the conditions for moral personhood, but only by 
virtue of their relations with other entities within the biosphere. 
Third, while biocentrism could arguably adhere to either the will or interest 
theory of rights, ecocentrism exclusively appeals to interest theory. To briefly 
review, under will theory, only actors with sufficient mental capabilities can 
direct others to fulfill or ignore duties owed to them. Under interest theory, rights 
are extended to “entities that have interests and whose interests are furthered 
by duties” (Kurki, 2017, p. 79). For biocentrists, while machines might operate 
in a way that is functionally similar to human cognition, thus affording them a 
performatively autonomous capacity to control duties owed to them, individual 
organisms might have interests, but these do not translate into moral rights. They 
would only be entitled to legal rights at best. Therefore, biocentrism offers mod-
est, hypothetical support for rights of robots under will theory, but despite recog-
nizing the interests of living beings, the approach stops short of extending rights 
to them under interest theory. For ecocentrists, the range of entities eligible for 
moral consideration in the biosphere includes living and non-living beings that 
do not necessarily possess cognitive capacities, and yet “animals and plants have 
interests in the sense of ways of realizing inherent potentialities” (Naess, 1995c, 
p. 229) that are revealed through our interactions with them. As such, ecocentrism 
effectively rejects any argument for rights under will theory while offering space 
for the rights of both living and non-living entities under interest theory via the 
three modes of identification and felt nearness. 
To summarize, whereas biocentrism extends legal rights to nonhuman organic 
and inorganic beings but moral rights only to humans, ecocentrism contends that 
all organic, living and non-living identifiable entities in the biosphere deserve the 
right to live. However, conflicts over the protection of this right are negotiated on 
the basis of identification, suggesting that living and non-living beings in certain 
contexts may qualify for relational personhood, which serves as a launchpad for 
the designation of moral and legal rights. Clearly then, biocentrism and ecocen-
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potential avenue for inorganic non-living entities such as intelligent machines to 
possess moral or legal rights. In the next section, I begin the transition from the 
philosophical to the practical by examining the ontological scope of the environ-
ment and the kinds of entities subject to legal consideration within it through the 
lens of critical environmental law. 
Critical environmental law in the Anthropocene: 
(Re)defining nature and legal persons 
The deficiencies of environmental law that frustrate its ability to address envi-
ronmental challenges have long been known to observers. In the context of the 
United States, environmental law is still relatively new compared to other areas 
of the law; it cuts across many areas of the law without necessarily establishing 
itself as a distinctive area of practice; and its implementation is subject to political 
and jurisprudential whims that ignore the need for timely adjudication of environ-
mental disputes (Tarlock, 2004, p. 217). Despite advances in the science of ecol-
ogy (Brooks, 1991, p. 2) and robust discussions among environmental ethicists 
(Hirokawa, 2002, p. 226), environmental law has remained relatively unmoved. 
Attention to these defects has inspired a number of reformatory programs flying 
under various banners—wild law (Cullinan, 2003), Earth jurisprudence (Koons, 
2008), critical environmental law (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011), green 
legal theory (M’Gonigle & Takeda, 2013), legal ecology (Paloniitty, 2015), 
and Earth system law (Kotzé & Kim, 2019), among others. Two of the main 
endeavors crucial to the implementation of these programs involve (1) defining 
the boundaries of nature and its position relative to humans; and (2) determining 
what constitutes a legal person. In this section, I focus mainly on the responses 
offered by critical environmental law, which is “an environmental law that exerts 
a radical critique of traditional legal and ecological foundations, while proposing 
in their stead a new, mobile, material and acentric environmental legal approach” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013, p. 863). 
The task of redesigning environmental law to become more responsive to the 
conditions presently facing humanity and the natural world has enjoyed renewed 
vigor in light of scholarly attention to the Anthropocene.20 The arrival of this 
geological epoch presents a moment for reflecting on the ways in which mod-
ern systems of law and governance have failed to prevent the current environ-
mental crisis. In particular, the Anthropocene calls upon us to question whether 
an anthropocentric worldview is sustainable, given the havoc it has wrought on 
the Earth and its inhabitants (Vermeylen, 2017, p. 138). This era of heightened 
ecological awareness also poses a kind of paradox. On the one hand, humans 
acknowledge the unique impact they have had on the environment and that any 
effort to meaningfully revise the status quo will require the demotion of human 
interests. On the other hand, this situation reifies the centrality of humans among 
members of the living order as the only beings capable of coming to this realiza-
tion. More concisely, humans are ethically indistinguishable from other entities 
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constitutes the Anthropocene dilemma. While critical environmental law interro-
gates these tensions and disrupts conventions inherent to Western systems of law, 
the Anthropocene creates the intellectual space necessary “for an opening up of 
hitherto prohibitive epistemic ‘closures’ in the law, of legal discourse more gener-
ally, and of the world order that the law operatively seeks to maintain” (Kotzé & 
Kim, 2019, p. 3). 
As arguably the most radical of the solutions proposed above, critical environ-
mental law presents intellectually demanding approaches to carrying out the two 
endeavors while remaining sensitive to the particular context of the Anthropocene. 
First, how should we characterize the relationship between humans and the envi-
ronment? In a critical reading of environmental law, the Cartesian notion of a 
definitive split between humans and nature is unsustainable. In its place emerges 
“hybrid connections between the human, the natural, the spatial, the artificial, the 
technological” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011, p. 19). These connections 
form assemblages that are gathered in alternate combinations depending on the 
situation. As such, environmental law becomes less fixated on applying a static 
definition of the environment and more like an autopoietic (i.e., self-creating) 
system such as an amoeba, which expands and contracts to include/exclude parts 
of the environment based on the circumstances. Perhaps uncomfortably for some, 
under such a system “[t]he environment … remains uncharted and unknowable” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011, pp. 26–27). 
Instead of construing humans as actors and nature as the unwitting spectator 
(i.e., climate change) or vice versa (i.e., natural disasters), all potential entities 
are marked by vulnerability, a situation in which one is thrown into the world, 
exposed to it, and aware of it. This awareness does not require consciousness 
but rather some sense of potential harm that might befall an entity. All such enti-
ties find themselves not in the center but in the middle of an immanent space, a 
place where hierarchy among beings has been replaced by a surface containing all 
beings at once. Everything that appears on the surface (i.e., all that is) is revealed, 
rendering it vulnerable. Indeed, “[a]s soon as one is present, one is vulnerable” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013, p. 859). Thus, for critical environmental 
law, the ethical priority previously assigned to certain types of entities by vir-
tue of their inherent worth, intrinsic value, or properties is eliminated completely 
in favor of the acknowledgment that all assemblages in this open ecology are 
vulnerable. 
The Anthropocene highlights the artificiality of human/nonhuman and nature/ 
culture divides, suggesting instead “an ontology of continuous connection 
between bodies” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 132). The resulting 
continuum is acentric and multi-agentic, a “manifold, full of fissures and planes” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 123). As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 
(2017) argues, “[t]he main find of the Anthropocene is that our presence on the 
Earth necessarily includes our ‘environment’, whether ‘natural’ or otherwise. We 
are always in an assemblage with the planet. A body is an assemblage of various 
conditions and materialities” (pp. 125–6). The notion that humans are in some 
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ways in which the ontological boundaries have been effectively blurred in this 
geological era. 
Several philosophers advance arguments that engage with the radical con-
ception of the environment described above. One area of philosophical inquiry 
involves the extent to which abiotic objects (i.e., non-natural artefacts) might be 
considered part of the environment. While some maintain that “[a]rtefacts are … 
discontinuous from nature” (Bryson, 2018, p. 17), others contend that there are 
degrees of artifacticity that depend on the kind of materials used and the amount 
of human effort expended in the design and creation of an object (Lee, 1999, pp. 
52–53). The former perspective may be characterized as ontological dualism (i.e., 
viewing some entities as inferior to others), whereas the latter is an example of 
ontological dyadism (i.e., recognizing and celebrating differences among entities). 
Yet, a more radical take that resonates with critical environmental law suggests 
that the ontological division between the natural and the artefactual established 
by the importance assigned to human intention ignores the unanticipated effects 
generated by artefacts. Therefore, we should replace “nature” with “reality” and 
accept that artefacts are continuous with natural entities (Vogel, 2015, p. 105). 
This perspective shares with critical environmental law a rejection of Cartesian 
dualism and a preference for assemblages. 
A related and broader philosophical discussion focuses on the boundaries of 
nature itself. The etymology of the word nature suggests that the term refers to a 
space filled with life that is nevertheless separate from humans (Merleau-Ponty, 
2003, p. 3). As indicated earlier in this section, the environment that is the (tor-
tured) object discussed by environmental ethicists is almost without exception a 
natural one. Rarely do non-living entities, let alone inorganic ones, find a home 
in these environs. But the present phase of modernity, a period many refer to as 
the Anthropocene, calls into question the strict delineation between the natural 
and the non-natural. In this crucial time, “[i]t no longer makes sense to consider 
nature as the backdrop against which human activities evolve” (Hey, 2018, p. 
351). If, for instance, humanity has had such a profound impact on nature that it 
is no longer possible to distinguish the natural environment from the built one, 
the former may now be said to include the latter. As Vogel (2015) argues, con-
tra McKibben (1989), “[t]he distinction between humans and nature … depends 
on a philosophically and biologically untenable dualism that forgets that human 
beings themselves are part of nature and instead treats them as exceptional crea-
tures who somehow transcend the natural” (p. 24). The extent of human influence 
on the environment is now so undeniable that we have moved from an exist-
ence predicated on “being-in-the-world” (to use Martin Heidegger’s phrasing) to 
one of “being-in-the-technological-world” (to borrow from Hans Jonas) (Tavani, 
2018, p. 12). The biosphere (Naess, 1995d) has been effectively subsumed by a 
continuously rupturing contingent reality. The point here is that the environment, 
far from being some idealized location free from human intervention, is not (and 
perhaps in the annals of human history never really was) a purely natural one, 
but rather a built one, one we built. In line with critical environmental law, it 
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Indeed, “the environment we encounter and live within is always already a built
environment” (Vogel, 2015, p. 58; emphasis added). Such a conception of the 
environment includes human and nonhuman, natural and artefactual entities. The 
practical application of this interpretation can be seen in the definition of envi-
ronmental justice used by the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials, which explains how “‘environment’ includes the ecological, physical, 
social, political, aesthetic, and economic environment” (NACCHO, 2019). 
Second, who or what counts as a legal person? In mainstream Western con-
ceptions of law, a “legal person” often refers to a nonhuman entity that possesses 
legal personality, such as a corporation,21 while the term “natural person” usually 
denotes a human being (Grear, 2013, p. 78). The law treats the latter as the quin-
tessential rational subject, the fulcrum around which objects like the environment 
must rotate. Throughout history, the privileged position occupied by the natural 
person has permitted legal discrimination among members of the human species 
(i.e., intra-species hierarchy) and against animals, ecosystems, and other non-
human entities (i.e., inter-species hierarchy) (Grear, 2015, p. 230). The elevated 
status conferred upon humans by contemporary legal systems is predicated on the 
idea that we alone possess dignity and reason, and thus law must work to advance 
the human good (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 49). 
A critical environmental law responsive to insights provided by the 
Anthropocene challenges these foundational assumptions on three accounts. First, 
it forces legal systems to reflexively confront their systematic biases. Critical envi-
ronmental law recognizes the fragility of concepts like “natural person,” which 
is exposed as a mere construct favoring “a white, property owning, acquisitive, 
broadly Eurocentric masculinity” (Grear, 2015, p. 236). Acknowledgment of such 
restrictive and power-laden criteria for designating legal relevance marks the first 
step towards opening up legal systems to new possibilities. Second, it erodes the 
notion of a clear nature/culture divide and offers in its place a void where new 
perspectives can take hold. Freed from the shackles of Western “juridical human-
ism” (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 49), law can entertain alternative views like those 
found in Indigenous cosmologies. For example, one Indigenous view asserted by 
Amazonian peoples considers both animals and humans to be people. In this per-
spective, “the form of species is just merely a clothing or an ‘envelope’ hiding an 
internal human form” (Vermeylen, 2017, p. 146).22 In brief, critical environmental 
law’s radical openness presents an opportunity for conceptualizing legal person-
hood in diverse ways. Finally, it de-centers and de-individualizes the legal person 
through a fresh understanding of materiality urged by the Anthropocene. In this 
geological epoch, nature has been hybridized, making it difficult (if not impos-
sible) to understand where humans end and nature begins (Arias-Maldonado, 
2019, p. 51). The Anthropocene demonstrates that the fortunes of both people 
and the planet rise and fall together; any semblance of autonomy has been lost 
(Vermeylen, 2017, p. 153). The complexification of hitherto static concepts like 
“man” and “environment” is assisted by New Materialism, which posits that “if 
everything is material inasmuch as it is composed of physiochemical processes, 
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materiality is always something more than ‘mere’ matter” (Coole & Frost, 2010, 
p. 9). One implication of this philosophical movement is that, contra Descartes’ 
rigid conditions of materiality, there no longer exists a meaningful distinction 
between organic and inorganic matter.23 Both are imbued with vitality and agency 
by virtue of their material constitution. As all kinds of lively matter are intrinsi-
cally and irreversibly intertwined with other forces and systems, the capacity for 
agency necessarily extends beyond the human form (Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 9). 
Another implication is that environmental legal subjects might now refer “not 
to individual bodies, subjects, experiences or sensations, but to assemblages of 
human and non-human, animate and inanimate, material and abstract, and the 
affective flows within these assemblages” (N. J. Fox & Allred, 2015, p. 406). The 
result is that the traditional subject of environmental law (i.e., the human agent) 
finds itself “de-centered” and “repositioned” to a place within, though not atop, 
ecologies consisting of “interspecies dependencies” (Grear, 2017, p. 93). 
The above arguments culled from critical environmental law, the Anthropocene, 
and New Materialism suggest that the contemporary Western conception of a 
legal person is not only outmoded, but also environmentally hazardous. As Grear 
(2015) observes, “[l]aw’s dominant construction of legal personhood—and law 
in general, including international environmental law—are thus unresponsive— 
at a fundamental level—to the ethical implications of the vulnerable embodied 
bio-materiality of the living order” (p. 241). A radically ecological envisioning 
of legal personhood would situate environmental subjects in the middle, not the 
center, of an open ecology where all entities endure a similar vulnerability, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that humans bear a special responsibility for their 
unique role in causing planetary destruction (Arias-Maldonado, 2019, p. 56). With 
their newfound openness to alternate perspectives (i.e., Indigenous and otherwise) 
inspired by critical environmental law’s call for reflexiveness and ecological epis-
temology, modern legal systems could accommodate both living and non-living, 
organic and inorganic, natural and artefactual legal persons as situations dictate. 
To conclude, critical environmental law and cognate intellectual departures 
from mainstream legal and philosophical thought offer two key innovations rel-
evant to the topic of rights for nonhuman entities. First, nature includes both the 
natural and built environments. In the age of the Anthropocene, it does not make 
sense to speak of a division between the two. Humans act upon and are continu-
ous with the environment, which includes natural and non-natural beings. Second, 
legal personhood can extend to nonhuman, non-living, inorganic, and/or artefac-
tual entities. The agentic capacity of all matter coupled with the preference for 
recognizing persons as inevitably bound up in assemblages opens up a complex 
and evolving basis for determining what counts as a legal person. Alternative 
perspectives on personhood, such as those inscribed in Indigenous cosmologies, 
are welcomed. For example, the Lakota saying at the beginning of this chapter, 
mitákuye oyásʾį (“we are all related”), advances a relational form of personhood 
that extends to both humans and nonhumans (Posthumus, 2017, p. 385). However, 
no perspective is viewed as inherently superior to another. In the following sec-
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nature has been found to possess rights and compare the extent to which the rea-
soning employed by judges comports with arguments made in environmental eth-
ics and critical environmental law. 
The rights of nature in court 
As mentioned towards the beginning of this chapter, while the ideas underlying 
the RoN are not new, their successful adjudication in courts around the world is a 
fairly recent development. To be sure, cases involving the RoN are not just about 
bringing nature into the fold of human legal systems in order to protect it; they are 
ideological battlegrounds for debating the merits of ontologies that prescribe dif-
ferent kinds of relations among humans and nonhumans (Youatt, 2017, p. 41). As 
such, these cases hold the potential to expose anthropocentric systems of law that 
have facilitated environmental destruction through rapacious economic develop-
ment (Calzadilla & Kotzé, 2018, p. 399). In this section, I examine how the RoN 
have been interpreted and justified in a few celebrated cases in order to under-
stand the extent to which jurisprudence in this area resonates with arguments from 
environmental ethics and critical environmental law on the rights of nonhuman 
entities. The objective is to determine how, if at all, case law on the RoN might 
inform the discourse on rights for technological entities. To this end, I analyze 
the legal reasoning employed in four RoN cases involving rivers24 and glaciers 
in order to distill the evidence and rationale(s) used to arrive at their respective 
rights-affirming decisions. 
In Wheeler c. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja
(Wheeler),25 plaintiffs sought to enjoin continuation of a project to widen the 
Vilcabamba-Quinara road, which was causing rocks and other materials to be 
deposited in the nearby Rio Vilcabamba in southern Ecuador. Failing to adhere 
to best practices of environmental management, the developers “had not car-
ried out an environmental impact assessment, secured planning permits for the 
construction, or planned for the disposal of debris that would inevitably occur” 
(Daly, 2012, p. 63). As a result of the excavation and displacement of debris, the 
Rio Vilcabamba was effectively narrowed, reducing the flow of the river while 
increasing its speed (Greene, n.d.). This alteration of the landscape caused ero-
sion and subsequent flooding, negatively impacting people living along the river. 
Complainants Richard Frederick Wheeler and Eleanor Geer Huddle argued that 
the development project violated the RoN, but more specifically the rights of the 
Rio Vilcabamba itself. On March 30, 2011, the provincial Court of Justice in Loja 
found in favor of Wheeler and Huddle, granting a constitutional injunction on the 
basis that the RoN had been disregarded and finding the provincial government 
liable for damages. 
The legal reasoning applied by the court in the world’s first-ever vindication of 
the RoN relied on constitutional law, impacts on future generations, and the rela-
tionship between humans and nature. The court specifically cited Article 71 of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution, which describes the rights of Nature or “Pacha Mama”26 
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reference, the decision went on to explain how “injuries to Nature are ‘genera-
tional injuries’ which are such that, in their magnitude have repercussions not only 
in the present generation but whose effects will also impact future generations” 
(Daly, 2012, p. 64). Finally, in support of the previous point, the court quoted at 
length a speech by former president of the National Constituent Assembly Alberto 
Acosta, who himself cites Aldo Leopold’s ecocentric maxim mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. Also in his speech, Acosta makes the following arguments in support 
of advancing “Earth democracy”:27 
a) individual and collective human rights must be in harmony with the rights of 
other natural communities on earth; 
b) ecosystems have the right to exist and follow their own vital processes; 
c) the diversity of life expressed in nature is a value in itself; 
d) ecosystems have their own values that are independent of their usefulness for 
the human being; 
e) the establishment of a legal system in which ecosystems and natural commu-
nities have an inalienable right to exist and prosper situational to nature at the 
highest level of value and importance.28 
Importantly, Acosta also contended that “[t]he human being is a part of nature, 
and [we] must prohibit human beings from bringing about the extinction of other 
species or destroying the functioning of natural ecosystems” (Daly, 2012, p. 64). 
That the aforementioned speech was included directly in the text of the decision 
(i.e., not dicta) speaks to the authoritative role that Acosta’s ideas played in the 
court’s reasoning. 
The court’s interpretation of the RoN, driven mainly by Acosta’s speech, 
offers a few important insights regarding the extension of rights to natural non-
human entities in the Ecuadorian context. First, injuries to nature are wrong not 
only because they violate or frustrate Pacha Mama, but also because they affect 
humans in the present and future. Second, while human rights should not conflict 
with the RoN, the latter should be given priority. Third, rights are bestowed upon 
whole ecosystems or natural communities, not individual natural entities. Fourth, 
humans are part of nature, although they possess the ability to act upon it as well. 
These points reflect some of the ideas discussed in the literatures on environ-
mental ethics and critical environmental law. In terms of ethics, the Ecuadorian 
RoN appear to express more of an ecocentric outlook than a biocentric one. 
Ecosystems possess a value of their own outside of that which might be assigned 
by humans, and natural communities are considered in their totality, not on a 
strictly individual basis. In terms of critical environmental law, the court rec-
ognized that humans should not retain their position of privilege as the central 
subject of environmental law, but at the same time, some of the reasoning sug-
gested that human impacts remain crucial to analyses of alleged violations of 
RoN. Although there seems to be little room in the decision for moving beyond 
natural or organic nonhuman entities, the de-centering of humans and the de-
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critical stance towards environmental law. Finally, while the court does observe 
that humans are entwined with nature, the ruling does not attempt to redefine the 
boundaries of the environment. 
In Center for Social Justice Studies et al. v. Presidency of the Republic et al.
(Atrato River),29 Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, under the aus-
pices of an acción de tutela,30 sought to halt illegal mining and logging activities 
along the Atrato River in the biodiverse Chocó district of Colombia. The claim-
ants argued that these activities, specifically the dumping of harmful chemicals 
into the river, were causing pollution that threatened water quality, aquatic life, 
agricultural production, and the lives of children from ethnic communities. These 
impacts, according to the plaintiffs, animated concerns about protecting “the fun-
damental rights to life, health, water, food security, a healthy environment, the 
culture and the territory of the active ethnic communities.”31 
After the claim was initially denied by several government entities due to 
standing issues, a failure to pursue all available avenues for redressing the griev-
ances, and a rejection of the allegation that illegal activities were being conducted 
along and in the river, the Delegate Ombudsman for Constitutional and Legal 
Matters took up the case on behalf of the affected communities. Following unsuc-
cessful efforts to proceed with the acción de tutela at the Administrative Tribunal 
of Cundinamarca and State Council, the case was reviewed by the Sixth Chamber 
of Revision, which added to the scope of government agencies implicated in the 
complaint. The Constitutional Court of Colombia considered the merits of the 
revised claim. 
After concluding that the plaintiffs did indeed have an admissible acción
de tutela, the court turned to discuss environmental issues. Despite recogniz-
ing the principle of human dignity as a “superior value” within Colombia’s
legal order,32 the court examined the constitutional relevance of environmental
protection. Referencing articles pertaining to collective rights and state obliga-
tions, the court emphasized “constitutional guarantees for the general welfare
and productive and economic activities of the human being to be carried out in
harmony and not with sacrifice or to the detriment of nature.”33 Importantly, the
decision articulated what the justices saw as a synergistic relationship between
environmental (i.e., the “Ecological Constitution”) and cultural matters (i.e.,
the “Cultural Constitution”).34 The former focus urges safeguarding the envi-
ronment for the sake of people and nature in their own right, while the lat-
ter highlights the inextricable link between nature and culture, leading to the
conservation of biodiversity for the ways in which it protects the vitality of
traditional cultures. 
The court alternately reviewed three theoretical approaches to identifying the 
importance of nature in the Colombian constitutional system—anthropocentrism, 
biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Citing its own case precedent, the court found spe-
cific support for an ecocentric approach in which “nature is not conceived only as 
the environment and surroundings of human beings, but also as a subject with its 
own rights, which, as such, must be protected and guaranteed.”35 This conclusion 
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the rights that ethnic communities have to administer and exercise autono-
mous guardianship over their territories—according to their own laws and 
customs—and the natural resources that make up their habitat, where their 
culture, their traditions and their way of life are developed based on the spe-
cial relationship they have with the environment and biodiversity.36 
Biocultural rights resonate with an ecocentric approach to constitutional interpre-
tation because they observe a “profound unity between nature and the human spe-
cies” that respects the role that Indigenous relationships with nonhuman natural 
entities play in fostering biodiversity.37 In support of clarifying its obligations to 
protect biocultural rights, the court enumerated several international legal instru-
ments that have been incorporated into Colombian law—ILO Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding 
of Intangible Cultural Heritage.38 It was on the basis of developments regarding 
biocultural rights at the international level that the court found nature to be “a 
subject of rights.”39 By explicitly adopting an ecocentric perspective, the court 
endeavored to deliver justice to nature while acknowledging the culturally signifi-
cant relationship that the environment has with humans. 
The Atrato River case provides three crucial insights related to the rights of 
nonhuman entities in Colombia. First, legal complaints may be considered jus-
ticiable when human interests, especially the rights of ethnic communities, are 
affected, not necessarily because nature itself suffers violations of its own rights. 
Second, the RoN are supported by homegrown case precedent, environmental 
and cultural aspects of the Colombian Constitution, international treaties to which 
Colombia is party, and biocultural rights. Third, the court has demonstrated a 
willingness to endorse an ecocentric approach to constitutional interpretation 
in which environmental and biocultural rights are fundamentally conjoined and 
mutually reinforcing. 
The above summary suggests that Colombia’s treatment of the RoN invokes 
aspects of environmental ethics and critical environmental law pertinent to the 
ontological centrality of humans and the kinds of subjects that might qualify 
for legal personhood. Clearly the court’s active embrace of ecocentrism dem-
onstrates a jurisprudential preference for more holistically ecological thinking, 
although the origins and final decision of the case suggest that anthropocentrism 
may not be so easily divorced from Colombian legal proceedings. Nature may 
have rights, but their violation might not inspire legal action until humans become 
affected as well. As far as parallels with critical environmental law, through its 
full-throated advocacy for biocultural rights, the court opened the door for de-
centering humans and de-individualizing legal subjects in the Colombian system. 
Although it did not directly entertain the possibility of non-natural legal subjects, 
the court’s emphasis on acknowledging Indigenous ontologies left space for the 
introduction of entities that hold certain cultural significance, irrespective of their 
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critical expansion of the environment that includes the built domain, but the judg-
ment itself does not make this point explicitly. 
In the State of Uttarakhand, the High Court decided two cases in the same year 
that advanced the RoN in India. In Mohd Salim v. State of Uttarakhand & Others
(Ganges and Yamuna),40 the plaintiff alleged that the governments of Uttarakhand 
and Uttar Pradesh had failed to cooperate with the Central Government when they 
did not appoint representatives to the Ganges Management Board, an institution 
set up to protect the river and its tributaries (Safi, 2017). The establishment of 
such an inter-state agency was deemed necessary given that the river ecosystems 
had been severely degraded due to pollution and unlawful activities (O’Donnell, 
2018, p. 136). 
In rendering its decision, the High Court tied together three main arguments. 
First, the Ganges and Yamuna rivers are sacred for Hindus, so the threat to their 
existence “requires extraordinary measures.”41 Second, these rivers contribute to 
the health and well-being of “communities from mountains to sea.”42 Third, the 
concept of legal person (or what the judges call a “juristic person”) can evolve 
according to the needs of society.43 Thus, in order to protect religiously signifi-
cant entities that serve important spiritual and physical functions, they need to be 
brought into the fold of the legal system as legal persons. 
In support of the latter argument, the justices cited Indian case law demon-
strating that nonhuman entities of religious importance can be considered legal 
persons when doing so serves “the needs and faith of society.”44 Interestingly, the 
High Court also added two qualifications regarding the concept of legal person-
hood in the Indian context. First, the decision asserts that “juristic” persons are 
similar to natural persons in the sense that they hold rights and obligations.45 The 
main difference between the two is that the former act through an intermediary, 
which is enabled through innovations in Indian law like the concept of “repre-
sentative standing” (Cunningham, 1987, p. 499). Second, the judges held that 
since developments in society naturally lead some entities to transform from a 
mere “fictional personality” into a “juristic person,” legal personhood could be 
conferred upon “any entity,” even “objects or things.”46 Given the important role 
that they play in Indian society, therefore, the Ganges and Yamuna rivers are con-
sidered “legal persons/living persons.”47 
In Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand & Others (Glaciers),48 High Court 
advocate Miglani “explicitly sought to extend legal personhood to all other natu-
ral objects in the State of Uttarakhand, including the Gangotri and Yamunotri 
glaciers that provide headwaters for the Ganges and Yamuna rivers” (O’Donnell, 
2018, p. 136). But before discussing the ruling in the Glaciers case, it is necessary 
to provide some additional background information. The petition filed in this case 
stemmed from an earlier complaint made by Miglani alleging “gross failure” by 
governmental authorities to prevent pollution of the Ganges river (Shivshankar, 
2017). Finding in favor of the plaintiff, the High Court issued an order recogniz-
ing the right to clean water, the polluted state of the Ganges river, and its signifi-
cance to the Hindu population.49 This order also included, inter alia, a mandate to 
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parts of the Ganges.50 The High Court’s ruling did not, however, resolve the issue 
raised by the petitioner. 
Following the disposition of the 2016 order, the High Court decided the Ganges 
and Yamuna case, which granted legal personhood to rivers and treated juristic 
persons as equivalent to natural/living persons. In light of this ruling and under the 
auspices of a miscellaneous application, Miglani sought to have the High Court 
declare “the Himalayas, Glaciers, Streams, Water Bodies etc. as legal entities as 
juristic persons at par with pious rivers Ganga and Yamuna.”51 In order to ren-
der its judgment on this request, the same panel of two judges who decided the 
Ganges and Yamuna case, Judges Rajiv Sharma and Alok Singh, explored U.S. 
and Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence,52 environmental literature, environmen-
tal science, international environmental law, legal scholarship, and, importantly, 
New Zealand’s (2014) Te Urewera Act, which gave the Urewera National Park 
the status of a legal entity on the basis of its spiritual significance for the Tuhoe, 
an Indigenous group (Rodgers, 2017, p. 272). 
Drawing from these varied sources of inspiration, the High Court arrived at 
several conclusions regarding the legal status of the Gangotri and Yamunotri gla-
ciers and their accompanying rights. First, bodies of water possess an “intrin-
sic right not to be polluted.”53 Second, polluting natural entities like air, forests, 
glaciers, and rivers is “legally equivalent” to harming a natural person.54 Third, 
natural entities “have a right to exist, persist, maintain, sustain and regenerate 
their own vital ecology system.”55 Fourth, humans and their natural surroundings 
constitute a “unified and … indivisible whole.”56 The High Court then reiterated 
the purpose and definition of a juristic person first articulated in the Ganges and 
Yamuna case, holding that “the Himalayan Mountain Ranges, Glaciers, rivers, 
streams, rivulets, lakes, jungles, air, forests, meadows, dales, wetlands, grasslands 
and springs are required to be declared as the legal entity/legal person/juristic 
person/juridicial person/moral person/artificial person for their survival, safety, 
sustenance and resurgence.”57 
Unlike the ruling in the Ganges and Yamuna case, the decision in the Glaciers
case made direct mention of climate change and Mother Earth in ways that evoke 
the concerns expressed in writings on law in the Anthropocene. The judges 
acknowledged that climate change poses an existential threat to natural entities on 
land and sea,58 and argued in favor of using legal rights to protect Mother Nature 
given our moral duties owed to future generations.59 These arguments can be seen 
as working synergistically in the context of the Anthropocene, marrying scientific 
assessments of planetary conditions with Indigenous worldviews that promote the 
RoN (Knauß, 2018, p. 703). 
Viewed in tandem, these two cases demonstrate the evolution of legal think-
ing about the rights of nonhuman entities occurring in Indian jurisprudence. First, 
while natural entities may hold certain religious importance that justifies their 
need for protection, they also possess intrinsic rights related to their own eco-
logical wellbeing. Second, humans and nature comprise a unified whole, and their 
fortunes are tied together. Third, legal personhood is a concept that is determined 
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juristic person. Fourth, legal persons are equivalent to natural persons in terms 
of the rights they possess and the need to prosecute violations of those rights, 
although the former may be represented in legal proceedings by a designated 
human. 
Together, the Ganges and Yamuna and Glaciers cases relate to ideas found in 
environmental ethics and critical environmental law regarding the human–envi-
ronment relationship and the extension of legal personhood to nonhuman entities. 
Humans are part of the environment, and natural beings such as bodies of water 
provide physical and spiritual sustenance to the Indian people. This perspective 
reflects an ecocentric intention, but in practice it is moderated by the emphasis 
placed on preserving nature on the basis of protecting religious values, the per-
formance of ecosystem services that benefit people, and the nod towards provid-
ing an environment of equal quality for future generations. However, given the 
understanding that humans might be the only entities capable of recognizing their 
unique responsibility to act as stewards of the environment by utilizing institu-
tions like the law, the hints of anthropocentrism may not be so problematic after 
all. On the issue of legal personhood, the Indian cases offer perhaps the most pro-
gressive vision discussed in this section. In both rulings, the judges held that legal 
personhood has been and should be determined by the needs of society. While 
prior Indian jurisprudence has awarded legal status to religious idols, today the 
extent of environmental degradation that has befallen rivers and glaciers warrants 
their consideration as legal persons as well. According to this theory, literally 
any entity could be granted the status of legal person in light of societal justifica-
tions. Therefore, the approach to legal personhood exhibited in the Indian cases 
comes closer than those described before them to manifesting a view in line with 
critical environmental law, although the extent to which it de-centers humans and 
de-individualizes legal subjects is not strongly pronounced. In addition, while no 
direct effort was made to incorporate the built environment into nature, the fact 
that non-natural entities could become legal persons might make this ontological 
move unnecessary as a practical matter.60 
A brief comparison of the cases reviewed in this section illustrates how the 
RoN have been adjudicated across different jurisdictions (see Table 4.1). 
The cases analyzed above suggest a few points regarding judicial interpretation 
of the RoN and the future of RoN jurisprudence. First, complaints tend to be reac-
tive (as opposed to proactive) and involve alleged injuries to both the environment 
and people. At this stage in their infancy, the RoN appear to be activated when 
humans recognize and decide to challenge failures to protect the environment. 
Second, the sources of legal reasoning implicitly draw upon global norms related 
to RoN and explicitly on a combination of national, foreign, and international law, 
and cultural ideas specific to each given jurisdiction. As such, the findings sum-
marized here concur with those of Kauffman and Martin (2018), who show that 
RoN norm construction involves multiple forms of influence at varying levels of 
governance. Third, rulings regarding the RoN have generally appealed to an eco-
centric environmental ethic, sometimes directly. Fourth, each case spoke the lan-
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some decisions actively de-centered humans in the realm of contemporary legal 
systems and de-individualized legal subjects in ways that reflect an ecocentric 
ethical orientation, others expanded the definition of a legal person to include enti-
ties beyond humans and nature. Although none of the cases redefined the bounda-
ries of nature to include the built environment, expanding the kinds of entities 
worthy of legal personhood on the basis of societal need welcomes nonhuman 
non-natural entities into the vulnerable space in the middle of the open ecology. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, what insights about the rights of artefactual entities can be 
gleaned from the discussions about environmental ethics, critical environmental 
law, and RoN cases? First, ecocentrism, considerably more so than biocentrism, 
can support a progressive extension of rights beyond the biosphere. Deep ecol-
ogy in particular recognizes both human and nonhuman cultures, and is compat-
ible with non-Western spiritual traditions like Buddhism, which have a dynamic 
ontology similar to that which is expressed in critical environmental law. Further, 
deep ecology recognizes identifiable entities or forms in the biosphere, which 
could include those that are non-living in the natural sense, but nonetheless impor-
tant to traditional cultures. An emerging area of scholarship applies Indigenous 
ideas to modern technology. Analysts writing on the subject argue that Indigenous 
epistemologies can serve as the basis for acknowledging “an extended ‘circle of 
relationships’ that includes the non-human kin—from network daemons to robot 
dogs to artificial intelligences (AI) weak and, eventually, strong—that increas-
ingly populate our computational biosphere” (Lewis et al., 2018, p. 2). This 
Indigenously derived notion of “making kin with the machines” (Lewis et al., 
2018) fits well with transpersonal ecology’s concept of cosmological identifica-
tion. In short, ecocentrism and its cognate ethical programs of deep ecology and 
transpersonal ecology are flexible enough to accommodate non-Western world-
views that utilize alternative epistemologies to identify entities natural and non-
natural that are part of the environment, warrant ethical consideration, and might 
deserve rights. 
Second, critical environmental law and its attention to the crises of the 
Anthropocene advocate for a radical revision to environmental law that dis-
rupts conventional notions of nature and legal persons. In the Anthropocene, the 
Cartesian divide between humans and nature is exposed as intellectually bank-
rupt, an ontological heresy. Instead, it is not only more accurate but also prudent 
to view the natural and built environments as enveloped by the broader physical
environment (Gellers, 2016). This space is an open ecology in which entities of 
all kinds are present and thus vulnerable. However, the open ecology is unstable 
and autopoietic, drawing in different combinations of entities and relationships 
as situations dictate. Here, legal persons are no longer defined by the extent of 
their moral agency. New Materialism has shown agency to exist in all matter 
and act as a process, so the properties deemed necessary for an entity to pos-
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established. Instead, it is preferable to refer to assemblages, not agents. Further, 
critical environmental law is highly sensitive to the imperialistic and dominating 
tendencies of contemporary Western legal systems, so in an effort to decolonize 
environmental law non-Western worldviews must be considered as valid as those 
that subjugated them, although no approach to legal thought should be privileged 
above another. Therefore, the range of entities that lay claim to the status of “legal 
person” and its attendant rights is highly dependent upon the context in which 
conflicts arise and the type of perspective adopted. In practical terms, a legal 
approach that recognizes Indigenous kinship with forms of technology like social 
robots would have to take seriously the possibility that such intelligent machines 
would constitute artefacts within the environment that may qualify for relational 
(and later psychological/moral and legal) personhood and moral or legal rights. 
Third, cases involving the RoN demonstrate how evolving global norms are 
adapted in different national contexts, clarifying how legal systems (re)interpret 
nature and legal personhood in light of traditional and diffused ideas. Interestingly, 
judges in each of the cases reviewed above rendered their respective decision 
using an ecocentric, as opposed to biocentric, ethical orientation. However, the 
rulings also reflect the kind of deeply embedded anthropocentrism that reveals 
itself in the form of the Anthropocene dilemma. That is to say, they simultane-
ously call for the elevation of nature’s interests to a level at least on par with that 
of humans while overlooking the facts that in each case, the complaint arose from 
alleged harm to humans, and that humans are presently the only entities capable 
of bringing these issues before courts. In addition, all four cases exhibit some 
degree of consonance with the objectives of critical environmental law, albeit in 
slightly different ways. While the number of cases examined here are insufficient 
to arrive at generalizable conclusions about the usefulness of RoN jurisprudence 
in expanding the list of potential legal subjects, a more tentative assessment would 
be that while the Latin American cases offer grounds for granting legal person-
hood to nonhuman natural entities, the Indian cases unequivocally support recog-
nizing artefactual entities, such as intelligent machines, as legal persons, provided 
society has a need for doing so. 
Demonstrating how extant moral and legal paradigms can be adjusted to 
accommodate technological beings will require two additional moves—propos-
ing a new framework for determining personhoods and prescribing an ethic with 
room for recognizing robots. These remaining tasks consume the pages of the 
final chapter, which we turn to next. 
Notes 
1 See Ecuador Const., tit II, ch. 7. 
2 See Law 071 of the Rights of Mother Earth (2010) and Framework Law 300 of Mother 
Earth and Integral Development for Living Well (2012). 
3 The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund lists Stone’s 1972 article as the 
first of many “key moments in the development of the movement for the Rights of 
Nature” (CELDF, 2019). At the time of writing, the article has over 2,000 citations 
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4 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
5 Ibid., at 741–742. 
6 Ibid., at 743. 
7 For an in-depth discussion of the role played by CELDF in the writing and passage of 
the Tamaqua Borough ordinance, see Kauffman and Martin (2018, pp. 53–54). 
8 Admittedly, this three-pronged characterization of environmental ethics (anthropo-
centrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism) greatly oversimplifies the totality of philosophi-
cal positions present in the field. However, given the focus of this book and the
intent to communicate crucial elements of environmental ethics to those new to the
area, I chose to restrict the diversity of views to a more easily digestible and still not
inaccurate classification system. For those interested in understanding the range of
philosophical orientations flying under the banner of environmental ethics, see Fox
(1990, pp. 22–35). 
9 This derivation of intrinsic value differs from Taylor’s earlier argument, which held that 
if an entity was a living being, “the realization of its good is something intrinsically
valuable” (Taylor, 1981, p. 201; emphasis in original). 
10 Specifically, Taylor’s antagonist proposes a hypothetical situation in which shooting 
one’s neighbor would be viewed as morally equivalent to “swatting a fly or stepping 
on a wild flower” (Spitler, 1982, p. 260). Taylor addresses this objection at length in 
his rejoinder, arguing that under a biocentric outlook, it will always be wrong to kill 
wild animals and plants, and doing so would be “as much a wrong as killing or harm-
ing a human,” but this does not mean that there are no valid reasons for killing a fly or 
wildflower (Taylor, 1983, p. 242). On the contrary, any such action must be justified in 
terms of moral reasoning that exceeds the nature of the wrongful act. 
11 Wetlesen notably uses the term “inherent value” instead of Taylor’s “inherent worth,” 
and the preference is not a trivial one. The author notes how “intrinsic value” and 
“inherent value” are often used interchangeably, but he opts for the latter because it 
suggests that an entity’s moral status is determined by “properties … internal to the 
nature of the subject” (Wetlesen, 1999, p. 290). For Taylor, an entity’s moral status is 
a function of its possession of a good of its own, not its internal properties. This is an 
important distinction. 
12 Some have argued that the emphasis on achieving ecological stability or equilibrium is 
misguided because it creates the impression that ecosystems existing in certain states 
are more valuable than others. Instead, wildness is preferred as an element of an eco-
centric ethic because of its ambivalence towards the type of ecological restoration pur-
sued. See Hettinger and Throop (1999). 
13 Fox (1990, p. 177) maintains that Leopold’s land ethic and Naess’s ecocentric ethic 
are distinguished only in terms of scope, referring to the former as ecosystemic (i.e., 
limited to the local ecosystem) and the latter as ecospheric (i.e., pertaining to the whole 
ecosphere). 
14 But see James (2014), who counters that “[t]he good Buddhist treats nature well … not 
because she believes she is ‘one’ with the natural world, but because she has, through 
practice, come to develop certain virtues of character. She treats nature well, that is, 
because she is compassionate, gentle, humble, mindful, and so on, not just in relation 
to her fellow humans, but in her dealings with all things” (p. 112). 
15 Note that Naess’s phrase “intrinsic value” is synonymous with Taylor’s notion of 
“inherent worth” mentioned earlier. 
16 More specifically, Norton (1982) claims that there exists a disjuncture between the 
interests of individual organisms and the integrity of the ecosystem. Granting rights 
to members of an ever-increasing moral circle is merely a way of attempting to cap-
ture all victims of harm caused by environmental degradation. But a comprehensive 
environmental ethic can accomplish the same heavy lifting without resorting to rights. 
Therefore, extending rights to the whole of the environment is unnecessary at best 
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ter of rights which makes the attempt to generate an environmental ethic from rights 
unpromising—I would even say impossible” (Norton, 1982, p. 33). 
17 But see Emmenegger and Tschentscher (1994, pp. 577–578), who argue that holism is 
not synonymous with ecocentrism; and McShane (2014), who contends that individual-
ism and holism are variants of biocentrism. 
18 Biocentrists appear to have focused less on the question of rights than their ecocentric 
counterparts. Legal scholars have notably expended more effort in this endeavor that 
environmental philosophers. Curiously, one legal analyst suggests that the RoN repre-
sent a biocentric (not ecocentric) outlook. See Borràs (2016). 
19 Interestingly, antipathy towards the introduction of rights into environmental ethics 
have come from both biocentric and ecocentric quarters. Rolston III (1993), a bio-
centrist, makes a Hohfeldian critique of the RoN, observing the absence of legitimate 
claims and entitlements among beings in the wild. As such, the very idea of rights 
applied to nonhumans and natural entities is “comical” and “inappropriate” (Rolston 
III, 1993, p. 256). Duncan (1991), an ecocentrist, similarly takes issue with the RoN, 
but for different reasons. First, perhaps ironically, extending rights to the environment 
may have the effect of reifying the Cartesian separation between humans and nature. 
Second, Western legal systems, whose rights are based on a philosophical commit-
ment to individualism, cannot intellectually accommodate holistic approaches to legal 
protection. This is all to say that neither biocentrists nor ecocentrists support rights for 
nature with universal approbation. 
20 The irony of naming such a period of contemplation the Anthropocene is not lost
on Grear (2017), who asserts that the Western, human-centered focus of the term
“simply extends the logics of Eurocentric human exceptionalism and methodological
individualism—the self-same logics that gave rise to the Anthropocene crisis itself”
(p. 79). 
21 Some terminological differences can be observed across the literature on legal person-
hood. For instance, Kurki (2017) refers to legal persons as “artificial persons” (p. 74). 
22 Even this non-Western cosmological form of anthropomorphism maintains a kind 
of anthropocentrism. Critical environmental law, by contrast, promotes a posthuman 
ontology that seeks to de-center humans entirely (even those dressed as animals). I 
thank Anna Grear for bringing this to my attention. 
23 For a more in-depth discussion of matter in the context of New Materialism, see Coole 
(2010). 
24 It is not immediately clear why so many RoN cases and laws focus primarily on riv-
ers, although Cano-Pecharroman (2018) suggests two potential explanations: “The first 
ruling recognizing the rights of nature was regarding a river, and the existence of this 
previous jurisprudence could have provided foundations for other judges to rule in the 
same way. The nature of rivers as a distinct mass of water elapsing across terrain with 
a quasi-permanent shape and presence may make it easier to legally define a river as an 
‘object’ that can become a ‘subject’ with rights” (p. 6). 
25 Wheeler c. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja, Juicio No. 11121-
2011-0010 (2011) (‘Wheeler’), available at https://elaw.org/system/files/ec.wheeler
.loja_.pdf. 
26 Although the phrase “Pacha Mama” is often inaccurately translated to mean “Mother 
Nature” (Blaser, 2014, p. 51), it is more properly interpreted as a “philosophy of life” 
that involves “living in harmony with nature, co-existing with it, caring for it, and allow-
ing for its regeneration to provide for the upcoming generations” (Cano-Pecharroman, 
2018, p. 6). 
27 Translation author’s own with the assistance of Google Translate. 
28 Wheeler, at 3–4. 
29 Center for Social Justice Studies et al. v. Presidency of the Republic et al., Judgment 
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30 An acción de tutela (or “guardianship action”) is a legal mechanism provided under 
Article 86 of the Colombian Constitution that streamlines the process of bringing a 
claim involving the violation of fundamental rights by public authorities (¿Qué es la 
Acción de Tutela?, 2017). 
31 Atrato River Case, translated by the Dignity Rights Project, available at https://delawar
elaw.widener.edu/files/resources/riveratratodecisionenglishdrpdellaw.pdf. 
32 Ibid., at 26. 
33 Ibid., at 30. 
34 Ibid., at 31. 
35 Ibid., at 34. 
36 Ibid., at 35. 
37 Ibid., at 37. 
38 Ibid., at 39. 
39 Ibid., at 98. 
40 Mohd Salim v State of Uttarakhand & Others, WPPIL 126/2014, High Court of 
Uttarakhand (2017) (‘Ganges and Yamuna’), available at https://elaw.org/system/files/
attachments/publicresource/in_Salim__riverpersonhood_2017.pdf. 
41 Ibid., at 4. 
42 Ibid., at 11. 
43 Ibid., at 10. 
44 Ibid., at 7. 
45 Ibid., at 10. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., at 11. 
48 Lalit Miglani v State of Uttarakhand & Others, WPPIL 140/2015, High Court
of Uttarakhand (2017) (‘Glaciers’), available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc
/92201770/. 
49 Lalit Miglani v State of Uttarakhand & Others, WPPIL 140/2015, High Court of 
Uttarakhand (2016), available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/189912804/. 
50 Ibid., at 73. 
51 Glaciers, at 2. 
52 The citations to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence focused mainly on the principle of 
parens patriae, which involves situations where the state has a quasi-sovereign interest 
in representing individuals who cannot represent themselves for one reason or another. 
See Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 




57 Ibid., at 63. 
58 Ibid., at 61. 
59 Ibid., at 61, 62. 
60 As a coda to the Ganges and Yamuna case, the Uttarakhand government challenged the 
High Court’s ruling and the Indian Supreme Court overturned the decision, agreeing 
with the State that the declaration on the rights of the rivers was “legally unsustainable” 
(BBC, 2017). 
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5 Rights for robots in a 
posthuman ecology 
The swarm is, as it were, not oncoming as a distant phenomenon: we are already 
swarm. 
(Matilda Arvidsson, 2020, p. 134) 
The revised question posed at the outset of this study was, under what conditions 
might some robots be eligible for moral or legal rights? In this final chapter, I 
draw together insights from the preceding chapters in order to form a response to 
this more carefully sharpened line of inquiry. First, I revisit the conceptual map 
detailed in Chapter Two in order to assess the individual analytical utility of onto-
logical properties and relational mechanisms. Second, I explore how the theory 
and practice related to animal rights might contribute to the debate over robot 
rights. Third, I review how environmental ethics, environmental legal scholarship, 
and case law on the rights of nature (RoN) might inform the discussion on rights 
for intelligent machines. Fourth, in light of the aforementioned analyses, I present 
a multi-spectral framework that can be used to determine the conditions under 
which certain intelligent machines might be eligible for moral or legal rights. 
Fifth, I propose a praxis-oriented, critically inspired ethic capable of accommo-
dating both organic and inorganic nonhuman entities. Sixth, I work through two 
hypothetical examples in order to demonstrate how the aforementioned frame-
work and ethic might prove useful in assessing the appropriateness of extending 
rights to artificial intelligence (AI). Seventh, I suggest areas for further research. 
Navigating the conceptual map 
The purpose of introducing the conceptual map in Chapter Two was to clarify 
the relationships between various properties/mechanisms, personhoods, statuses, 
and incidents/positions. Here I interrogate this heuristic tool further, seeking to 
extract from it a defensible method for determining the personhood(s) for which 
an entity might be eligible. In order to accomplish this, I evaluate the individual 
candidacy of some of the most frequently discussed ontological properties and 
relational mechanisms. I begin at the top left of the map (i.e., those properties 
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those mechanisms tied to relational personhood).1 I argue that while relational 
mechanisms provide a stronger platform than ontological properties for making 
determinations about moral or legal status, both should be considered in tandem. 
Consciousness, as mentioned earlier, is a trait whose relevance to moral con-
cern is commonly debated among AI ethicists. Many argue that only those beings 
endowed with consciousness are eligible for psychological/moral personhood, 
moral status, and moral rights. A general interpretation of consciousness suggests 
that the term refers to “subjective states of sentience and awareness that we have 
during our waking life” (Searle, 2008, p. 356); that is, consciousness is a capacity 
for feeling and thought internal to a subject. Another perspective proposes that 
consciousness can be found not within the brains of agents themselves, but rather 
in all matter. This idea is known as “panpsychism” (Nagel, 1979; Goff, 2019). 
An alternate hypothesis suggests that consciousness exists as a causal interac-
tion between agents and their external world (Manzotti & Jeschke, 2016). Still 
another view adds that there are degrees of consciousness reflecting different 
levels of cognitive awareness, stages of development, and abilities among spe-
cies (Turner, 2019, pp. 152–153). As such, it might be more appropriate to talk 
about consciousness as a phenomenon that varies according to brain activity, age, 
and type of entity. Absent dispositive scientific evidence, each of these perspec-
tives might be equally plausible. However, our understanding of consciousness is 
limited by the problem of other minds, making it difficult to verify empirically. 
Consciousness might also be epiphenomenal to higher-order cognition, making 
the trait less morally significant than certain behaviors that suggest even nonhu-
man creatures are capable of mental states (Carruthers, 2005). While consider-
able evidence points to animals experiencing “at least simple conscious thoughts 
and feelings” (Griffin & Speck, 2004, p. 5), the question of AI consciousness 
remains far murkier (Torrance, 2008; Schneider, 2016). For instance, Takayuki 
Kanda remarked in an interview that “[c]onsciousness requires a full understand-
ing of the world. AI today is still struggling to identify objects.” Another inter-
viewee, Yoshikazu Kanamiya, added that “we don’t have an appropriate model 
of consciousness, and without a model it is difficult to talk about whether or not a 
robot can exhibit consciousness.” In short, consciousness is not a strong option for 
establishing personhood due to unresolved issues regarding how we operational-
ize it and confirm its presence in other entities. 
Intentionality is another quality regarded as important to personhood and moral 
status. However, there are numerous ways in which intentionality is defined and 
applied in the literature, making terminological consistency elusive. For instance, 
scholars have written about folk (Calverley, 2008), functional (Johnson, 2006), 
and philosophical (Searle, 1980) forms of intentionality, to name but a few of the 
variants. Even if we subscribe to the philosophical version (perhaps an appropri-
ate choice given the subject matter of this book), which refers to intentionality as 
“that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of 
affairs in the world” (Searle, 2008, p. 356), there may be levels of such a capac-
ity that make it necessary but not sufficient for personhood (Dennett, 1976, p. 
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of sophistication: a potted plant growing in the direction of sunlight streaming 
through a window; my dog Shiva leaping on top of her kennel to retrieve her 
favorite plush toy; a videogame opponent operated by the computer that seeks 
to defeat its human adversary; and a young woman studying hard for an exam 
because doing well might help her gain admission to graduate school. Deciphering 
intentionality requires observers to make inferences about the motivations under-
lying the actions of other agents. It is therefore at best an indirect, if intuitively 
appealing, attribute associated with personhood. 
Sentience is a property discussed at length in the literature, especially among 
those writing on animal rights. In general, it is thought to refer to “the capacity 
to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness” (Singer, 1974, p. 108). Unlike 
some other properties, sentience arguably suffers less from definitional ambigu-
ity.2 However, Gunkel (2012) contends that Singer, the main proponent of sen-
tience as a moral criterion in animal ethics, “conflates suffering and sentience” 
(p. 84). In fact, Singer’s sentience involves “phenomenal consciousness” (i.e., 
the capacity to feel pain, pleasure, etc.) but not the kind of self-consciousness 
associated with higher-level internal thought (Torrance, 2008, p. 500). In addi-
tion, scholars disagree about the extent to which sentience generates interests 
(and eventually rights). Singer contends that sentient beings have interests, which 
compel their moral consideration on equal grounds with humans. By contrast, 
Fox (1990) draws a comparison between plants and humans to demonstrate that 
maintaining life is an interest independent from one’s capacity for sentience. 
Therefore, “sentience cannot be considered synonymous with having interests 
per se. Rather, sentience simply introduces a new class of interests—mentally 
expressed interests—into the domain of moral considerability” (Fox, 1990, p. 
167). On a more practical note, Wise (2013) argues that sentience may prove 
unhelpful as a benchmark used in animal rights advocacy because “common law 
judges will accept autonomy, but not sentience, as a sufficient condition for legal 
personhood” (p. 1286). Complicating matters further, new scientific research on 
plants “suggests that sentience is a contingent and fluid concept; one that depends 
upon a constantly changing combination of scientific and cultural assumptions” 
(Pelizzon & Gagliano, 2015, p. 5). The increasing knowledge about sentience 
renders its usefulness as a standard for moral or legal consideration more dubious 
than ever, despite mounting evidence that animals indeed experience suffering 
(perhaps more so than enjoyment) (i.e., Groff & Ng, 2019). Thinking in terms 
of robots, sentience requires the capacity for consciousness, which might only 
come if machines achieve singularity. But Yueh-Hsuan Weng cautioned during 
an interview that this is “not likely to happen in the near future.” 
Autonomy is an ontological property associated with personhood and moral
agency. Its Greek roots, autos (self) and nomos (law), indicate that it refers to
the capacity to impose law on oneself (Schmidt & Kraemer, 2006, p. 74). A
Kantian view suggests that autonomy entails “obedience to the rational dic-
tates of the moral law” (Calverley, 2008, p. 532). In other words, an agent uses
reason to decide on a course of action in line with self-imposed moral laws,
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context of AI, autonomy may mean the possession of agency independent from
operators, programmers, or users who would otherwise dictate the actions of
a technological entity (Sullins, 2006, p. 30). The crucial distinction between
these two interpretations is that the former involves qualities possessed by an
agent herself and actions traceable to that agent, while the latter emphasizes the
degree of causal separation between an artificial agent and its human operator.3 
Calverley (2008) writes that if an action undertaken by an intelligent machine
is not traceable to its original human operator, it would be responsible for the
ensuing action and therefore deemed sufficiently autonomous to be considered
a legal person (p. 533). But the standard for autonomy might be considerably
lower among laypersons. As Ryutaro Murayama of robot start-up GROOVE X
noted during an interview, people may simply “think” that intelligent machines
operate autonomously based on their behavior. Continuing in the legal domain,
Wise (2013) finds autonomy to be the main trait underlying dignity, a foun-
dational aspect of human rights. However, the animal rights litigator argues
that autonomy, which requires consciousness, is also present in animals, albeit
to varying degrees. More directly, consciousness is necessary for autonomy,
which is the basis of dignity and therefore rights. The plurality of definitions
and interwoven concepts of similarly unsettled meaning make autonomy yet
another property that is relevant to both moral and legal inquiries, but difficult
to pin down conceptually. 
Intelligence is intuitively integral to personhood. Humans have long been des-
ignated the intelligent species, while animals were simply (if lovingly) deemed 
“God’s dumb creatures” (Neave, 1909, p. 563). Intelligence clearly figures promi-
nently in the context of technologies alleging to exhibit artificial forms of it. For 
instance, Turing’s (1950) famous imitation game was conceived as a theoretical 
way of determining whether or not machines could think. In working through 
his thought experiment, Turing argued that intelligent behavior might be possi-
ble through machine learning. Importantly, intelligence was viewed as a process 
that could be replicated. Searle (1980), on the other hand, proposed his Chinese 
Room argument as a way of refuting Turing. In this thought experiment, Searle 
countered that the outputs generated by instructions were not authentic markers 
of intelligence. For Searle, it is intentionality, not the mere replication of symbols, 
that demonstrates intelligence. 
However, as with many other ontological properties, intelligence lacks a clear 
definition. Even an “intuitive notion of intelligence may not pick out a single 
neatly defined cognitive capability” (Shevlin et al., 2019, p. 1). Perhaps tellingly, 
in the early days of intelligence studies, the construct was determined inductively 
through the structure and performance of psychometrics (Wagman, 1999, p. 1). 
Furthermore, intelligence is often understood to mean different things depend-
ing on whether one appeals to lay, expert, Western, or non-Western conceptions 
(Sternberg, 2000). These aggravating factors suggest that “[i]ntelligence, as a 
coherent concept amenable to formal analysis, measurement, and duplication, 
may simply be an illusion” (Kaplan, 2016, p. 7). This is particularly problematic 
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Dignity is the last of the ontological properties examined here, and the only one
deserving of an entirely separate category as it relates to personhood, status, and
rights. For reasons specified here, it might represent the hardest case for an attrib-
ute’s translation to nonhumans. Kateb (2011) explains that human dignity com-
prises two essential claims: “[a]ll individuals are equal; no other species is equal
to humanity” (p. 6). These ideas are reflected in foundational instruments of inter-
national human rights law. For instance, the very first provision of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) states unequivocally that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UN General Assembly, 1948,
art. 1). Metaphorically speaking, dignity is like “a special coin that is handed out
to each person at birth” denoting his/her unique stature in the world relative to that
of all other entities present (Daly, 2012, p. 14). This special quality reserved for
humans alone emerges from our “rational nature” (P. Lee & George, 2008, p. 173),
“practical autonomy” (Wise, 2002, p. 34), or “rational autonomy” (Tasioulas,
2019, p. 64). The possession or absence of dignity influences determinations of
moral status (Shelton, 2014, pp. 7–8) and dignity rights (Daly, 2012, p. 6). 
Animal rights theorists and practitioners have addressed the issue of dignity, 
albeit without the same fervor as they have other properties such as consciousness 
and sentience. Singer (1974) takes umbrage at the prized place dignity occupies in 
human ethical systems. He argues that dignity functions as a convenient, if ethi-
cally problematic, fast track to achieving an egalitarian society. After all, how else 
would one defend the conclusion that Adolf Hitler possesses more inherent worth 
than an elephant? As mentioned above, Wise (2013) finds that judges mainly view 
autonomy as the basis for dignity, so nonhuman creatures that exhibit autonomy 
should similarly be afforded dignity, which would qualify them for legal person-
hood and legal rights. 
Not surprisingly, scholars writing on AI ethics have been even quieter on the 
subject of dignity. For instance, a global survey of 84 AI ethics guidelines finds 
that “dignity” was included in only 13 documents, making it the second-least 
common principle mentioned, ahead of only “solidarity” (Jobin et al., 2019). Only 
when the rights of humans are implicated in the development of artificial agents 
does dignity seem to enter the discussion (i.e., Donahoe & Metzger, 2019; Risse, 
2019). For example, an analysis of robots applications in the healthcare domain 
suggests that human dignity should serve as the basis for governance over robot-
ics (Zardiashvili & Fosch-Villaronga, 2020). However, when the issue of the dig-
nity of intelligent machines themselves comes to the fore, scant mention of the 
property can be found. Notable exceptions include brief statements regarding the 
dignity of AI slaves (Solum, 1992, p. 1279), robots under the Japanese concept of 
Mottainai (Vallverdú, 2011, p. 181), and “hosts” (i.e., androids) in the HBO sci-
ence fiction series Westworld (DiPaolo, 2019, p. 5). Like other properties before 
it, “dignity does not have a concrete meaning or a consistent definition” (M. Y. K. 
Lee, 2010, p. 157). In addition, its underlying reasoning is circular and appears to 
only reinforce a human-centered view of the world. Therefore, of the properties 
entertained here, dignity is perhaps the least likely to curry favor among those 
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Societal need is the first of the relational mechanisms described in this sec-
tion. Societal need is relational in the sense that it involves jurists acknowledging 
and responding to the imperatives of the wider community. The premise of this 
approach to determining legal personhood and legal status is simple—we should 
alter our legal constructs if doing so would help advance societal objectives. 
American jurisprudence has a longstanding tradition of applying this reasoning 
to corporations and ships. To be sure, no one seriously considers either of these 
nonhuman entities real, natural persons. Neither of them can reciprocate duties 
like true moral agents can (Watson, 1979, p. 123). But these concerns are beside 
the point. Treating companies and seafaring vessels as artificial persons helps to 
shield humans from liability and resolve conflicts. Thus, legal personhood has 
been extended to these entities because of the practical benefits obtained by treat-
ing them as more than mere things. 
In Chapters Three and Four, I highlighted cases in which jurists performed 
nearly the same maneuver, although these disputes dealt with animals and nature. 
In Karnail Singh, an Indian High Court held that it was necessary to give rights 
to the entire animal kingdom in order to combat the scourge of environmental 
destruction. In Chucho, Judge Tolosa granted a writ of habeas corpus to release a 
bear from captivity as part of a larger effort to promote the survival of all species. 
Finally, in both Ganges and Yamuna and Glaciers, rivers were reconceived as 
legal persons as a means of safeguarding natural resources of great significance to 
the Hindu faith and community well-being. 
Despite the problem-solving appeal of this jurisprudential innovation, there 
are at least two problems with promoting societal need as the basis for legal con-
sideration. First, like environmental law in general (Boyd, 2003, p. 212; Kotzé & 
Kim, 2019, p. 5), experience has shown this strategy to be reactive, not proactive. 
Only after the lives of animals or the quality of the environment were threatened 
did we witness judges engage in the sort of conceptual broadening that expanded 
the realm of legal personhood. Until other countries follow suit, they are likely to 
suffer harms first and provide legal solutions later. Second, it is vulnerable to the 
criticism that this mechanism is both subjective and anti-democratic. Relying on 
unelected judges to act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 
893) who reshape legal constructs in the face of societal challenges may lead to 
instability in the way legal systems interpret important terms and invite charges 
that legal actors are usurping the will of the people, invoking the specter of a 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” (Friedman, 2002, p. 155). All told, societal need 
offers much in the way of ideational flexibility and social responsiveness, but 
perhaps at the risk of institutional stability and democratic legitimacy. 
Anthropomorphism is perhaps the most widely discussed mechanism by which 
humans relate to nonhuman entities. Despite being defined differently across dis-
ciplines, anthropomorphism is fairly well captured as “the tendency to attribute 
human characteristics to inanimate objects, animals and others with a view to 
helping us rationalise their actions” (Duffy, 2003, p. 180). In the context of moral 
and legal obligation, anthropomorphism leads to recognizing and privileging 
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it can be found in numerous cultures across space and time (Boyer, 1996). In 
fact, anthropomorphizing other creatures may have endowed humans with an 
evolutionary advantage by helping hunters predict the moves of their prey, aug-
menting our cognitive capacity in the process (Mithen, 1996). The evolutionary 
antecedents of anthropomorphism continue to echo in modern times. For instance, 
a study by Miralles et al. (2019) suggests that humans feel more empathy and 
compassion towards species biologically closer to our own. Recent work from 
cultural psychology adds that perhaps social robots “exploit and feed upon pro-
cesses and mechanisms that evolved for purposes that were originally completely 
alien to human–computer interactions” (Sætra, 2020). Today there is considerable 
debate over whether anthropomorphism is facilitated more by characteristics of 
the human perceiver or qualities of the object being perceived. Ample empirical 
research offers support for both of these arguments. 
One explanation for variations in anthropomorphism focuses on the differences 
observed among humans. That is, the degree to which humans anthropomorphize 
other entities depends on their individual idiosyncrasies. Epley et al. (2007) argue 
that three psychological factors can affect the likelihood that humans engage in 
anthropomorphism: knowledge about humans and oneself (elicited agent knowl-
edge), the desire to explain the behavior of other entities (effectance motivation), 
and the need for social interaction (sociability motivation). They find empirical 
support for effectance motivation and sociability motivation in experimental con-
ditions involving animals (Epley et al., 2008). The same group of researchers also 
demonstrate that some people are more likely than others to anthropomorphize 
nonhuman agents (Waytz et al., 2010). In particular, they show that individuals 
who score higher in anthropomorphism (as assessed by responses to a question-
naire) are more likely to treat other entities as moral agents worthy of care and 
concern, believe that nonhuman agents are capable of intentional action and being 
held responsible for their behavior, and engage in socially desirable behavior 
when in the presence of such entities. Another analyst goes as far as to say that 
the attribution of human-like qualities is wholly independent from the nature of 
the object, and that anthropomorphism is instead stimulated by “relatedness, the 
disposition to consider others as possible interlocutors in communicative interac-
tions” (Airenti, 2015, p. 123; emphasis omitted). When humans engage in rela-
tions with other agents on the basis that communication seems possible, empathy 
emerges. 
Another explanation seeking to resolve differences in the extent to which 
humans anthropomorphize nonhuman agents centers on the traits of objects them-
selves. This angle helps us understand why “[p]eople … anthropomorphize robots 
more than other technologies” (Young et al., 2011, p. 54). More specifically, 
anthropomorphism might vary according to an entity’s physical appearance, 
movement, or behavior. Fifty years ago, Mori (1970) introduced the “uncanny 
valley” (bukimi no tani) hypothesis, which proposes a non-linear relationship 
between human-like appearance and affinity. The more similar an entity seems 
to a human being, the more positive affect it is likely to generate, but only to a 
point. At a certain level of human likeness, affinity plummets into an abyss of 
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emotional repulsion. Affinity recovers and grows as human likeness escapes the 
valley, reaching its apex in the presence of an actual healthy human. In addition, 
Mori surmised that movement might dramatize the effect that appearance has on 
affinity. 
This phenomenon has been explored extensively in the literature on human– 
robot interaction (HRI). While studies (con)testing the uncanny valley hypoth-
esis are legion,5 a few examples from HRI research may suffice to illustrate the 
scope of findings on the relationship between a robot’s physical appearance and 
human affinity. One study concluded that human-like robots may be more likely 
than merely machine-like sophisticated robots to elicit changes in the non-verbal 
behavior of humans (Kanda et al., 2008). In a separate experiment, human sub-
jects displayed more empathy towards a physically embodied robot than a disem-
bodied one (Kwak et al., 2013). Researchers in another study determined that the 
morphology of a robot (i.e., whether it looks like a machine or a human) affected 
the likelihood that people assigned blame to the entity when it made a decision 
regarding a moral dilemma (Malle & Scheutz, 2016). There is also some evidence 
that movement might be even more important than appearance in fostering posi-
tive feelings about robots (Castro-González et al., 2016). 
In addition to physical appearance, a robot’s perceived behavior might also 
affect the likelihood that it garners affinity. Roboticists researching anthropomor-
phism have looked to the other side of the coin—dehumanization—in order to 
understand the conditions under which human similarity generates positive affect. 
On this subject, Haslam (2006) has identified two types of humanness—human 
uniqueness and human nature. Human uniqueness refers to qualities associated 
with civility, maturity, moral sensibility, rationality, and refinement. The absence 
of these traits may make an entity seem amoral, childlike, coarse, irrational, and 
uncivilized (i.e., animal-like behavior). Human nature, on the other hand, reflects 
agency, cognitive openness, depth, emotional responsiveness, and interpersonal 
warmth. Deficits in these areas are correlated with coldness, inertness, passivity, 
rigidity, and superficiality (i.e., machine-like behavior). Applying this typology, 
researchers have found that emotionality, not intelligence, makes robots seem 
more human-like (Złotowski et al., 2014), and that physical embodiment affects 
the perception of an entity’s human nature, but not human uniqueness (Złotowski 
et al., 2015). 
Other factors less well investigated than physical appearance, movement, and 
behavior are perceptions of mind and the context in which human–robot interac-
tions take place. Gray and Wegner (2012) experimentally test the extent to which 
reactions associated with the uncanny valley hypothesis relate more to the per-
ceived experience or agency of a robot and find support for the former. Fussell et 
al. (2008) consider the effects of repeated interactions with intelligent machines 
and observe that “as more people interact with robots, their abstract conceptions 
of them will become more anthropomorphic” (p. 145). Heeding the call to take 
context more seriously, Young et al. (2011) suggest analyzing HRI through the 
lens of “holistic interaction experience,” which includes “visceral factors of inter-
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Anthropomorphism offers a promising, but not bulletproof, mechanism for
assessing the extent to which robots might be worthy of moral or legal con-
cern. On the one hand, the tendency to assign human-like qualities to nonhu-
man agents is almost universally observed across cultures, is well researched,
and offers an empirical basis for consequential determinations of personhood,
status, and rights. On the other hand, there is a lot of conflicting evidence in the
scholarly literature, variable levels of anthropomorphism among humans detract
from the ability to make moral or legal determinations on a consistent basis,
and the anthropocentric nature of the phenomenon might result in the exclusion
or marginalization of less human-like entities. In sum, as a relational mecha-
nism, anthropomorphism seems better equipped than most ontological properties
to guide judgments about moral or legal consideration, but its case is far from
airtight. 
Kinship is the final relational mechanism evaluated here. Sahlins (2011) 
describes kinship as “‘mutuality of being’: people who are intrinsic to one anoth-
er’s existence” (p. 2). This concept involves a “compound and complex network 
of ties” (Malinowski, 1930, p. 29) that extends from the individual to the family 
to the clan and beyond. Fowler (2018) argues that both kinship—mutuality of 
being—and personhood—a state of being maintained through relationships—are 
useful for understanding social affiliations. In the context of moral or legal con-
cern, kinship helps to specify the scope of the moral universe, the relations humans 
have with nonhumans, and the rules governing interactions between them. While 
the precise contours of these areas vary across traditional and Indigenous cultures, 
important similarities can also be observed. 
Several different forms of kinship relations have been emphasized through-
out this book. The cosmology of Cree people accommodates both animate and 
inanimate beings in a “circle of kinship” (Lewis et al., 2018, p. 7). The Lakota 
worldview remains open to the possibility that nonhuman, non-living entities 
can possess properties such as consciousness by virtue of the spirits that reside 
within them and the raw materials used in their construction (Posthumus, 2017). 
Adherents of Shintoism believe that both objects and natural beings have spirits, 
and that gods, humans, and nature are bound together through kinship because 
they are all related (Vallverdú, 2011). The Māori of New Zealand see animals, 
land, and plants as “imbued with spirits” that “also inhabit the people and look 
after them,” resulting in reciprocal obligations among the community and the envi-
ronment to nurture each other (Magallanes, 2015, p. 280). Despite the apparent 
diversity of ontological and cosmological perspectives identified above, a couple 
of unifying themes seem to emerge. First, kinship relations between humans and 
nonhumans are common among Indigenous societies (Studley, 2019). Second, 
many Indigenous groups espouse an understanding of the relationship between 
humans and the environment that might be characterized as a “kincentric ecol-
ogy” (Salmón, 2000, p. 1327), in which humans are but one strand in a larger 
web of relations that fosters mutual responsibility among its constituent elements. 
Notably, these relationships need not exist in dyadic form exclusively among 
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that trees communicate with each other and have familial relations of their own 
(Wohlleben, 2016). 
As a criterion used to determine moral or legal obligation, kinship holds great 
potential. Although it may mean somewhat different things in different social 
contexts, common threads such as recognition of nonhuman entities (even AI) and 
ecological sensitivity provide some room for cross-cultural application. Further, 
kinship, more directly than any of the other properties or mechanisms reviewed 
in this section, abjures anthropocentrism, which has shown to be problematic for 
both ethical and environmental reasons. Finally, kinship deflates Western chauvin-
ism by acknowledging, celebrating, and elevating the worldviews of Indigenous 
and traditional peoples. These positive attributes do not render kinship immune to 
criticism, however. For one, the perspectives found among non-Western societies 
regarding social relations may present practical problems where legal systems are 
not coterminous with cultural geographies. More bluntly, how will we know what 
standard to use in a given jurisdiction? In addition, the diversity of views about 
kinship may lead to confusion and/or inconsistent outcomes. Lastly, those people 
(i.e., non-Indigenous persons) charged with representing or adjudicating the inter-
ests of nonhumans may default to anthropocentric behavior given that the respon-
sibility for making moral or legal judgments ultimately lies within the hands of 
human actors. In other words, implementing kinship might prove difficult for peo-
ple alienated from or unfamiliar with kincentric ecological cosmologies. 
This section explored the viability of a number of ontological properties and rela-
tional mechanisms for determining the moral or legal status of nonhuman entities.
By no means was this exercise intended to be exhaustive. Several more properties
and mechanisms have been mentioned throughout this book, including, inter alia, 
rationality, will, capacity to be a legal subject, animism, facing, and self-realization.
My goal in this part of the final chapter has been to assess the individual candidacy
of arguably the most common and controversial characteristics or ways of relating
to others in an attempt to locate suitable candidates for a uni-criterial approach
to moral or legal consideration. This attempt has proven unsuccessful, and that is
precisely the point. None of the properties or mechanisms alleged to inform person-
hood, status, or rights is independently sufficient for such purposes. All of the crite-
ria examined above feature strengths and weaknesses. In general, while properties
provide parsimony, relations revel in complexity. Yet, as I have shown, relations
are more inclusive of various entities than are properties. To reiterate a point made
in Chapter Two, properties and relations are inextricably linked; the latter are often
informed by the former. Therefore, it is an inescapable fact that both properties and
relations will necessarily invade analyses of moral and legal obligation. The next
two sections seek to build on the conclusions reached in this section by extracting
insights from the theory and practice on animal rights and the rights of nature. 
Animal rights: Revealing tensions, not solutions 
The literature on animal rights reveals four main tensions left unresolved in the 
quest to extend enhanced moral or legal protection to nonhuman entities. First, 
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at least some degree of anthropocentrism seems unavoidable, exposing animal 
rights to the criticism that humans will always enjoy a status superior to that of 
all other entities. Second, the importance of reciprocal duties remains unsettled, 
with attendant implications for the likelihood that moral patients like animals 
(or perhaps robots) might be deemed worthy of moral rights. Third, definitional, 
conceptual, and empirical issues associated with various ontological properties 
(i.e., consciousness and sentience) render their applicability to moral and legal 
analyses suspect, as evidenced by the argument from marginal cases. Fourth, and 
on a related note, moral and legal theorists alike have struggled to advance a logi-
cally defensible and inclusive program for identifying those animals eligible for 
personhood, status, and rights. These flaws might be overcome if any or all of the 
following were achieved: (1) scholars and jurists agree on the relative importance 
of certain properties; (2) there was a compelling societal need to extend rights to a 
specific animal or group of animals; and (3) Western philosophy and law became 
more open to adopting insights from non-Western worldviews. 
Case law on animal rights appears to offer more promise than animal rights 
theory. Litigation has been initiated by humans acting on behalf of animals on the 
basis of alleged harms to the animals themselves, not humans or their sensibili-
ties. Judges (mainly those in the developing world) have exhibited a willingness 
to consult a breathtaking array of foreign and domestic laws, scholarship, and 
cultural practices in their deliberations. Decisions finding that animals indeed pos-
sess rights have also relied on a mix of approaches as opposed to remaining con-
tent to adjudicate claims using a single analytical lens. Finally, animal rights cases 
suggest that how we choose to define terms integral to judicial decision-making 
where nonhuman entities are concerned (i.e., legal personhood, legal subject, and 
legal rights) greatly affects the kinds of outcomes obtained. 
In sum, while theory on animal rights is tangled and irresolute, the associated 
jurisprudence has proven flexible and innovative. The properties-based approach 
still tends to dominate discussions about the moral and legal status of nonhumans, 
although relational approaches have made modest inroads in academic circles and 
legal decisions. However, scholars and practitioners have yet to devise a coherent 
and consistent model capable of being deployed in different political and legal 
contexts. The lingering issues enumerated above will need to be tended to if ani-
mal rights are to take flight on a global scale and prove useful in the domain of 
intelligent machines. 
Rights of nature: Embracing vulnerability 
and contingency in the Anthropocene 
Scholarship relevant to the RoN provides fertile ground for cultivating moral and 
legal concern regarding natural and artefactual nonhuman entities. The environ-
mental ethic of ecocentrism, but more specifically its cognate progeny of deep 
ecology and transpersonal ecology, delivers an ontological orientation (i.e., 
holism) that is inclusive of a range of biotic and abiotic forms and resonates with 
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environmental law infuses the discussion with radical departures from con-
ventional Western thinking by replacing Cartesian dualisms with assemblages, 
de-centering humans from their presumed position of authority, eschewing axi-
ological and utilitarian logics in favor of recognizing a vulnerability common to 
all, decolonizing environmental law, and embracing the contingency and fluidity 
inherent to an open ecology. Writing on environmental law in the Anthropocene 
instructs that this geological epoch presents an opportunity for assessing the fail-
ures of anthropocentric Western institutions and considering bold alternate imagi-
naries that disrupt the path dependent tendencies hastening planetary destruction. 
New Materialism adds the insight that all matter—organic and inorganic—is 
endowed with agentic capacity, annulling the idea that humans are the only agents 
in the moral universe. 
Cases involving the RoN illustrate how holistic environmental ethics and radi-
cal reform programs might translate in different legal contexts. Causes of action 
regarding alleged harm to humans and nature have been adjudicated through the 
lens of ecocentrism, although the complaints have focused on redressing past or 
ongoing grievances instead of anticipating them. To reach their decisions, jurists 
have sought the counsel of numerous sources, including foreign and domestic 
law, Indigenous ideas, and religious beliefs. Critical environmental law has also 
crept into RoN jurisprudence, as evidenced by legal reasoning that de-centers 
humans, de-individualizes legal subjects, or expands the definition of a legal per-
son beyond its standard contours. Interestingly, the outcomes observed suggest 
that radical decisions invoking global norms might still be filtered through local 
contexts, as Latin American cases expanded the purview of legal concern to non-
human natural entities while Indian cases broadened the ontological horizon even 
further by recognizing the legal personhood of non-living artefactual entities. 
Scholarship on environmental ethics and environmental law obtained concrete 
(and occasionally explicit) expression in case law dealing with the RoN. In the 
course of this harmonizing, hitherto unrecognized nonhuman entities emerged 
as new legal subjects in an open ecology without the requisite agonizing over 
the extent to which they possess morally significant properties. As such, RoN 
jurisprudence has contemplated the legal status of nature using methods totally 
alien to the doctrinaire rubrics employed in animal rights literature and litigation. 
However, the reasoning that facilitated this ontological shift has shown itself to 
be reactive, eclectic, and context-specific, hardly a portable recipe for combatting 
environmental destruction in disparate corners of the Earth. It remains to be seen 
whether jurists are willing to apply a similar approach to questions with arguably 
less existential urgency, like the legal personhood of technological beings. 
Towards a multi-spectral framework 
for determining personhoods 
In order to assess the extent to which nonhuman entities might be at least theoreti-
cally eligible for moral or legal consideration, three questions must be addressed. 
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throughout this book, the latter is easier to resolve than the former. Moral con-
sideration has proven seriously constrained by the ambiguity surrounding the 
selection of morally relevant properties. Barring the arrival of paradigm-altering 
empirical revelations about consciousness, intelligence, sentience, and so on, the 
properties-based approach to moral status will remain mired in a vigorous, incon-
clusive debate among philosophers. A more productive way forward has been 
proposed by Levinasian scholars, namely Coeckelbergh, Crowe, and Gunkel, who 
have injected new life into this old discussion by reversing the Humean thesis 
to elevate the nature of encounters with alterity above properties alleged to pro-
vide a means of morally discriminating among entities. However, this relational 
approach tends to downplay the important role that properties play during these 
encounters. 
In terms of legal issues, Chapters Two and Four, along with the previous sec-
tion of the present chapter, demonstrate that legal personhood, legal status, and/or 
legal rights have been extended to plenty of nonhuman entities in both developed 
and developing countries for reasons related to expediency and societal need. 
Such legal persons have included bears, chimpanzees, corporations, idols, nature, 
rivers, ships, and even the entire animal kingdom. Conversely, nonhumans have 
been denied legal benefits where jurists have engaged in the rigid application of 
legal definitions, exhibited antipathy towards foreign legal ideas and non-Western 
worldviews, and tread upon the messy terrain of criteria relevant to moral obliga-
tion, an exercise that is unnecessary for matters regarding legal status. To be direct, 
there is nothing prohibiting nonhumans from obtaining legal recognition of one 
kind or another provided that doing so is considered necessary to advance societal 
goals or overcome societal problems. Thus far, judges have kept careful watch 
over the ontological boundaries of the legal realm, only occasionally expanding 
preconceived notions about who counts as a person in a given jurisdiction. 
Second, does the ability of an entity to reciprocate duties or be held responsible 
matter for the assignment of moral or legal rights? Moral rights have long been 
reserved exclusively for moral agents capable of fulfilling moral duties given their 
possession of certain ontological properties. However, there are some humans 
who fail to pass the test of moral agency (i.e., fetuses, infants, the mentally inca-
pacitated). In these marginal cases, the possession of moral rights is determined 
by their dignity and inherent worth as humans. This logic is incomplete and cir-
cular, rendering its conclusions doubtful. In addition, as detailed in this chapter 
and in Chapter Four, New Materialism makes a compelling argument that agency 
(along with some of its cognate properties) is “distributed across a vast range of 
beings and entities” and “decoupled from humanity” (Arias-Maldonado, 2019, p. 
53). An alternative and complementary concept that attempts to fix the flaws of 
moral agency is moral patiency. Unlike moral agents, moral patients do not suffer 
the burden of enacting duties. They are moral patients by virtue of the fact that 
things done to them can be considered right or wrong. For some, any bit of infor-
mation could qualify as a moral patient (i.e., Floridi, 1999). For others, only those 
entities who are owed a duty by a moral agent can be considered for this status 
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share of practical and epistemological problems (Gunkel, 2012, pp. 153–157). 
Still, the ongoing project of refining moral patiency sheds light on the limited 
analytical usefulness of relying on moral agency as the sole benchmark for the 
extension of moral rights. 
On the legal side, Western systems of law have long separated legal subjects 
worthy of rights from legal objects that amount to property. But the content of 
these categories has been reshuffled throughout history, perhaps most notably in 
the case of slavery. The fact that some humans were once regarded as property to 
whom no legal duties were owed exposes legal status as historically contingent 
and conceptually malleable. As the category of legal subjects has become more 
inclusive and humanity has sought to resolve more of its disputes in the court-
room, some jurisdictions have taken up the mantle of expanding notions of legal 
personhood and legal status, affording ever more entities the opportunity to obtain 
legal recognition. An example of this kind of progressive legal decision-making 
can be seen in the Glaciers case reviewed in Chapter Four, in which nature was 
granted legal rights on the basis of moral duties humans have towards future gen-
erations. Thus, the capacity to reciprocate legal duties is not a condition necessary 
for obtaining elevated legal status or legal rights. 
Third, what role do properties and/or relations play? As stated numerous 
times throughout this text, using ontological properties as the basis for psycho-
logical/moral personhood, moral status, and moral rights is fraught with compli-
cations. Importantly, substantial disagreement persists regarding the quality(ies) 
deemed necessary for moral personhood and how the presence of one or more 
of these traits in an entity can be empirically verified. Legal personhood has also 
succumbed to the allure of properties in two ways. First, the capacity to be a legal 
subject, possess rights, or fulfill duties is determined by the possession of cer-
tain properties. Second, even the concept of dignity derives its significance from 
autonomy, a property associated with moral personhood. Thus, where moral or 
legal obligations towards nonhuman entities are concerned, some combination of 
ontological properties is required. Relations, by contrast, are more complex and 
contingent, contributing to relational personhood, which may be seen as occur-
ring prior to judgments regarding an entity’s eligibility for psychological/moral or 
legal personhoods. Yet, even relational approaches do not fully extricate proper-
ties from assessments of moral or legal concern. This is because our encounters 
with alterity are colored by human tendencies—like anthropomorphism—which 
privilege certain forms and attributes above others. Although humans possess sub-
conscious preferences for specific features, these physical, cognitive, and emo-
tional qualities collectively assume neither the shape of a generalizable archetype 
nor the form of a near-perfect human facsimile, as evidenced by HRI research on 
the uncanny valley. All of this is to say that despite the problems identified with 
properties, the approach advocated here—an explicitly relational one—must nec-
essarily incorporate such perceived characteristics to some extent. 
So far we have determined that (1) deciphering an entity’s eligibility for rights 
depends on whether the inquiry is focused on either the moral or legal dimen-
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reciprocate duties is not required for either moral or legal consideration; and (3) 
a relational approach will have to account for properties as well. The next step 
towards designing a framework that helps determine the kind(s) of personhood for 
which an entity might be eligible requires two additional specifications. 
First, efforts to assess an entity’s candidacy for moral or legal concern must 
transition from being uni-criterial (i.e., Singer’s (1974) sentience) or multi-
criterial (i.e., Warren’s (1997) properties and relations) to multi-spectral (i.e., 
Fowler’s (2018) dimensions of personhood). Parsimony should give way to com-
plexity, allowing for variability in the importance and intensity of certain fac-
tors used in the assessment of personhood. Second, the philosophical approach 
undergirding both moral and legal concern should consist of an amalgamation of 
properties and relations clumsily but accurately described as “properties-as-they-
appear-to-us within a social-relational, social-ecological context” (Coeckelbergh, 
2010, p. 219). There are five important elements in this long-winded phrase— 
properties, us, relational, ecological, and social. Properties possess an undefined 
but undeniable currency that generates affective and behavioral responses among 
those entities present on a common surface. Us should be interpreted in a holis-
tic and non-anthropocentric manner, meaning something closer to “whomever 
or whatever.” Latour’s concepts of “actant” and “hybrid” offer some analytical 
clarity here. Actants refer to humans and nonhumans, categories of being that 
replace subjects and objects (Latour, 2004, p. 237). Hybrids consist of “associa-
tions of human actors and nonhuman actants” (Teubner, 2006, p. 511). In terms 
of the model proposed here, entities present during social encounters are either 
actants or members of a hybrid engaging in relations with other beings under a 
broader ecological context. As such, us could describe humans, bears, nature, 
idols, robots, or any combination thereof. Relational and ecological refer to the 
scope and content of the contexts in which encounters occur. The prefix social
entails how identities are co-constructed through mutual relations. 
The framework presented here builds off the conceptual map from Chapter 
Two in the form of a multi-spectral tool that draws together all four types of 
personhood and their requisite ontological properties or relational mechanisms, 
each of which may be more or less significant in a given context (see Figure 5.1). 
As indicated in the figure, there are six criterial categories that correspond to
the four kinds of personhood. Mentality includes consciousness, intentionality, and
sentience. Autonomy consists of intelligence, rationality, responsibility, and will.
Capacity refers to the ability to hold rights, burdens, and entitlements. Utility reflects
the practical reasons for extending legal personhood. Contextuality entails the extent
to which an assemblage is embedded in the social world and ecological system, and
the relationship between bodies in the assemblage. Finally, physicality involves the
material composition of the entities (i.e., partial determinants of zoo- or anthropo-
morphism) and their appearance-in-context to actants or hybrids.6 Importantly, there
are no minimum necessary conditions or thresholds beyond which an entity can be
said to possess one or another kind of personhood (as evidenced by the plus and
minus signs). Each category is ontologically flexible, epistemologically contingent,






























































Figure 5.1 Multi-spectral framework for determining personhoods. 
arrows connecting the personhoods reflect the directionality of influence between
them and solid lines reflect stronger associations than dotted ones. Each of the forms
of personhood are nested within social-relational and then social-ecological con-
texts, which interact with one another, as evidenced by the dashed line. Using this
framework, determinations of personhood(s) can be made using a method similar to
the one employed by the judges in Karnail Singh, which relied on properties, rela-
tions, laws, jurisprudence, societal need, and religious doctrine. 
Towards a critical environmental ethic 
The second move in the project of incorporating artefactual entities into moral or 
legal universes involves proposing an ethical outlook hospitable to their inclusion. 
In the space here, I will crudely sketch the contours of what might be called a 
critical environmental ethic conceived with this purpose in mind. 
First, the ontological orientation should shun individualism in favor of a radi-
cal, not merely biospherical, holism. Given the collapse of the human–nature 
Cartesian divide, it is no longer appropriate to talk of nature as separate from 
human society or entities as existing wholly separate from each other. As Vogel 
(2015) boldly asserts, “[t]he distinction between the natural and the artificial is 
ontologically meaningless” (p. 169). If there is no ontological difference between 
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previously considered cultural artefacts “discontinuous with nature” (Bryson, 
2018, p. 17), are now woven into a “plane of immanence” in which differences 
recede and the defunct categories of artificial, human, natural, and technological 
“fold into each other and constantly emerge as epistemological and ontological 
hybrids” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013, p. 857). What surfaces is a “sin-
gularity” that is a feature of Anthropocenic radical acentricity (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 133), not the “technological singularity” of AI lore 
(Winfield, 2014). 
Second, and on a related note, anthropocentrism should be rejected in favor of 
an ecocentric-anthropic ethical perspective. This ethical position, borrowed from 
deep ecology and Judge Tolosa’s decision in Chucho, adopts a “relational, total-
field image” (Naess, 1973, p. 95; emphasis omitted) that nevertheless recognizes 
the important obligation humans have to protect the whole environment and all 
its inhabitants, and their unique capacity to realize a more benevolent world.7 Of 
course, this perspective presents a paradox. That is, in the same breath it advo-
cates in favor of refocusing the ethical universe through ecocentrism while simul-
taneously reifying nature as a subject. However, a critical environmental ethic 
acknowledges rather than dismisses or retreats in the face of incongruences, con-
tradictions, complexities, and slippages inherent to the Anthropocene (De Lucia, 
2017, p. 116). 
Third, the kinds of subjects that fall within the ethical domain are all those that 
find themselves vulnerable in an “‘open ecology’ of social, biological and eco-
logical processes” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013, p. 854). These include 
assemblages of hitherto discrete beings that are in actuality inextricably bound 
together. A couple of concrete examples may suffice to illustrate this idea. In 
Chucho, Judge Tolosa gave legal effect to the term “nature–subject couplet” 
(emphasis omitted), which describes the union of a legal subject and the envi-
ronment in which it exists.8 In the context of modern warfare, Arvidsson (2020) 
describes AI swarming insect drones as indicative of the “posthuman condition of 
an ecology of human–animal–technology entanglement” (p. 135). In both exam-
ples, it does not make sense to extract individuals from these assemblages, as 
their existences are thoroughly and indissolubly fused. Furthermore, such group-
ings may expand or contract depending on the context, reflecting “an ontology of 
continuous connection between bodies” (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 
132). These “bodies melting into each other’s contours” constitute an “acentral 
and multi-agentic” continuum (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2017, p. 123). This 
critical awareness of instability, contingency, and vulnerability materializes as 
one of the chief insights afforded by the Anthropocene, or what Haraway (2016) 
refers to as the “Chthulucene,” which “is made up of ongoing multispecies stories 
and practices of becoming-with” (p. 55). 
Fourth, the Anthropocene (or Chthulucene) provides the moment of crisis and 
opportunity for revision that enables the elevation of new cosmologies and imag-
inaries, like those of traditional and Indigenous cultures. Under this new state 
of affairs, it is no longer permissible to exclude from the realm of possibility 
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systems are forced onto a plane of radical equality with non-Western perspectives 
that may introduce concepts unfamiliar to or even uncomfortably challenging 
their existing modes of operation. Examples of this critical approach in action can 
be seen to some extent in all four RoN cases discussed in Chapter Four, in which 
nonhuman entities were recognized as legal persons with legal rights. Paying trib-
ute to Indigenous cosmologies, this ethical perspective is as kincentric as it is 
ecocentric-anthropic. 
Fifth, the content of this ethical orientation demands a heightened awareness 
of and responsiveness to several concerns (Grear, 2015b, pp. 304–306). Such an 
ethic must first and foremost be ecological in terms of both its normative objec-
tive and epistemological sensibility. That is, it should seek to improve and protect 
the environment while remaining sensitive to the insights obtained through vari-
ous relations, behaviors, and knowledges. This means honoring the actual lived 
experiences and condition of all entities, assemblages, and systems. In addition, 
substantial emphasis should be placed on combatting inequality and injustice in 
all forms, which requires acknowledging the disproportionate violence dealt to 
marginalized human populations and nonhuman animals (and perhaps one day 
artificial agents, if it is not already the case) and “deliver[ing] … inclusion, com-
passion and resilience” (Grear, 2015a, p. 246). This ethic also recognizes the 
power associated with subject-positionality and its manifestation in uneven, par-
ticular, and variably experienced vulnerabilities. Finally, a critical environmental 
ethic pays special tribute to the intrinsic linkages between macro-level phenom-
ena and micro-level concerns. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963) once wrote, 
“[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (p. 2). 
Sixth, rights hold a contradictory status in a critical environmental ethic. On 
the one hand, rights represent the failed anthropocentric instrument of a predomi-
nantly Western legal order. On the other hand, the Anthropocene creates a fissure 
whereby alternative interpretations of rights are given the space to blossom. It is 
therefore perhaps best to think of rights under this ethical approach as delivering 
a range of options that vary in terms of their transformative potential. Arguably 
the most transformative (but also the least innovative) are constitutional environ-
mental rights (Collins, 2019, p. 13). Other avenues include rights from Indigenous 
law and ecological law. Indigenous legal systems have dealt with environmental 
concerns for far longer than industrialized countries have, and they are far more 
accommodating of nonhuman entities. Ecological law, which is based on ecocen-
trism, seeks to spread an ecological consciousness throughout all legal and politi-
cal institutions. A critical environmental ethic would remain open to any of these 
foundations for rights. Importantly, this openness could support the extension of 
rights to any entities or constituents of assemblages given the ethic’s rejection 
of dualisms and hierarchies that have justified longstanding ethical intolerance 
towards nonhumans. 
To briefly restate, a critical environmental ethic is holist and ecocentric-
anthropic; includes all vulnerable bodies present in an open ecology as assem-
blages; accommodates non-Western worldviews (especially the notion of 
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experiences, inequality, power, positionality, vulnerability, and multi-level inter-
connections; and is open to extending rights to nonhuman entities. 
Applying the multi-spectral framework 
and critical environmental ethic 
In order to evaluate the extent to which a nonhuman entity such as an intelligent 
machine might be eligible for rights using the framework and ethic proposed here, 
several questions must be asked (although not necessarily in the following order). 
First, what kind of personhood is under investigation—psychological/moral or 
legal? The answer to this question will guide the observer down pathways to dif-
ferent forms of personhood, status, and rights, as discussed earlier. Second, what 
are the properties of the entity in question as they appear to relevant actants or 
hybrids in the context of the social interaction and broader ecological context? 
Third, what is the relative importance of these properties in the specific relational 
and ecological contexts? Fourth, what is the nature of the relations among the 
actants and/or hybrids in terms of both the encounter and the environment? Fifth, 
what are the scopes of the social-relational and social-ecological contexts? Sixth, 
how do the aforementioned factors shape expectations about the kind of conduct 
permissible among the entities involved? To lend a critical bent to Leopold, a 
thing is right when it tends to deliver inclusion, compassion, and resilience to all 
present in an open ecology. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 
What might implementation of a multi-spectral, critical approach look like? 
To begin, we would have to choose whether to focus the analysis on the qualifi-
cation for psychological/moral or legal personhood, realizing that the path pur-
sued might wind up being epiphenomenal to relational personhood. The former 
would involve simultaneous consideration of both properties and relations. This 
entails demonstrating the degree to which the observer perceives the intelligent 
machine to possess some combination of attributes that support the act of identifi-
cation (i.e., cosmological, personal, or ontological). Crucially, the mix of qualities 
deemed relevant will vary to some extent from actant to actant, and some may 
feature more prominently than others in the course of identifying (with) a robot. 
For instance, some human partners may privilege verisimilitude with respect to 
consciousness, while for others, approximating intelligence is more important. In 
addition, understanding the temporal, spatial, and phenomenological dimensions 
of the encounter will flesh out the nature of the contexts in which the interaction 
occurs. This interactive process of interpretation, considered in tandem with an 
assessment of the relational and ecological contexts in which the encounter takes 
place, determines the likelihood that an actant qualifies for relational personhood, 
which in turn affects the robot’s candidacy for moral personhood. Significantly, 
in line with the relational approaches to robot ethics reviewed in Chapter One, the 
proper ethical orientation an actant should apply when encountering an intelligent 
machine is a function of their mutual relations. Appropriate behavior towards 
alterity is predicated not primarily on the properties they are perceived to have, 
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the moment in which AI reveals itself to its reciprocating actant. In other words, 
the qualities of the entity structure but do not wholly determine the ethical ori-
entation applied in the course of mutual engagement. Upon qualifying for moral 
personhood, further inquiry is made as to whether the robot might be considered 
either a moral agent or moral patient. If shown to possess some level of respon-
sibility or accountability for its actions separate from that of its programmers or 
users, the intelligent machine may be viewed as a moral agent. If judged other-
wise, the robot would likely hold the status of moral patient. The specific types of 
moral rights for which the AI is eligible would vary according to its moral status. 
If legal personhood was of interest instead, the analysis would proceed differ-
ently. The multi-spectral framework suggests that personhood in the legal domain 
is determined by two factors—capacity and utility. Capacity is often tied to prop-
erties such as autonomy, consciousness, and rationality. Utility entails practical 
reasons why society might benefit from extending legal personhood to an entity, 
such as assisting in the resolution of disputes involving nonhumans. Importantly, 
assessments of both capacity and utility cannot be divorced from the relational and 
ecological contexts in which they are conducted. Pertinent issues along these lines 
include the nature, duration, and intensity of relationships among entities and/or 
the extent to which they comprise an assemblage; the situatedness of the parties 
(i.e., their positionality) within the larger ecological scheme; and the degree of 
kinship that an observer feels with an actant. In the event that a robot is found to 
possess sufficient capacity and/or utility relative to its relational and ecological 
contexts, it may qualify for legal personhood. Since a critical environmental ethic 
does not distinguish between legal objects and legal subjects, the next step would 
focus on the specific kinds of legal rights to which the AI might be entitled. 
In terms of both moral and legal rights, the precise content of those entitle-
ments would be shaped by the normative commitments held by a critical envi-
ronmental ethic. That is, rights that serve to promote inclusion, compassion, and 
resilience, and eradicate injustice and inequality, would be extended to the appro-
priate actants and/or hybrids. 
Robot rights on the horizon? Two hypothetical examples 
In an effort to illustrate how the framework and ethic developed in this chapter 
might be used to determine the applicability of rights to intelligent machines, in 
this section I present two hypothetical examples drawn from robotic technology 
currently out in the world—zoomorphic robot companions and anthropomorphic 
sex robots. 
Zoomorphic robot companions (i.e., robot dogs and cats) have been created 
with the intention of providing comfort and entertainment to owners (especially 
the elderly) without requiring the work normally associated with caring for live 
animals (Sparrow, 2002). Empirical evidence suggests that humans express 
uncertainty about the ontological status of these robot companions. An analysis 
of three studies pertaining to human interactions with robot dogs shows that peo-
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that also embod[y] attributes of living animals, such as having mental states, 
being a social other, and having moral standing” (Melson et al., 2009, p. 546). 
This ambivalence has already produced some interesting real-world impacts. For 
instance, in 2019, YouTube’s algorithm began removing robot combat videos on 
the grounds that they ran afoul of community standards prohibiting depictions of 
animal cruelty (Cuthbertson, 2019). Although the robots featured in these videos 
did not look much like quadrupedal domesticated animals, the controversy high-
lighted concerns about how humans identify and treat nonhumans, even those of 
the zoomorphic mechanical kind. On a more anecdotal basis, roboticist Atsuo 
Takanishi recounted during an interview how his mother would often talk to Aibo 
(a robotic dog) as if it were a “human baby” or “pet animal.” 
Applying a uni-criterial approach to animal rights in the context of zoomorphic 
robot companions offers only a simplistic analysis that would likely end in a most 
obvious conclusion—robot pets are neither sentient nor subjects-of-a-life; there-
fore, they are eligible for neither moral nor legal personhood. Considering a single 
relational mechanism like anthropomorphism would also not do much to resolve 
a robot pet’s moral or legal status, as that tendency has proven highly variable 
among humans, and less is known about the translation of this phenomenon to 
intelligent zoomorphic machines. A multi-criterial approach (i.e., Warren, 1997) 
still leaves guesswork to be done as to the presence of certain morally significant 
characteristics, relies on a hierarchy that places properties above relations, neglects 
the role of moral patiency, defines artefacts narrowly, and reifies Cartesian bound-
aries cast into doubt by the Anthropocene. Therefore, as argued above, both uni-
criterial and multi-criterial approaches remain deeply unsatisfactory. 
A multi-spectral, critical approach provides a more complex method for con-
ducting this inquiry. Consider a scenario in which a robot dog serves as a com-
panion for an elderly person. Immediately upon purchasing her new robot dog, 
the owner gives it a name—“Fi-Do” (short for “Fidelity-to-Dog”). As the owner 
lives alone, Fi-Do provides an important source of daily interaction and com-
fort. Despite have lost much of her sight due to cataracts, the owner has man-
aged to retain an acute sense of hearing. As such, the elderly woman speaks to 
Fi-Do constantly throughout the day, and her spirits are lifted when her prized pet 
barks back in response or cozies up to her while she’s sitting on her couch. One 
day, while the owner is out buying groceries, a burglar breaks into her apartment, 
stealing valuable personal items, including Fi-Do’s expensive charging station. 
Without the charging station, the elderly woman is unable to recharge her com-
panion, rendering Fi-Do helplessly inert. 
Does Fi-Do have rights, and, if so, were they violated by the burglar? The robot 
dog’s eligibility for moral or legal personhood (and thus moral or legal rights) 
would be driven by the initial encounter with its owner, whose perception of and 
reaction to the mechanical pet would be informed by a combination of a priori
expectations and conditions inherent to the relationship as it unfolds (i.e., contex-
tuality). Naming the robot companion indicates personification, and the positive 
affect that the owner feels towards the intelligent machine demonstrates a kind of 
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whose sight isn’t what it used to be, may have a better sense of the robot dog’s 
simulated sentience than its intentionality (i.e., psychological properties), because 
she can hear the dog yelp when it “accidentally” runs into a wall. The human– 
robot dog relationship would also be colored by the broader social-ecological 
context. For instance, the robot companion might be considered a member of the 
owner’s household within a society that bestows special spiritual value upon dogs 
and technology, both for reasons related to non-Western religious beliefs. In addi-
tion, the robot dog’s unique positionality (i.e., a companion to a visually impaired 
elderly woman) and vulnerability (i.e., it needs to be charged in order to continue 
operating, making it dependent upon others) would be taken into account when 
seeking to understand the ethical implications of actions that pose an affront to the 
hybrid entity’s well-being (i.e., depriving the robot of its charging station). The 
robot dog’s moral personhood would then be assessed based on these initial con-
ditions, and its potential for obtaining legal personhood would be determined by 
analyzing the pet’s capacity and utility. If, for instance, designating Fi-Do a legal 
person for the purpose of filing a claim might have the practical effect of deterring 
would-be burglars from robbing elderly people of their ability to interact with 
their robot companions or inspiring people to treat both robotic and live animals 
more humanely, these factors could be incorporated into the equation. Finally, 
any specific moral or legal rights Fi-Do might possess in light of the aforemen-
tioned factors could be explicitly set forth by legislators or judges. 
Anthropomorphic (or humanoid) sex robots, at one time only the stuff of sci-
ence fiction or speculative fascination, have also recently become tangible fixtures 
of modern society. Broadly speaking, these intelligent machines are “[c]reated 
specifically to allow individuals to simulate erotic and romantic experiences with 
a seemingly alive and present human being” (Gersen, 2019, p. 1793). There are 
two main schools of thought regarding the ethical and legal implications of sex 
robots. One group of observers presents arguments in favor of the design, sale, and 
use of sex robots. Some, like Ron Arkin, director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory 
at Georgia Tech, suggest that they might be useful for research purposes (Hill, 
2014). Others have made the case that sex robots might help physically and men-
tally disabled people enjoy the right to sexual satisfaction (Nucci, 2017). Still 
others approaching the subject from queer studies propose that “sex robots may 
in fact enable new liberated forms of sexual pleasure beyond fixed normaliza-
tions” (Kubes, 2019, p. 1). Libertarians might contend that people should have 
the freedom to purchase any goods that the market will provide and government 
should not regulate provision of those goods (Danaher, 2019). Another group of 
scholars identifies major ethical or legal concerns regarding sex robots. These 
analysts raise a number of objections, including that sex robots may cause humans 
to ignore their “full humanity” (Richardson, 2016, p. 52), experience difficulty 
establishing meaningful relationships with other humans (Nyholm & Frank, 
2019), and engage in practices that increase their propensity to harm other people 
(Sparrow, 2017). 
A uni-criterial method of determining moral or legal obligations towards sex 
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consciousness, or intelligence. While a survey of present technological capabili-
ties might quickly dispense with the idea that any of these apply, it is at least 
conceivable that future iterations of sex robots might come close to approximat-
ing these qualities in human-like proportions. However, demonstration of any one 
of these properties might be insufficient to obtain moral or legal status due to the 
lingering issue of the argument from marginal cases. It strains credulity to think 
that humanity would settle on a particular trait that might not also be present (at 
least not to a high degree) in a flesh and blood human. Relying on a sole relational 
mechanism like societal need might also prove lackluster, as that might assist in 
determining legal, but not moral, status. A multi-criterial approach would afford 
the inquiry more room for acknowledging complexity, but it would also likely 
classify a sex robot as a kind of mere artefact deserving of less moral or legal 
status than other entities whose possession of certain properties grants them a 
position above that of other candidates. In addition, this type of approach would 
still maintain ontological separations that are no longer tenable in an era when the 
boundaries between humans, nature, and technology are blurrier than ever. 
A multi-spectral, critical approach would be better suited to handle the unique 
vulnerability and contingent status of sex robots. The strength of this argument 
can be illustrated through the presentation of a hypothetical example. Imagine 
a lonely but otherwise neurotypical human who purchases a sex robot (“Pat”) 
designed to provide its owner with a means of achieving sexual gratification. 
The human, who comes to feel love and affection for the mechanical mate, often 
brings the robot into public spaces to serve as a companion. Amorous activi-
ties between the two, however, occur exclusively in the confines of the owner’s 
private residence. One day, acting out of self-pity due to an inability to perform 
sexually the previous evening, the owner strikes Pat across its face while the two 
ride the subway together, much to the horror of nearby passengers, some of whom 
confuse the robot for a human person until authorities arrive on the scene. 
The likelihood that this intelligent machine might qualify for moral personhood 
would depend on several factors, including the extent to which both the owner and 
the onlookers perceive the robot to possess attributes associated with mentality 
and/or autonomy (i.e., consciousness or intelligence), the nature of the relational 
(i.e., character of human–hybrid interactions) and ecological (i.e., public transpor-
tation setting nested inside of the broader physical environment) contexts, and the 
material composition of the humanoid (i.e., silicone, steel, and thermoplastic elas-
tomers processed with oil). Determining the potential that Pat might be eligible 
for legal personhood would require additional inquiries into the robot’s capacity 
(i.e., evidence of properties intrinsic to psychological and moral personhoods) and 
utility (i.e., strengthening societal norms against domestic violence). Furthermore, 
the physicality of the sex robot might invoke Indigenous claims of kinship given 
the use of raw materials imbued with spirits that were used in the construction of 
the technological entity. As suggested here, both moral and legal personhood are 
fundamentally derived from relations between the robot and other actants present 
within its ontological orbit. Finally, the nature of the owner’s conduct would also 
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and positionality committed against a vulnerable nonhuman would be deemed 
unequivocally unjust and, therefore, unethical. The specific moral or legal rights 
that would apply to Pat in this situation could either be prescribed proactively 
through legislation or reactively through judicial decision-making. 
Both of these hypothetical examples were provided in order to demonstrate 
how the multi-spectral framework and critical environmental ethic might be used 
to respond to real-world situations where the rights of intelligent machines are at 
issue. To be sure, the application of these devices is not likely to follow a linear 
path; they are menus, not quadratic equations. However, I hope that the approach 
suggested here proves useful for pushing the conversation about the extent of our 
obligations towards nonhumans in general and robots in particular in productive 
directions. 
Looking forward 
While this chapter has sought to develop a method for assessing the conditions 
under which robots might be eligible for rights, more work remains to be done on 
this and related inquiries. In this last section, I identify three promising areas for 
further research. First, as AI becomes more sophisticated and robots are deployed 
in more social environments, research on ethical and legal conflicts between 
humans and intelligent machines should be pursued vigorously. Examples of top-
ics worthy of investigation include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in military 
operations, autonomous vehicles in commercial and public transportation, and 
medical telepresence robots. Second, the burgeoning scholarship on the ethics 
of environmental robots (i.e., van Wynsberghe & Donhauser, 2018; Donhauser, 
2019) should assess the role of AI in environmental protection. How might robots 
improve our ability to address environmental challenges, and what are the prac-
tical and ethical issues associated with employing intelligent machines in such 
varied contexts as disaster relief, environmental justice, sustainable development, 
and wildlife management? Third, additional effort should be expended to under-
stand how AI might be used to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. How 
might robots safeguard civilians, especially vulnerable groups such as women, 
children, disabled people, and the elderly, during conflict? To what extent might 
intelligent machines enhance the efficiency and sustainability of agricultural pro-
duction in order to combat food insecurity? How might artificial agents contribute 
to democratic governance, especially in terms of facilitating public participation 
in political decision-making and strengthening electoral processes? These topics 
represent but a few of the many fruitful avenues scholars would be wise to con-
sider examining in the near future. 
As a placard posted in Honda’s “Robots in Your Life” exhibit at Japan’s 
Miraikan (National Museum of Emerging Science and Innovation) declares, “[r] 
obots are already living alongside us … what will it take for human beings to live 
in harmony with robots?” (Miraikan, 2019). Indeed, their pervasiveness is only 
likely to increase as they continue to “invade” our homes, workplaces, medical 
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efficiency, security, health, and so on. However, “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
paradigms of robot design (Ishiguro, 2006, p. 321) have begun populating the 
world with a divergent mixture of minimally lifelike mechanoids and realistic-
looking zoomorphic and anthropomorphic intelligent machines. While the grow-
ing presence of all kinds of robots in human society has elicited much scholarly 
debate, the latter group has generated specific attention as far as morals and laws 
are concerned. 
Interestingly, the rise of the robots has occurred contemporaneously with a 
global movement to extend legal rights to nonhuman natural entities. This effort 
has resulted in rights being granted to animals and the environment, but in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, under different circumstances, and using different sources 
of evidence and reasoning. Perhaps due to the fairly recent acknowledgment of 
rights for living and non-living entities, there has thus far been little reciprocal 
engagement among scholars and practitioners focused on the moral or legal status 
of robots, animals, or nature. In writing this book, I have sought to bring these 
discussions into dialogue with one another towards the goal of finding a mutually 
intelligible answer to the question of rights for nonhumans. 
In my attempt to accomplish this interdisciplinary task, I have shown how
the provocative (or what some might deem heretical) issue of rights for robots
is less about robots and more about the process by which we determine who
(or what) deserves rights. This process has been thoroughly disrupted by the
Anthropocene, which has exposed the Cartesian divide between humans and
nature to be empirically inaccurate and philosophically outmoded. As such,
the cast of characters eligible to make claims against other entities needs to be
revised. Through the philosophical and legal analyses contained within these
pages, I have charted one (but by no means the only) course for allocating rights
in this new epoch. But above all, I hope that this extended intellectual exercise
inspires readers to think more holistically and critically about how all entities,
natural and artefactual, contribute to the collective project of worlding. Together
we can create a posthuman ecology that is more inclusive, compassionate, and
resilient for all. 
Notes 
1 Given the fact that ontological properties related to psychological and moral person-
hoods feed into the qualities linked with legal personhood and there is some fuzziness 
as to which properties are necessary for moral personhood, I will simply use the word 
personhood when referring to the next stage in the conceptual map (unless specified 
otherwise). 
2 But see Dennett (1996), who claims that “there is no established meaning to the word 
‘sentience’” (p. 66). 
3 Confusingly, Schmidt and Kraemer (2006) include both the Kantian and AI-inspired 
versions of autonomy in their criteria for a “strong notion of autonomy,” which consist 
of “abid[ing] by self-imposed moral laws that prove its independence from the original 
intentions of the creator” and “self-reflexivity,” or “the capability of distancing oneself 
from immediate impulses by means of a self-imposed second-order system of wishes, 
i.e. a kind of moral law” (p. 77). 
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4 However, as Darling (2016) points out, popular arguments for animal rights tend to 
be based not on the degree to which nonhuman creatures approximate the human 
form, but rather the extent to which we consider them capable of human-like cognition 
or feeling. For a broader discussion of the philosophy and law on animal rights, see 
Chapter Three. 
5 A search of the phrase “uncanny valley” on Google Scholar yielded over 11,000 aca-
demic works. While plenty of studies validate the uncanny valley hypothesis (i.e., 
Mathur & Reichling, 2016; Mathur et al., 2020), with recent scholarship even provid-
ing neurological confirmation of the effect (Pütten et al., 2019) and demonstrating its 
relevance in the context of zoomorphic robots (Löffler et al., 2020), some researchers 
have had mixed results when attempting to replicate previous efforts (i.e., Palomäki et 
al., 2018). 
6 Although the physicality of the entity has not been discussed in great detail, Fumihide 
Tanaka raised the point during an interview that the tactile sensation afforded by the 
texture of an artificial agent’s external layer goes a long way towards providing humans 
who interact with robots a “psychological sense of security.” 
7 The orientation advocated for here is not as all-encompassing as Floridi’s (1999) IE, 
which views all morally significant entities as forms of information in an infosphere (as 
opposed to deep ecology’s biosphere). I argue that adopting information as the primary 
unit of accounting in a moral universe results in a meta-ethic that is ontologically over-
inclusive, producing intuitively problematic conflicts of interest and overlooking the 
basis of meaningful relations that occur among cognizable entities of biotic or abiotic 
composition. 
8 AHC4806–2017 (‘Chucho’), Radicación no. l7001–22–13–000–2017–00468–02, 
available at http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/radicado-n-17001-22-13
-000-2017-00468-02.pdf. Translated by Javier Salcedo, available at https://www.non
humanrights.org/content/uploads/Translation-Chucho-Decision-Translation-Javier-S
alcedo.pdf, at 6. 
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